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 The primary purpose of this exploratory study was to determine if there is a best model 
available for public research universities to use when they are implementing or revising a 
mechanism to commercialize early-stage academic biotechnology inventions and discoveries.  
Unintended consequences, including conflicts of interest, faculty roles, and the mission of the 
public research university were also studied in order to determine if these issues could be 
managed or removed when academic biotechnology commercialization occurred. 
This study compared the best practices biotechnology commercialization model at the 
University of California San Diego (UCSD) with biotechnology commercialization mechanisms 
in place in three different public university settings: Georgia Research Alliance (University of 
Georgia), University of North Carolina Chapel Hill (MBA Entrepreneurial program and Carolina 
Challenge), and Pennington Biomedical Research Center - Louisiana State University System. 
The UCSD model included five key components declared essential for commercialization 
success including: 1) small size of the institution, 2) higher than normal research dollars for 
faculty, 3) extremely entrepreneurial community, 4) integrated life sciences curriculum, and 5) 
integrated commercialization track (funding, R&D expertise, springboard for new companies). 
The study found that not all five components which were deemed essential for success at 
UCSD were necessary in designing a successful model in the other three organizations.  Five 
new components also emerged as important to consider when creating a commercialization 
model, including: 1) highly-focused program, 2) critical mass of faculty who commercialize, 3) 
workforce development, 4) research cross-collaborations, and 5) faculty incentives for 
commercialization. 
  xiii 
  The study also found several options for managing or removing unintended 
consequences associated with commercializing early-stage technologies, including: 1) 
channeling of commercialization revenues to support academic programs, 2) developing 
university foundation programs for arms-length activities including equity in new companies, 
and 3) developing specific allowances for faculty engaged in start-up company activities. 
 The researcher recommended that further study be conducted for two of the original five 
components (higher than normal research dollars for faculty and integrated life sciences 
curriculum) because they were under-represented or did not exist in the models analyzed. 
 
 







A growing issue facing universities is the lack of research and development funding and 
expertise available for the successful commercialization of early-stage academic biotechnology 
inventions and discoveries (Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), 2006; 
Friedl, 2006; Pisano, 2006; Powers, 2006).  Without finding a viable commercialization solution, 
many university technologies may never have a chance to become drugs, medical devices, 
diagnostics or other important treatments or tools for the life sciences.  To address this issue, 
academic institutions have forged closer relationships with industry and have also entered the 
biotechnology business much more directly.  Some of academia’s commercialization activities 
have resulted in unintended consequences, such as conflicts of interest, concerns over faculty 
roles, and questions regarding the overall mission of the university. 
Despite these consequences, missing out on the opportunities to produce biotechnology 
successes could have significant negative consequences for universities and for the public good.  
More than $25 billion in revenue from U.S. university-based businesses and technology licenses 
has been infused into the academic community since the early 1980s, with $1.38 billion dollars 
in licensing income reported  during fiscal year 2004 and nearly one billion dollars calculated for 
the previous fiscal year, 2003 (AUTM, 2006).  As a result, many communities, regions, and 
states are increasing their economic development expectations in relation to academe, seeing 
universities as the key to successfully revitalizing and expanding their underperforming 
economies. 
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 To drive this economic engine, several large states are making significant investments in 
bioscience research and development.  For example, seven universities in North Carolina are 
partnering with Dole Foods owner, David H. Murdock, to build a $1.5 billion biotechnology 
research complex 30 miles northeast of Charlotte (Fischer, 2007).  
Recently, other states have begun to invest heavily in biotechnology development, with 
the goal of solidifying partnerships between higher education and business and industry.  A few 
years ago, the state of Washington created a $350 million program, the Life Sciences Discovery 
Fund.  A new proposal to spend $1 billion over the next ten years has been proposed by the 
Governor of Massachusetts, Deval Patrick (Fischer, 2007). 
California has committed $3 billion to regenerative medicine, while nearly $600 million 
for Scripps Research and more than $200 million for the Burnham Institute have been generated 
in Florida.  Pennsylvania has pledged $500 million for the Jonas Salk Legacy Fund, and $350 
million has been gathered for bioscience research in the state of Washington.  Not only are the 
larger states looking to create bioscience partnerships, but also smaller states such as Alabama 
and North and South Dakota have committed investments in these areas (Fischer, 2007; 
Schwartz, 2006). 
 Others, however, have urged caution, noting that building a biotech hub is a risky  
 venture and one that might not pay off for years, if ever.  As greater numbers of  
 civic leaders …look to higher-education institutions to create jobs and revitalize  
local economies, development experts worry that the expectation that university-
generated research will lead to an economic renaissance may be overly idealistic… 
(Fischer, 2007, p. A-1). 
 
These activities have resulted in an escalation in the formation of closer relationships 
between academia and communities.  Some argue that higher education institutions are more 
important to a community’s economic development than tax cuts or other incentives (Fischer, 
2006).  Such economic development projects can augment transformation in a local or regional 
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economy, but do not act as the core for economic transition.  Instead, they can become “a good 
way to diversify your region and your economy, but, by themselves, they are not going to replace 
your steel industry, or your textile industry,” reiterates Walter H. Plosila, Vice President at 
Battelle Memorial Institute (Fischer, 2007). 
Washburn (2005) discusses the danger of universities marketing themselves as engines of 
economic growth, which could create false expectations, especially in the so-called “catch-up” 
schools.  One of the concerns Washburn explores is that if these universities are unable to deliver 
on the promises they have made to their legislatures and communities, this failure could 
jeopardize their requests for future funding.  This opinion is shared by James J. Duderstadt, 
University of Michigan President Emeritus and University of Rochester President Joel Seligman, 
among others (Powers, 2006). 
In support of this point of view, many faculty and others are concerned that the 
expectations being placed on academia are out of proportion, especially in economically 
depressed regions, as argued by Sean Stafford of the University of Chicago, who believes that 
universities play an important role but cannot shoulder the entire responsibility for economic 
development (Fischer, 2006).  He and others warn there is a limit to the extent of the economic 
returns and promises any single academic institution can bring to its local community, region, 
and state (Washburn, 2005). 
Those who push this economic platform know that academic-based blockbuster 
biotechnology hits, which have grossed millions of dollars for universities, faculty, related 
institutions, academic teaching hospitals and other affiliated centers, are central to this success.  
Such noteworthy biotechnology license deals include more than $200 million to Florida State 
University from Bristol-Meyers Squibb for Taxol, $80 million to date to the University of 
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Florida for Gatorade (Powers, 2006),  $46 million to Memorial Sloan Kettering from Amgen for 
Neupogen, and  $16 million to Massachusetts General Hospital from Immunex for Embrel 
(Edwards, Murray & Yu, 2003). 
A 2002 survey by Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz and Burton reinforced that these 
blockbuster successes are not the rule for academic biotechnology commercialization. 
The distribution of licensing revenues is highly skewed with a few big commercial 
successes generating large returns for a small number of universities.  Well-known 
licenses, such as the Cohen Boyer gene splicing technique (University of California and 
Stanford), Gatorade (University of Florida), Cisplatin (Michigan State)…or Taxol 
(Florida State University) are the exceptions rather than the rule (p. 108). 
 
Nevertheless, such successes have prompted greater pressure to encourage academic 
institutions, including public universities, to form market-driven partnerships with business and 
industry (Angell, 2000; Edwards, Murray & Yu, 2003; Gordon, 2004; Spack, 2005; Vallance, 
2001) and encourage faculty to commit more time and effort to research leading to 
commercialization (Etzkowitz, Webster & Healey, 1998; Newman, Couturier & Scurry, 2004; 
and Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). 
Such admonitions, though, have done little to dampen the trend of looking to  research, 
and, in particular, to biotechnology, to jump-start regional economies.  Nationwide, state 
and local governments, universities, and private companies are spending millions of 
dollars to build new facilities and attract top-flight researchers (Fischer, 2007, p. A-1). 
 
This economic push, which gained momentum in the 1990s and continues today, has 
been defined by Slaughter and Leslie (1997) as academic capitalism.  The term, academic 
capitalism, relates specifically to higher education research  activities, realizing that academic 
institutions contain some of the most scarce and valuable human capital that “nations possess 
capital that is valuable because it is essential to the development of the high technology and 
technoscience necessary for competing successfully in the global economy” (Slaughter & Leslie, 
p.11).  The majority of this capital rests in the knowledge and information possessed by faculty 
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and other academic staff.  When this capital applies to work that “yields a benefit to the 
individual academic, to the public university they serve, to the corporations which with they 
work, and to the larger society” (p. 11) and moves toward or enters the marketplace, this 
becomes academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie). 
Even though the nation’s universities are the largest source of such academic capital, 
transforming this raw resource into successful market bioscience products and treatments, is a 
complex process with a low success rate.  For example, although impressive, some of the 
biotechnology commercialization revenue successes presented above may be misleading.  In the 
new annual report from the Association of Technology Managers (AUTM, 2006), the actual 
return on investment that universities received for their support of technology transfer in fiscal 
year 2004 was only 15 cents on the dollar.  Also decreasing was the number of institutions 
reporting annual royalties of more than $20 million.  In 2000, 14 institutions fell into this 
category, while only 11 did in 2001. 
Contrasting these data, the volume of technology transfer activity grew during that same 
reporting period.  The number of inventions rose from 10,802 in 2000 to 11,259 in 2001 and to 
16,871 in 2004.  Patent filings also increased by approximately 1,000 for fiscal year 2001 over 
fiscal year 2000 and have continued to increase each fiscal year since (AUTM, 2006; 
Blumenstyk, 2003b). 
Looking deeper, the story appears mixed.  “The relationship between the number of 
issued patents and the number of new licenses is largely coincidental; despite our fondest hopes, 
we are not able to license 97 percent (97%) of patents as soon as they issue” (Wheaton, 2006, 
p.1).  A recent survey reported that only 12 percent (12%) of university licensed technologies are 
ready for commercialization (Feldman, et al., 2002).  The report describes the small success rate 
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related to discoveries, citing that of all invention disclosures, only a small number resulted in 
interest from potential licensees, with an even smaller number generating any license income.  
“The rule of thumb in university technology transfer is that for every 100 invention disclosures, 
10 patents and 1 commercially successful product results” (p. 108).  “Despite the controversy, 
universities are forging ahead with their technology transfer activities in a quest for new sources 
of revenue and new-found legitimacy as important sources of innovation in a competitive global 
marketplace” (Powers, 2003, p. 26). 
Academic Biotechnology Commercialization 
The prognosis for biotechnology success is quite risky, which is of notable concern for 
research universities, because a sizeable share of academic inventions and discoveries are 
biomedical.  These technologies require extensive U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approvals which include expensive, long-range research and corresponding comprehensive data.  
Most FDA approvals take an average of 10 years and can cost upwards of $800 million to $1 
billion dollars to reach commercialization.  “Current estimates of development times for small-
molecule drugs are 10-15 years with an estimated average cost of $802 million per approved 
drug”  (Friedman, 2006, p. 36). As a result, the lag time for any royalty milestone payments 
going back to a university can be substantial (Feldman et al., 2002). 
The Milken Report on university biotechnology commercialization released in 
September, 2006, concludes that very few universities account for the majority of revenue 
associated with biotechnology-based economic development (Milken, 2006).  According to this 
study, related revenues and the location of successful commercialization programs in the U.S. are 
concentrated in very few geographic regions.  A Milken Report from 2004 reports that the San 
Diego area is ranked as the best geographic location for biotechnology startup company 
  7 
commercialization in the U.S., followed by Boston, and then Raleigh-Durham, but the number of 
highly developed geographic clusters is small (Milken, 2004; 2006). 
A Brookings Institution Report conducted by the Institute of Portland Metropolitan 
Studies (Portland State University, 2001) concluded similar findings.  In a survey of 51 of the 
largest U.S. metropolitan areas, the report concluded that only nine areas contained the capacity 
to generate and sustain significant biotechnology industry development. 
Harvard Business School Professor Gary Pisano (2006) goes even further, concluding 
that after being in existence for 30 years, the biotechnology industry has still not come of age.  
He describes the current status, noting that “despite the commercial success of companies such 
as Amgen and Genentech and the stunning growth in revenues for the industry as a whole, most 
biotechnology firms earn no profit” (p. 114).  In fact, Pisano points out that a very small 
percentage of entities generate positive cash flows and the overall industry has lost money.  In 
addition, he adds there is no evidence that small biotechnology companies are “significantly 
more productive at [research and development] R&D than the much maligned behemoths of the 
pharmaceutical industry” (p 115). 
Several experts argue that academia’s fascination with the technology industry and with 
the commercialization of its own inventions and discoveries is not based on extensive review of 
the process and the realistic probably of success, nor on comprehensive strategic planning in 
order to maximize opportunities (Pisano, 2006;  Powers, 2006).  Those who are skeptical declare 
that the shift from more traditional revenue sources to this new model, which focuses on 
commercial returns and economic impact, was implemented hastily, without enough time and 
effort given to assess how this relatively new, potentially strong revenue stream would actually 
play out over a broad range of academic institutions located across the country (Newman, 
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Couturier & Scurry, 2004).  This lack of vision, Pisano points out, has contributed to the 
lackluster overall performance of the biotechnology industry. 
As reinforcement for this argument, Washburn (2005) reports that the biotechnology 
commercialization problem may go back as far as the late 1970s.  At that time, data presented to 
the U.S. Congress in support of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was somewhat misleading.  The 
Bayh-Dole Act, a watershed piece of federal legislation which marked a significant change in the 
federal science and technology policy, became a catalyst for commercialization of academic-
based inventions and discoveries.  Proponents of the Act argued that federally-licensed patents, 
including those from academia, were sitting dormant and not being commercialized.  What was 
not disclosed in the data presented to Congress, according to Washburn, was the fact that the 
majority of the patents held by the federal government had been offered to industry but turned 
down because they were too early-stage and needed further developmental research funding 
which those in industry were unwilling to provide. 
Ironically, even after more than 25 years since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), 
this same problem of how to develop and fund early-stage inventions and discoveries remains a 
major issue for universities (Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006).  Yet, the fact that many 
academic technologies are too early, or even inappropriate, to commercialize is often 
overshadowed by the assumption that success for early-stage technologies is all but assured with 
just more time and money.  Even today in academia, approximately one technology in 100 brings 
in license revenue (Feldman, et al., 2002).  The return on investment for technology transfer is 15 
cents on the dollar (AUTM, 2006) and 12 percent of licensed technologies are ready for 
commercialization (Feldman, et al.). 
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The revelation that most university-generated technologies were not commercialized 
prior to Bayh-Dole because they were too early-stage or not appropriate to market, begs the 
question as posed by Washburn (2005), “what share of the university-based inventions generated 
since 1980 were  commercialized because of the institutions created under Bayh-Dole, and what 
share would have been commercialized anyway?” (p.143). 
The Valley of Death 
Powers (2006) and Pisano (2006) suggest that university leaders need to rethink the 
technology transfer model in order for these institutions to reach their true commercial potential.  
Powers notes “…the current technology transfer process has done a better job of raising 
universities’ financial hopes than it has of realizing them” (p. B-18).  One of the most important 
pieces too often absent from the current commercialization paradigm is a reliable mechanism for 
bridging the gap between early-stage academic biomedical inventions and discoveries and 
venture fund investment interest.  This funding gap exists today despite three decades of 
increasingly commercialization mechanisms (Friedl, 2006). 
As described below by Colonel Karl E. Friedl, Ph.D., (2006) of the U.S. Army Research 
Institute of Environmental Medicine, this growing issue has been referred to as the “valley of 
death” by himself and others. 
Between these two fundamentally different cultures of researchers and developers is the 
so-called “valley of death,” where discoveries fall into a technology purgatory instead of 
smoothly transforming into new building blocks accessible to the problem solvers.  This 
cultural divide is reinforced by the existing organizational structures that want to fund 
only the most innovative mechanistically based projects and investors who want 
reasonable feet-on-the-ground indicators of likely success (p. 413). 
 
Others are recognizing the importance of this growing problem, including the Association 
of University Technology Managers (AUTM), the professional organization for academic 
technology transfer managers, which has recently added a new category to its annual survey to 
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specifically address this commercialization issue (AUTM, 2006).  AUTM describes “gap” as 
“the discontinuity in funding between federal funding for research – which typically drops 
sharply as technologies approach commercialization – and commercialization, which can be very 
difficult to obtain in the very earliest, highest-risk stages of technology commercialization” (p. 
2). 
The survey results indicate that inventors and technology transfer officers have found it 
necessary to turn to alternative funding sources at this early state, such as friends and family.  
Individuals provided approximately half of the earliest stage funding for university start-up 
companies, according the 2004 fiscal year AUTM survey (AUTM, 2006). 
As noted above, this problem with commercializing early-stage academic inventions is 
not a new one, but was present before the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act.  The difference is that, 
initially, this early-stage funding problem was not discussed but kept quiet during the 
Congressional hearings in the late 1970s regarding the Bayh-Dole Act.  This silence has, in some 
ways, mistakenly led some to assume that the early-stage commercialization problem is a very 
recent one (Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Washburn, 2005). 
Commercializing biotechnologies which may not be ready or appropriate for further 
development can result in efforts that lead to increases in the rates of 1) start-up companies, 2) 
inventor involvement in technology development, and 3) equity ownership by the academic 
institution.  Such expansion of technology development activities might be based on the need to 
commercialize at all costs and might not revolve around sound business practices (Fischer, 2007; 
Powers, 2006; Rubin, 2005). 
The gap between academic technology transfer offices and the venture community is 
especially large, as noted by Eric Nicolaides, a Chicago-based venture management form partner 
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(Technology Transfer Tactics, 2007).  He points out that if a new start-up company is formed 
around an academic inventor, but not much more, then that is not really forming a new company 
in the sense of economic development. 
Conversely, recognizing that a significant number of academic biotechnologies are and 
will continue to be very early-stage, the solution is not always as simplistic as deciding “go” or 
“no go,” but actually involves a more sophisticated assessment mechanism.  Not all technologies 
which find themselves in the valley of death should be commercialized, but, not all of them 
should be abandoned.  Universities must choose which technologies are non-rival goods as 
described by Washburn (2005) and disseminate them into the public domain while promoting the 
remaining promising technologies through additional research and development.  “The best way 
to guarantee that a technology will reach commercialization is to take an active role in bringing 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and scientists together at the time a license is granted and a 
strategy is formed for a new product”  (Pounds, 2007). 
Yet, there may be other incentives working in tandem with those related to developing 
promising technologies.  Economist Jerry Thursby conducted a large survey of university 
technology transfer officers in which he reported that revenue was considered their highest 
priority, even if it challenged the need for effective commercialization (Washburn, 2005).  Such 
incentives may cloud the decision-making process and may influence how much time and 
attention is paid to commercializing the technologies, whether or not they deserve to be 
developed. 
Presently, viable options for such gap-filling commercialization measures are scarce at 
universities, with the few available opportunities often plagued by conflicts of interest and 
replete with unintended consequences.  As a result, many promising yet nascent biomedical 
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technologies sit undeveloped because current investment strategies are not structured to include 
such early-stage, high-risk research in their portfolios (Spack, 2005).  Using current practices, 
such as creating university-based start-up companies to commercialize these early-stage 
technologies often results in conflicts of interest, concern over faculty roles, issues related to 
whether such technologies are viable for commercialization, and other unintended consequences 
(Powers, 2006; Technology Transfer Tactics, 2007). 
According to a study on university-based start-up companies, the market returns and 
success rates for academically-generated technologies is not attractive to investors (Chukumba & 
Jensen, 2005).  In studying why industry is reluctant to fund university-based start-up companies, 
the authors discussed that, according to those in industry, academic inventions and discoveries 
are often considered extremely embryonic.  “If an established firm is unwilling to take a license, 
then it is very difficult to find the funding for a start-up because even the venture capitalists who 
specialize in start-ups come to university inventions only as a last resort” (p. 4). 
Contributing to this problem has been a change in the climate surrounding biotechnology 
investment options.  In recent years, the value in early-stage biotechnology stock has fallen 
dramatically.  The University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) reported that the university 
had a record-breaking 125 deals with biotechnology investors in 2000 but that number dropped 
sharply to 70 the next year (2001) and only 39 in the first ten months of 2002 (Knight, 2002).  
One reason for this change can be attributed to the fact that investors are now more interested in 
technologies that will get to market quicker and turn a profit in less time than university 
inventions typically can. 
The AUTM survey editors also report that start-up companies created by these biotech 
investors have dropped off dramatically (AUTM, 2006).  Although angel investing has begun to 
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rebound since the dot com downturn of 2002, current biotechnology angel investors have 
become more like early-stage investors, moving their funds toward later-stage technologies, 
according to Jeffrey Sohl, Director of the Center for Venture Research at the University of New 
Hampshire (AUTM). 
Ashley Stevens, who was a co-editor of the 2002 AUTM survey and Director of 
Technology Transfer at Boston University that same year, explains. 
Over the past few years, investors have been more interested in starting up companies 
based around products in late-stage development…Universities don’t have nearly as 
many phase 2 compounds in their licensing baskets…and my guess would be that many 
of the recent university startups are stuck at seed stage, hoping for venture [capital 
investment] (Bouchie, 2005, p. 843). 
 
This downturn, which began in 2000, led to a buyer’s market for early-stage 
biotechnologies, many of which had their origins in university-based inventions.  The result was 
that venture funds began investing in later-stage technologies at lower, early-stage prices.  This 
reduced even further the value of early-stage technologies and pushed investors to increasingly 
show interest in late-stage technologies that are already in the clinic or have a short time frame 
before submission to the FDA for drug or device approval (Kling, 2005). 
Some companies which are focused on funding biotechnologies explain how they are 
now structuring their early-stage investments, while acknowledging that the research they are 
looking for lies within universities.  In targeting very early-stage academic-based technologies, 
these companies only expect to pay bargain prices for such university-based inventions.  They 
have discovered a new bargain price niche along with secured rights to academic discoveries.   
One investor described that this new strategy was developed after his company had 
miscalculated the time and investments they would need to provide for a technology that took 
longer to develop than anticipated.  Because the company had originally paid a large sum for the 
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rights to the technology, they later opted not to put another $16 million into developing it further 
but chose to shut down its overall technology development instead (Forman, 2006). 
Looking abroad for successful academic commercialization models to emulate has been 
difficult as well.  It appears that this commercialization gap problem is not confined to the 
United States.  A recent study in the United Kingdom (UK) found that biotechnology venture 
capitalists are not attracted to invest in university-based spinout or startup companies based on 
academic inventions.  This increased risk-aversion by traditional biotechnology investors has 
resulted in the need for UK academic technology transfer offices to look for other sources of 
early-stage funding and other support (Dorey, 2004).   As a result, in parts of Europe as well as 
in the United States, it is becoming more apparent that creating new, early-stage technology 
development strategies are paramount in order to secure maximum long-range returns from 
academic intellectual capital (Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006). 
But will these strategies work?  Even proponents of the new economy, such as University 
of North Carolina System’s Leslie Boney, recognize the transformation into the knowledge 
economy will contain some difficult moments.  “On some level, there is a disconnect between 
the old economy and the new economy,” he says, “and in the short term, that could be painful for 
people in the community” (Fischer, 2007, p. A-1). 
The presumptions that there would be a high success rate for academic inventions and 
discoveries after implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act and related legislation did not take into 
account that prior to the passage of Bayh-Dole, the majority of university-generated inventions 
and discoveries were too early or inappropriate to commercialize (Washburn, 2005).  How 
accurate is the assumption now that the funding gap is a recent phenomenon, which needs 
solutions based solely on recent events?  
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Also missing from the present equation for closing this funding gap is the 
acknowledgement that some biomedical research inventions and discoveries have been and 
remain non-rival goods, which should become part of the public domain, with the ability to be 
used and shared simultaneously by many researchers (Washburn, 2005).   As discussed earlier by 
Nicolaides, not all university-based technologies are appropriate for the marketplace 
(Technology Transfer Tactics, 2007). 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has voiced this same opinion and has increased 
its demand that research tools and other appropriate biomedical technologies that have been 
invented or discovered using NIH research funds should be shared by academic researchers, even 
if there is the ability to commercialize the technologies.  NIH provides a mechanism for 
protecting the technologies for commercialization while ensuring that the tools or biomaterials 
are also shared (NIH, 2007). 
One recent option for addressing this overall academic commercialization problem 
involves universities creating their own start-up companies, as pointed out in the 2005 study by 
Chukumba and Jensen.  Even so, using this new commercialization strategy has not always 
provided a viable solution, the authors point out, “as is well-known by now, university 
inventions are typically embryonic.  Their commercial potential is uncertain and the likelihood of 
their success is very small” (p.6). 
Statement of the Problem 
The lack of research and development funding and expertise available for the successful 
commercialization of early-stage academic biotechnology inventions and discoveries leaves 
many potential drugs, treatments, diagnostics, and other life science solutions undeveloped  
(AUTM, 2006; Friedl, 2006; Pisano, 2006; Powers, 2006).   To address this issue, academic 
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institutions have entered into and increased their commercialization activities, including the 
formation of start-up companies, resulting in unintended consequences, such as conflicts of 
interest, concerns over faculty roles, and questions regarding the overall mission of the 
university.  Despite these consequences, missing out on opportunities to produce biotechnology 
successes could have significant negative consequences for universities and for the public good.   
Many academic research institutions have encouraged faculty and other employees to 
commercialize their inventions and discoveries, and have set up offices of technology transfer to 
oversee these activities, but these initiatives alone are not enough to ensure success for transfer 
of university-based technologies into the marketplace (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).   A very low 
percentage of academic inventions and discoveries ever become successfully commercialized 
(AUTM, 2006; Chukumba & Jensen, 2005; Milken, 2004; Pisano, 2006; Powers, 2006).   
One way to increase the rate of success associated with academic biotechnology transfer 
is to provide a new, broadly-applied mechanism to provide a more comprehensive way to bridge 
the gap between early-stage inventions and venture capital funds.  At the same time, such 
mechanisms should ensure the university’s mission and address the concerns raised, such as 
unintended consequences, concerns over faculty roles, and questions regarding the overall 
mission of the university. 
This was an exploratory study focused on analyzing the following:  1) the mechanisms 
for commercializing early-stage academic inventions and discoveries with success defined as the 
formation of a new company or the license to an existing entity, and 2) the resulting unintended 
consequences and the processes implemented to minimize or remove these unintended 
consequences resulting from such commercialization activities.  Both issues were analyzed 
around creation of a viable start-up company as the measure of success regarding early-stage 
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academic technologies.  The goal of the study was to present possible mechanisms, models, and 
best practices that other public universities could use to successfully commercialize their early-
stage biotechnologies while preserving the overall mission of the university and minimizing or 
eliminating related unintended consequences. 
Initially, this study was planned to analyze two different university-based mechanisms to 
develop early-stage, academic biomedical inventions and discoveries with the goal being the 
formation of a start-up company or licensing to an existing company.  One model, that of the 
Louisiana State University System Pennington Biomedical Research Center (PBRC), is based on 
the creation and implementation of an early-stage research and development investment 
platform, while the second at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is focused around a 
specialized entrepreneurial curriculum program in the graduate school MBA program. 
The PBRC model is a comprehensive program still being developed, involving several 
key players in the university, including faculty and administrators.  This program also includes 
other academic components, a research foundation, and an early-stage investment fund, among 
others.  The goals of the program include commercialization of early-stage inventions and 
discoveries through the formation of start-up companies and the elimination or management of 
related conflicts of interest and other unintended consequences, while preserving the mission of 
PBRC and the Louisiana State University System. 
The UNC MBA biotechnology entrepreneurship model is a program that reinforces the 
core missions of education and training and also increases the chance of commercialization 
success for academic biotechnologies with the goal of starting new companies around 
technologies.  This recently created curriculum-based mechanism at the University of North 
Carolina has been established to commercialize early-stage academic biotechnology inventions 
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and discoveries and promote technology transfer success (Kouri, 2006).  This model also helps to 
grow the number of local biotechnology industry experts in finance, management, and regulatory 
areas.  Graduate students, inventors, and industry experts develop business plans and create start-
up companies.  Even with such a history of biotechnology success in the Research Triangle, the 
funding gap also exists and is growing in North Carolina. 
During the initial phase of studying the PBRC model, an opportunity arose to include the 
Georgia Research Alliance (GRA) program as a third bioscience commercialization model to 
analyze.  Due to the ongoing success of the GRA program, access to key informants participating 
in the GRA program, and the focus on the GRA model by the State of Louisiana Board of 
Regents, the model was added to this study. 
As a first step, the three models were reviewed individually and then compared to each 
other.  The second step of the analysis continued when the three mechanisms were compared to 
the University of California at San Diego (UCSD) model.  The Milken Report (2004; 2006) 
ranks the San Diego region and UCSD first in biotechnology start-up company formation and 
continued operations, which the report considered essential in early-stage commercialization 
success.  The UCSD model includes the following five key components for success.  This study 
looked at the presence or absence in the GRA, UNC, and PBRC models of each of the five key 
research commercialization components listed below: 
1) Organizational efficiency based on a flat hierarchy and the relative small size 
of the institution, 
2) A high ratio of research dollars to faculty, 
3) A highly entrepreneurial culture and community, 
4) An integrated academic life sciences curriculum program, and 
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5) A specialized biotechnology commercialization program which includes: 
a. Funding for new technology development 
b. Research and development expertise, and 
c. A springboard for new company development 
(Holmes, 2006; Milken, 2004; 2006). 
This study also addressed the following questions: 
1) What is the individual process by which: 
a. the GRA model works? 
b. the PBRC model works? 
c. the UNC model works? 
2) How do the five key components play out in each setting (GRA, UNC, and 
PBRC) in terms of organization, implementation, and in relation to 
commercialization? 
3) What are the similarities and differences among the three models and how do they 
compare to the UCSD model? 
4) Are there additional key components considered essential for commercialization 
success? 
5) How do the three models address the issues related to unintended consequences 
such as conflicts of interest, faculty roles, and the overall mission of the 
university? and 
6) Which findings can be applied to other public research universities? 
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Academic Locations for Start-Up Companies 
According to experts (Holmes, 2006; Milken, 2004; 2006; Pisano, 2006), the success of 
biotechnology start up companies is very dependent on geographic culture, the availability of 
start up funds, and qualified, seasoned management (Blumenstyk, 2006).  A large number of 
research universities are often situated in economically depressed or risk-averse geographic areas 
which are away from major population centers containing potential employees who possess the 
necessary highly-specialized skills.  Therefore, it seems even more important for universities 
located in less populated areas which are economically depressed or less entrepreneurial, to focus 
an even greater effort on what can be done to help ensure commercialization success for their 
biotechnologies since the odds do not appear to be in their favor. 
Since the issues of geographic region, a revamped biotechnology commercialization 
model, and management of conflicts of interest are of central focus, this study addressed these 
key issues.  The 2006 Milken Report concludes that university intellectual property “…is 
absorbed more readily in regions with an existing technology industry base.  A high 
concentration, or clustering, of technology firms in a region assists in creating an environment of 
linkages and opportunities for university commercialization efforts” (Milken, 2006, p. 55).  This 
study looked at which of these elements might be crucial to commercial success in other regions 
or locations in the U.S and whether successful models elsewhere could be developed which only 
contain a subset of all of the key elements. 
Wu (2005) points out that the overall success for industry clusters is enhanced by the 
concept of collective efficiency, where proximity provides benefits for many players in the 
geographic area.  The author further explains “as creative industries concentrate in a city, new 
business formation also becomes more likely through startups and spin-offs.  Barriers to entry 
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are lower than elsewhere as needed assets, financial support, skills, inputs and employees are 
often available locally” (p. 3).  But Pisano (2006) indicates that such initiatives based on focused 
strategic planning have not taken place at the majority of academic institutions. 
By contrast, success has been notable in the geographic locations where decades of 
planning and implementation as well as great emphasis on education and training have occurred 
to support the development of the local biotechnology industry.  Wu (2005) describes the role of 
universities in the overall success of biotechnology clusters. 
A scan of nearly all of the clusters, particularly biotech R&D, points to the critical role 
played by local universities and research institutions in bridging technology and 
industries.  Most creative communities seem to spring up near universities where learning 
and industrial activity are woven into the local culture.  Universities can become 
incubators for startup firms, as places where knowledge is patented, where specialized 
research is housed, and where scientists and industry work together on product 
commercialization (p. 8). 
 
According to the February, 2007, Louisiana Board of Regents and Louisiana Recovery 
Authority report issued by Regional Technology Strategies, Inc.,  the majority of biotechnology 
research and development takes place in only nine U.S. metropolitan areas, including Boston, 
Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, San Francisco, San Diego, 
Seattle, and Washington, D.C. (BOR, 2007).  The report continues, 
The gap between the top nine life science regions and the rest of the nation is  
considerable.  Compared to the other 42 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S., these nine 
cities have eight times as much biotech research activity, ten times as many large and 
newly established biotech firms, and thirty times more venture capital funding (p. 34.). 
 
In the top three biotechnology geographic clusters ranked by the Milken reports (2004; 
2006) - 1) San Diego, 2) Boston; and 3) Raleigh-Durham) - the local academic research 
institutions have played key roles for decades in terms of economic development and overall 
success.  All three communities began their biotechnology push more than 20 years ago, have 
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continued to invest in the ongoing development in their regions, and look to the universities as 
key strategic partners in these comprehensive models. 
A note of caution accompanies these data.  Despite the successes in terms of economic 
development, none of the nine U.S. metropolitan areas which are home to the most successful 
biotechnology hubs rank within the top 25 largest employers in their regions (Fischer, 2007).  
Brookings Institution biotechnology cluster expert, Joseph Cortright, comments that it takes luck 
and time to turn a promising technology through the commercialization continuum, and for drug 
products, this process can take several years, or decades, and in the end, the technologies 
produce very few new jobs (Fischer). 
Even with such proactive measures, these three successful clusters took years to develop.  
Until the late 1970s, the San Diego area was primarily a Navy town which was home to a 
nascent University of California campus with little comprehensive biomedical research.  Then, 
dependence on the federal government for its economic well-being began to change when the 
military downsized its presence in the area.  As the focus shifted away from federal military and 
related economic support, community leaders chose to find other areas of fiscal promise in order 
to maintain and hopefully grow its economic development (Milken 2004; Milken, 2006). 
One mechanism was to expand the University of California San Diego (UCSD) and 
increase its focus on research activities related to the biosciences. According to the Milken 
reports (2004; 2006), the investments and talent needed to expand UCSD’s research 
infrastructure and provide a basis for overall economic development had their origins in the 
success of the Silicon Valley information technology (IT) industry.  Identifying new 
opportunities to recreate biotechnology success in the San Diego area, experienced Silicon 
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Valley industry personnel and available funds were invested in San Diego, which jumpstarted the 
economic transformation in this area of Southern California (Milken). 
The economic development in the Boston area has been somewhat different.  The region, 
with a very strong history of biomedical research in its universities, contains two of the most 
notable academic institutions, Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
both of which are private.  Substantial research funds; an abundance of research faculty; the 
presence of expertise in the financial, legal, and management areas; and access to East Coast 
venture funds have all contributed to the successful development of Boston-based technologies 
both in  information technology (IT) and biotechnology.  Like the San Diego model, the strategic 
planning and support of this Northeast industry began in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Milken, 
2004; 2006). 
The Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina area, also known as the Research Triangle, has 
many similarities to the San Diego history, with its focus primarily on biotechnology 
development and not IT.  The origins of its planning and support mechanisms also date back 
more than three decades. Although the Research Triangle Park (RTP) is home to the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (public), North Carolina State (public), and Duke University 
(private), it is important to note that they were not the principle entities which spearheaded the 
RTP development (Washburn, 2005).  The main forces behind the initial planning and the 
ongoing push to keep the project on focus were the bankers, industrialists, and land developers.  
Al Link, who has written two books on the development of the RTP, explains that the 
universities were focused on keeping themselves focused on their research priorities and not 
becoming an extension of industry.  “The universities saw themselves as magnets to attract 
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research companies to the area, not as participants in those companies’ research efforts”  
(Washburn, p. 177). 
In the 1950s, North Carolina suffered from brain drain and a declining economy.  
Markets for the state’s primary industries – textiles, furniture, and tobacco – were declining and 
college graduates typically left the state to seek work elsewhere.   Looking to capitalize on the 
three local universities, Duke, North Carolina State, and the University of North Carolina, local 
politicians and businesspeople sought to create local opportunities to stem the brain drain.  
Research Triangle Park was founded in 1959 on 450,000 acres of worn-out farmland. 
Today Research Triangle Park exceeds 7,000 acres, is host to 136 organizations, and its 
38,000 employees draw $2.7 billion in salaries, making it the largest planned research 
center in the world.  Roughly one third of the resident firms and organizations are 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies (Friedman, 2006, p. 208). 
 
One of the differences in the Raleigh-Durham model is that a major pharmaceutical 
company, Glaxo Smith Kline, located its North American headquarters in the Research Triangle, 
which created a natural springboard for spin-off biotechnology companies (Friedman, 2006).  
Very recently, the state of North Carolina announced a partnership with Duke University, six 
public universities (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Charlotte and Greensboro; 
North Carolina State University, North Carolina A&T State University, North Carolina Central 
University), and Dole Foods owner David Murdock to create a $1.5 billion biotechnology 
research campus in Kannapolis, a small town 30 miles northeast of Charlotte (Fischer, 2007). 
Yet, these geographic examples are the exception in terms of how the overall U.S. 
biotechnology industry has been modeled.  In all three cases described above, biotechnology 
activities have been in existence for three decades, having evolved and adapted over time and 
having customized themselves to meet the changing needs of their respective communities.   Wu 
(2005) describes how venture capital has focused around five key biotechnology hubs in the 
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U.S., with a tendency to localize around technology clusters.  For example, Wu notes that 75% 
of new venture capital is focused in five American metropolitan areas, including “Boston, San 
Francisco, San Diego, Seattle and Raleigh-Durham.  In Boston, venture capital flowed more to 
software and biotech, while in San Diego it went disproportionately to medical and biotech 
R&D” (pp. 10-11). 
Pisano (2006) notes that in studying the structure of the biotechnology industry for the 
past 20 years, he has learned that much of its infrastructure or “anatomy,” as he describes it, was 
borrowed directly from Silicon Valley IT models.  Noting that these models are flawed when 
applied to biotechnology commercialization, Pisano believes that a radical departure in structure 
must take place in order for success to prevail in the overall biotechnology arena. 
In his description of the anatomy of biotechnology, Pisano (2006) includes universities, 
start-up companies, not-for-profit laboratories, established companies and investors, as well as 
the infrastructures linking them together, such as capital markets and intellectual property.  He 
concludes that the different sectors and players in the biotechnology industry work at cross 
purposes, creating “islands of expertise that impede the integration of critical knowledge” (p. 
116).  Wu (2005) continues by explaining the special role that the new, small biotechnology 
firms play in this industry. 
The large basic research establishments in universities, government, and private firms 
serve as important incubators for the development of innovation.  Individuals then 
establish firms, often small startups, to commercialize them.  This pattern has been 
particularly significant in the biotech, microelectronics, and computer industries (p. 6). 
 
Adding to the controversies, a new consensus is emerging even among those in higher 
education who had embraced this economic pathway, recognizing that the existing version of the 
commercialization model needs to be revamped in order to ensure success for a broader range of 
academic biomedical research institutions.  Two major reasons for restructuring the paradigm 
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have been suggested: 1) many academic universities with a focus on biotechnology are located 
outside of progressive, highly populated geographic clusters; and 2) numerous conflicts of 
interest associated with such academic/industry/ investment partnerships are emerging and have 
not yet been adequately addressed (Association of Academic Health Centers, 2005; Newman, 
Couturier, & Scurry 2004; Spack, 2005). 
Conflicts of Interest 
As discussed by Powers (2006), ethical issues are creating conflicts of interest in 
academe related to economic development which have yet to be resolved. 
Financial interests at times cloud institutional or faculty judgment: Universities have 
allowed businesses that support research to control its publication…And although federal 
regulations require faculty members to disclose potential financial conflicts of interest, 
colleges and universities vary in how thoroughly they enforce such requirements and are 
under no obligation to report their own possible conflicts of interest (p. B-18). 
 
In 2003 and 2004, public interest groups questioned the high price of a drug from Abbott 
Laboratories that had been developed and sponsored in part through federal funds, questioning 
the rights and responsibilities of the use of public funds for such bioscience research and 
development (Rubin, 2005).  To add to these concerns over conflicts, the retrenchment of 
venture funding has forced universities to begin to take equity ownership in new start up 
companies which are cash-strapped and which have had little or no support from biotechnology 
venture capitalists.  A patent report found that 66% of businesses had not entered into license 
agreements with academic institutions.  The top two reasons for the lack of collaboration were 
that 1) university technologies were too early to commercialize, and 2) academic research is very 
seldom in areas where the companies conducted business (Thursby & Thursby, 2000). 
Recently, the biotechnology industry has begun to voice its dissatisfaction in dealing with 
universities.  Several industry representatives concur, citing a shift in the mission from the public 
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good to returns on investments (ROIs).  Thomas Berger, Vice President of Genta, Incorporated, 
explains that money seems  to be the main concern, yet he points out, these universities want that 
revenue stream without taking the corresponding risk (Wahsburn, 2005). 
A related danger was pointed out by Hewlett Packard’s (HP) Jim Duly.  He commented 
that HP spent approximately $20 million annually on academic sponsored research, but 
university terms were becoming increasingly unreasonable (Washburn, 2005).  He added, “tech 
transfer officers have become so focused on short-term revenue….they are destroying long-term 
sponsored research relationships with industry” (p. 192). 
These areas of tension between universities and industry have resulted in the 
development of new tactics to promote opportunities for licensing.  One such mechanism has 
been for universities to be more directly involved in the formation of startup companies.  Since 
such newly formed entities are in search of start-up capital, academic institutions have bypassed 
traditional royalty payments for equity ownership (Feldman, et al., 2002).  Such company 
ownership is new for academia, which now finds itself in situations in which it has little or no 
prior experience. 
Despite the drawbacks, the trend is projected to continue.  Part of the reluctance to limit 
equity ownership may be due to the fact that traditional licensing mechanisms are not always the 
best solution for academic biotechnologies.  Over time, it has become more apparent that 
traditional licensing mechanisms cannot fulfill all situations.  “This has resulted in a greater 
understanding of the limitations of this transfer mechanism in terms of a downward revision in 
expectation about licensing’s revenue-generating potential” (Feldman, et al., p. 109). 
At the same time, despite the push toward closer relationships in controlling research 
activities and commercialization discoveries, young biotechnology companies have pulled back 
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from cutting-edge science, and have, instead, increased their focus on pursuing refinements (new 
formulations) with an eye toward increasing the breadth of treatment possibilities.  Friedman 
(2006) discusses that small companies usually do not have the capital necessary to pursue more 
than one project at a time. 
From an investor’s point of view, this can be seen as increasing the risk of failure, since 
the company has not spread the risk over several projects, which can, thus, turn away potential 
investment.  “Larger companies can at least prioritize their goals, giving investors a relative 
appreciation of potential success.  Therefore, small size combines the problems of increased risk 
due to lack of diversification with exclusion from consideration by investors…” (Friedman, 
2006, p. 211).  Pisano (2006) warns that this leaves gaps with little focus paid to high-risk 
projects and wonders where the new breakthroughs will come from and how the industry will 
reduce the possibility of a breakdown. 
Many involved in biotechnology believe that, eventually, the sector will be successful but 
it will take more time.  James A. Severenson, Ph.D. (2006), Vice Provost at the University of 
Washington in Seattle, believes technology transfer actually enhances the public service mission 
of the university through the creation of partnerships between academia and industry.  In 
supporting this belief, he discusses that, as a result, there is an increase in sponsored research, 
development projects, and teaching programs, among others. 
Others, such as Pisano (2006), Powers (2006), and Newman, Couturier and Scurry 
(2004), wonder when that day marking success will actually come.  As described by Pisano, the 
belief that this industry will turn the corner may not be plausible unless more emphasis is placed 
on reassessing the overall biotechnology strategic model. 
Such optimism assumes that the underlying structure of the sector is healthy and the 
strategies of the players make sense.  My research suggests otherwise.  This structure and 
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these strategies cannot solve the fundamental business and scientific challenges facing 
the sector (p. 118). 
 
Failures in Existing Translational Research 
  Contributing to the concern regarding commercialization success are those related to the 
underperformance of clinical translational research.  Recent scrutiny about the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) regarding its overall vision  and clinical outcomes research, has led to a massive 
new restructuring of the NIH clinical research initiative.  NIH has weighed in on its own flawed 
overall clinical research model, including technology transfer, and developed a new strategy to 
transform academic clinical developments.  In the first major overhaul in 50 years regarding how 
it funds biomedical research, the NIH has launched a comprehensive project to reduce the time 
from discovery to treatment, with a major component of its restructuring focused on decreasing 
the time and effort needed to translate discoveries into treatments and technologies for patients.  
Some of the widespread criticism of its past research model has included the assessment that 
NIH-funded research at universities has been very successful in theoretically curing disease, 
treating illnesses, and making strides in the mouse model, but has not been able to translate such 
advances to humans (NIH News, 2006). 
 ‘The NIH doesn’t impose any plan or measure the impact,’ contends Stephen  
Johnson, head of the Center for Innovations in Medicine…at Arizona State  
University…’The metric used to tell if a researcher is successful is by his or her 
publication record…more than anything, researchers need to come up with a  
coherent plan to battle diseases like AIDS and cancer.  We haven’t done that’ 
(Littlehales, p. 28). 
 
The new NIH plan to advance biomedicine, which has been named the Clinical 
Translational Science Awards (CTSA), calls for the development of 60 academic health center 
sites across the U.S. which will be linked to form a national consortium.  Twelve sites have 
already been funded for a five year period at approximately $700 million.  Additional sites will 
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be funded beginning in 2007, with the NIH goal of having all 60 sites up and running by 2012 
(NIH funds, 2006; NIH, 2007). 
In another comprehensive plan to revamp academic training and education for 
biotechnology, 13 of the most prestigious graduate schools in the country are revamping their 
Ph.D. programs in order to speed translational research.  The Howard Hughes Medical Institute 
has committed $10 million in training grants for the program, which is just being launched 
(Kuehn, 2006). 
In support of the philosophy outlined in the NIH perspective, Pisano (2006) has declared 
that a comprehensive change will be required, which he defined as one that will have long-range 
and significant impacts on universities, government-funded research, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and others involved in the biotechnology industry.  A key component to the overall 
success of this new academic commercialization model is a redesigned group of mechanisms for 
bridging the gap between inventions and resultant treatments (NIH, 2007). 
University administrators and inventors, on the other hand, are not typically seasoned in 
the business of early-stage biotechnology commercialization, which often requires the ability to 
take an academic technology, create a complex business plan for continued research and 
development, form a new start-up company around it, secure adequate investment funding, and 
put into place a capable management team to develop the technology into a viable marketable 
product (Fischer, 2007; Kouri, 2006). 
Universities are not usually viewed as leaders in entrepreneurship.  In fact, there is often 
a tendency to distinguish between the search for truth in science, considered a legitimate 
function of the university, and the search for invention, which is considered an 
inappropriate focus on ideas that have potential commercial or practical applicability”  
(Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, & Stoto,1989, p. 110). 
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Unintended Consequences 
In the past, providing researchers with more flexible policies to encourage their 
involvement in commercialization has resulted in some successes, but also in some highly 
controversial collaborations with industry (Olivierei, 2003).  As previously mentioned above, 
industrial collaborations can result in unintended consequences for universities.  Such unintended 
consequences have left some university faculty and administrators skeptical about the entire 
technology transfer process.  They question how this new commercialization focus affects the 
overall purpose of higher education institutions, especially public universities, and they caution 
academic administrators about the lack of experience of academe in this relatively unknown 
business climate (Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004; Schmidt, 2002). 
Higher education may be particularly vulnerable to issues surrounding technology 
commercialization.  Nadler, Hibino, and Farrell (1999) have studied the consequences of 
conventional thinking, which reduces a complex problem into independent parts prior to 
solution-finding.  As a result, the authors conclude, the wholeness of the problem is not 
considered as each problem is being analyzed and solutions formulated.  More often than not, 
each resultant solution provides only a partial fix, while also creating new, unintended 
consequences when applied to the whole.  To add to the complexity, the overall, more universal 
problem or issue may still remain and contain new or additional difficulties. 
This collapse of the thinking paradigm, in which there is extensive analysis of the parts 
but not the whole, is based in the scientific research model (Nadler, Hibino & Farrell, 1999).  
Where but in academe is the scientific research approach more prevalent?  This research 
approach stands as the cornerstone of scientific inquiry, where it has proven successful for 
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hundreds of years.  Such solutions are most successful when the problems are based in natural 
phenomena. 
Inherent in this analysis design is the belief that there is a single, correct solution to a 
problem.  Unfortunately, when this fragmented scrutiny is applied to broader, more obtuse issues 
involving human behavior, market influences, and other unpredictable variables, the research 
model is less successful.  In their research of how market forces influence academe, Newman, 
Couturier and Scurry (2004) indicate that historically, many higher education institutions either 
do not address the marketplace in their problem-solving processes or are inexperienced when 
including these forces in their analyses.  
According to Slaughter, Archard, and Campbell (2004), there are two popular strands 
describing the norms and values of science.  The Mertonian theory sees science as distinct and 
separate from the marketplace and considered value-free.  This interpretation is related to that 
proposed by Vannevar Bush (1945), which is called the linear model of science-based 
innovation, and is described in more detail in Chapter 2.  The other major strand, 
entrepreneurialism, purports that science recognizes both academic and market components.  
Consequently, no one consensus exists regarding the value of or even the appropriateness of 
academic commercializing of inventions and discoveries. 
For example, Mendoza and Berger (2005) state that the results in academe have been 
both positive and negative. 
Industry-university partnerships have provided university administrators, faculty 
members, and businesspersons with new relationships that are changing the nature of 
academic roles and rewards…some…viewed quite positively- such as the generation of 
new sources of revenue…while…other unintended consequences may be having a 
negative impact on the academic profession (pp. 3-4). 
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 Dr. Wesley Cohen (2001), of Carnegie Mellon University, states that the majority of 
public research conducted in universities and government laboratories in such areas as drug 
development and biotechnology, becomes available to industry through public avenues.  He does 
not infer that privatization is not appropriate for such research, but, rather, that academic leaders 
and researchers need to take into consideration the mechanisms for transferring these 
technologies to best practices.  
Naiveté also plays a role in how higher education has dealt with technology transfer, 
according to Van Der Werf and Blumenstyk (2001).  Public universities do not have the same 
market influences as their for-profit scientific counterparts and are less savvy as to how to 
participate in the business climate (Schmidt, 2002).  Academic inventors are not familiar with the 
world of business management and development nor do they typically acknowledge that such 
expertise requires training and experience.  According to Kouri (2006) and Nowak (2006), a 
researcher who remains involved in the development of the new company will typically fail at 
any attempt at management.  Often, the researcher will want to maintain control even though the 
success of the new company may be irreparably damaged.  Whether or not the researcher is 
involved in the new company management, universities themselves are not very experienced in 
business development. 
On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies and other commercial biomedical 
organizations employ the scientific method but also function according to market pressures.  
Management of academic-based intellectual property should be viewed “as a necessary 
administrative service and expense, and not as a university profit center,” according to David 
Pramer (1998, p.448), who has been professor and administrator for research policy at Rutgers 
University. 
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But experts say that the commercialization trend also reflects a growing appreciation for 
the value that universities can have in developmental research and “in assisting start-up 
companies.  Universities have deeper pockets and are more patient and stable than easily 
spooked venture capitalists.  They also often have the best-equipped laboratories, the fastest, 
most robust computer systems, and the most extensive libraries” (Van Der Werf & Blumenstyk, 
2001, p. A28).  Conflicts also arise over the traditional view of knowledge as a public good 
under the stewardship of academic versus the growing belief that such knowledge is academic 
capital, subject to monetary valuation (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
The potential commercialization value of such academic riches were first realized  more 
than two decades ago, when the federal government passed the Bayh-Dole Act, the first in a 
series of legislative acts to encourage large, research universities to commercialize their 
federally-funded inventions and discoveries.  Much has changed since then in the landscape of 
academia.  Now, even regional universities boast of having technology transfer offices while 
many administrators and researchers expect their institution's next technology will be one that 
will bring in millions of dollars in royalties. 
But, the process is not always smooth.  Universities and industry are suing each other 
over patent rights (Nadis, 2000), government and peer-reviewed research journals are claiming 
academic research is besieged with conflicts of interest (Mangan & Blulmenstyk, 2000; Olivieri, 
2003), state governments are demanding more public/private partnerships despite these conflicts 
(Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004), and critics claim the return on investment from academic 
technology transfer is skewed and misleading (Schmidt, 2002).  Yet, the push to involve public 
funds, public universities, and state dollars in biotechnology commercialization continues, with 
an expectation that faculty researchers will play a major role. 
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Faculty Roles 
Critical to the success of biotechnology commercialization is intellectual capital, which is 
uniquely concentrated in research universities.  As a result, faculty who are expert in research 
areas ripe for commercialization now find themselves in the middle regarding where their 
loyalties and responsibilities lie (Bok, 2003).  On the one hand, they are valued for their 
academic contributions, including teaching and research; on the other hand, they are pressured to 
commercialize any inventions and discoveries they have made.  Such dual participation creates 
conflicts of interest, resulting in regulations and limits on their time and effort (Gelijins & Thier 
2002; Newman, Couturier & Scurry; 2004). 
Most of the university-industry pressures are focused on its researchers, who struggle to 
balance the need for academic freedom and scholarship with industry-sponsor obligations.  “This 
question needs national attention by both academia and industry, with the goal of defining broad 
standards…the standards should be clear, easily understood and easily explained to the general 
public” (Hall & Scott, 2001, p. 553).  The authors continue by pointing out recent cases of 
apparent conflicts of interest only strengthen the questions surrounding these relationships. 
In the new North Carolina Research Campus project, the state has committed nearly $30 
million annually, focused on hiring academic researchers.  The participating universities are 
preparing to hire for new faculty members, UNC is looking to fill 18 faculty positions while 
North Carolina State is slated to hire 13 new faculty (Fischer, 2007).  
According to Mendoza and Berger (2005) “other issues fostered by faculty partnerships 
with industry representatives include conflict of interests, restriction of information flow, shift 
power to non-academic personnel, universities’ fragmentation into entrepreneurial fiefdoms, 
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shifts of research priorities toward more marketable areas with the consequent distortion of 
traditional academic missions…” (p. 3).  Often at the center of discussion is money. 
Currently, 77% of NIH’s research budget is committed to funding ongoing projects.  As a 
result, many new programs or grants are not being funded (Couzin & Miller, 2007).  The authors 
continue, 
Many scientists complain that the tough funding climate is exacerbated by an  
excessive focus at NIH on costly “big science,” such as the Cancer Genome Atlas,  
which is using large-scale genetic sequencing to decipher the molecular basis of  cancer 
and whose 3-year pilot phase is budgeted at $100 million.  Projects like this one, many 
scientists say, are coming at the expense of grants that sustain individual labs and have 
been the source of much innovation over the years (p. 359). 
 
Trying to adjust to this funding barrier has led some to turn to different financial avenues.  
One researcher suggests that academic faculty revisit industry sources as one alternative.  Mary 
Hendrix, scientific director of one of Northwestern University’s research centers, discusses how 
researchers can recover their lost government funding by looking elsewhere for support.  Her 
choice is to promote public-private partnerships and form stronger relationships with specific 
disease foundations (Couzin & Miller, 2007). 
For example, Johns Hopkins, one of the nation’s leading research universities, has had 
difficulties in translating its research activities into commercialization success.  The university’s 
administration cites politics and a negative faculty attitude regarding technology transfer as the 
key to the university’s problems.  To address this problem, a new head of technology transfer has 
been hired (Johns Hopkins Technology Transfer, 2007). 
Many agree that faculty play a critical role in commercialization of technologies and that 
the culture of buy-in from the faculty is key to this part of economic development. 
The core of this success is a university’s ability to build intellectual capacity by recruiting 
and retaining top-notch faculty.  For instance, successful biotech clusters are highly 
dependent on the quality of medical research and availability of specially trained research 
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scientists and technicians.  These universities have been a hot bed of technological 
innovation and entrepreneurs, inventing the gene chips to transform medicine and 
pushing the boundaries in stem cell research (Wu, 2005, p. 8). 
 
One of the attractions that academia has over industry is that university researchers can 
share in the royalties generated from the technologies they discover.  “Managing faculty cannot 
be as direct as it is with industry employees, whose behavior is non-voluntary and driven directly 
by established organizational outcomes” (Mendoza & Berger, 2005, p. 9).  Unlike industry, 
where researchers are typically hired as work-for-hire and revenues from discoveries remain with 
the employer, the standard position in American universities recognizes that faculty are not 
work-for-hire, and actually own their own inventions and discoveries.  Mendoza and Berger add 
that the same goals and interests might not be shared by faculty and administration, but that, 
traditionally, limitations on administrative control have been the result, in part, to faculty self-
governance and their ability to maintain professional mobility. 
Even so, as part of their employment terms, faculty and others agree to assign the 
intellectual property they discover or invent while employed to their academic institution, and in 
return, they are entitled to a percentage of royalties or equity generated from the 
commercialization of their technologies.  Still, an unresolved tension remains between the goals 
of the faculty and administrators.  “The greatest points of conflict for professors were issues that 
pushed them to make choices between a public service and an academic capitalist knowledge 
regime.  These issues were publishing versus patenting, access versus secrecy, and contested 
ownership of a wide variety of intellectual property” (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004, p. 113). 
 Intellectual capital, the collective expertise and creativity of faculty, is considered one of 
the cornerstones of academic research institutions.  According to Derek Bok (2003), a 
university’s scholarly quality and integrity remain paramount in the eyes of the public and in a 
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democratic society.  He continues by explaining that for generations “universities have long been 
one of the principal sources of expert knowledge and informed opinion on a wide array of 
subjects…” (p. 117).  Yet, several scholars agree that faculty’s role as the major labor force in 
higher education is undergoing substantial changes (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  Financial 
changes have pushed academic institutions to form partnerships with business and industry and 
have encouraged faculty to commit more time and effort to research instead of teaching 
(Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
Even with this shift, many higher education institutions do not recognize 
commercialization success in faculty promotion and tenure considerations.  The state of 
California Council on Science and Technology acknowledges the importance of such recognition 
in a 2006 report on state funded research.  “In considering a set of state IP policies, it is 
important to understand that the  reward system that motivates researchers depends in large part 
upon their ability to share some or all of their research, in order to obtain recognition” (p. 11). 
 Bok (2003) points out that “research universities are rarely, if ever, any better than their 
faculties” (p. 117).  To continue making their greatest contribution, which he believes is their 
intellectual capital, “…it is imperative that they guard the integrity of their procedures for 
appointing and promoting professors…” (p.117).  Bok goes on to caution administrators, 
legislators, and others not to reward or advance faculty for work conducted solely on the basis of 
commercial viability, regardless of its inherent research interest or value. 
 On the other hand, recent levels of funding at NIH have not kept up with the cost of 
living. 
Even though the budget for…NIH doubled between 1998 and 2003, to $26  
billion, it has hardly kept pace with inflation since.  During the boom, academic  
and research labs built up capacity and talent, and thousands of long-term projects  
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got funding – but now new projects struggle to secure support (Littlehales,  
2007, p. 26). 
 
 “Compounding the problem is that most universities and medical institutions rely on NIH 
money for the bulk of scientists’ salaries and overhead costs and are not set up to support faculty 
members long-term” (Couzin & Miller, 2007, p. 358).  Presently, the funding percentage at NIH 
is lower than it has been in several years, and has dropped dramatically in just a few years.  For 
example, at one of the NIH agencies, proposal funding has dropped from 27% in 2001 to 11% in 
2006.  To add to the difficulties, more scientists than ever are having to resubmit their grant 
applications prior to securing funding, which can be a wait of up to eight months (Couzin & 
Miller). 
Consequently, the reality of the current financial situation in public universities does not 
allow for a total disregard for academic researchers in their role as inventors and creators of 
products and technologies.  Dr. Cohen (2001) explains “…universities place different weights on 
how founding a company is credited…In many universities, commercial activities are still 
regarded as “second tier”…Universities also vary in the amount of funding delay they will 
tolerate as a consequence of working with industry” (p. 180).  As evidence of the growing 
support of the importance of technology transfer in terms of faculty roles, the Texas A&M 
University Board of Regents has recently voted unanimously to include technology 
commercialization of inventions as part of faculty tenure evaluation (Lipka, 2006). 
The promise of substantial commercial revenue streams is important to acknowledge 
because the majority of these inventors are research faculty.  In addition, one needs to 
acknowledge the power and influence that such a promising financial return from 
commercialization has on research universities (Kirp, 2003; Newman, Couturier, & Scurry; 
2004).  As explained above, the lack of experience that faculty researchers have in business 
  40 
development and management presents its own problems.  At the same time as faculty inventors 
are encouraged to commercialize their inventions by their university administrations, 
government, and others, few avenues exist to help them learn how to become well-versed in 
business matters.  Kouri (2006) explains that one solution is to develop a business management 
and development curriculum in which the faculty researchers take part.  Nowak (2006) 
demonstrates that another alternative is to establish early-stage developmental funds, and Holmes 
(2006) demonstrates that at UCSD there is a successful combination of both, at least in part. 
Mission of the Public Research University 
 Universities can play an integral role in local, regional, and state economic development.  
In some geographic locations, the university is one of the largest employers.  The traditional 
expectation of a university regarding economic impact was measured in the number of 
individuals employed by the institution of higher education and its affiliate organizations, the 
students who entered as consumers into the local economy, and university-related special events 
which brought in additional local revenue.  But the expectations related to economic impact in 
the modern sense goes beyond these traditional avenues.  The twenty-first century view of 
academic economic impact often includes characteristics that resemble that of a company town 
(Fischer, 2007). 
At the same time, research universities have the responsibility of meeting their core 
mission of teaching, research, and community service. How can these institutions of higher 
education balance their long-standing obligations and also look to including new ones?  Richard 
K. Lester, a center director at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, cautions that a real danger 
exists if academic institutions promise more return than is possible and reiterates that universities 
are primarily educational institutions (Fischer, 2007). 
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 Despite these warnings, academic institutions continue to move forward with regard to 
economic development.  The UNC System is one example of a statewide institution of higher 
education putting into motion several projects and programs focused on commercialization and 
economic development.  System President Erskine B. Bowles, the former director of the federal 
Small Business Administration and a venture capitalist, has acknowledged that the UNC System 
“has made economic development transformation a central part of its mission.  That objective is 
playing out in different ways on different campuses…and the university has started a fund to 
reward grants…that focus on local economic-development needs” (Fischer, 2007, p. A-1).  This 
new role is seen as an important obligation by the UNC System.  “Now we have the opportunity, 
and the obligation, to help the state figure out what the new economy looks like” (p. A-1). 
 This exploratory study analyzed each of the three models, compared them, and then 
looked at them in relation to the UCSD best model for academic-based commercialization and 
start-up company formation.  Even though the models contain only some of the five key 
components, all of these mechanisms which were studied, aimed at moving early-stage 
academic-based technologies further along the commercialization continuum in order to increase 
the possibility of market success. 
As a result of this study, five additional key components were identified as important in 
developing a successful commercialization model.  In addition, the study explored ways to 
diminish the unintended consequences associated with commercializing early-stage technologies, 
especially in terms of conflicts of interest, faculty roles, and the mission and uses of the public 
university. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
“An embedded assumption of the theory of academic capitalism is that shifting revenue 
streams, whether contracting or expanding, shape strategic initiatives” (Slaughter & Rhoades, 
2004, p. 182).  As noted above, the impact has been less than anticipated regarding fiscal and 
economic returns (Dueker, 1997; Edwards, Murray & Yu, 2003; Pisano, 2006; Powers, 2006) 
and as explained below, more than expected in terms of unintended consequences for 
administrations and faculty (Dueker; Olivieri, 2003). 
With such a complicated background of how and why technology transfer developed in 
academia, it helps to outline how we got to where we are presently, and how we can move 
forward while implementing best practices and planning for the future in terms of academic 
biomedical research commercialization. 
Background 
During World War I, the federal government hired university researchers by placing them 
at federal laboratories where they conducted research for governmental projects.  By World War 
II, the United States government had changed it tactics, opting instead to develop partnerships 
with universities by contracting with higher education institutions in order to preserve the control 
by civilian scientists over their own research projects (Geiger, 1990).  Vannevar Bush issued a 
report on the future of science in America to President Franklin Roosevelt in 1945 in which he 
emphasized that medical advances and new products depended directly on continued advances in 
basic research, which were only available through universities and their expert scientists (Bush, 
1945). 
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Recognizing the tremendous contribution academic scientists made during World War II, 
the federal government deliberately chose to increase science research support beginning in the 
late 1940s (Bok, 2003).  Central to this growth were countless faculty researchers who opted to 
pursue their careers in academia instead of industry.  Their intellectual capital and expertise were 
paramount in the unprecedented successes and advances made in science during the decades 
between 1940 and 1970 (Geiger, 1990).  By the start of the 1970s, the United States was the 
undisputed world leader in science and technology with research faculty at the core of this 
scientific revolution (Bok).  This three-decade increase in federal funding expanded 
concentrations of academic scientists, boosted graduate school education, paid the salaries of 
laboratory technicians and support staff, and purchased complex, expensive research equipment 
(Geiger). 
A major change in the postwar U.S. national innovation system is the immense expansion 
of research in institutions of higher learning.  By simultaneously providing funds for 
university research and education, the federal government has strengthened the university 
commitment to research (Wu, 2005, p. 6).  
 
In 1940, for example, the total dollar amount spent on organized research in universities, 
regardless of funding source, totaled $27 million.  By the end of the decade, the federal 
government alone provided academic centers with more than $130 million annually (Geiger, 
1990).  As a result, allocations to science faculty through research grants and contracts rose 25-
fold from 1948 to 1968, exceeding even the expectations of those individuals who were 
instrumental in initiating these changes (Bok, 2003).  Central to this exponential growth in 
federally sponsored research was the increase in basic sciences, biomedical and nuclear research 
(Geiger). 
Due to the sheer enormity of higher education research and the expertise of faculty during 
these three decades, the number of academic researchers grew exponentially (Geiger, 1990).  
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University-based researchers housed in the most advanced scientific laboratories, developed 
technologies that accomplished everything from putting a man on the moon to inventing gene 
splicing techniques.  During this time, academic clinical scientists sparked the beginning of the 
new biotechnology industry (Bok, 2003). 
Del Favero (2003) discusses how a focus on one’s discipline provides faculty with 
competing allegiances.  She explains 
[faculty members’] primary connections with peers in their discipline go beyond the 
boundaries of the institution that employs them…Achieving success in one's 
discipline...consumes the energy and attention of most faculty...and recognition and 
career advancement, especially at universities that place a high priority on research, 
consumes the energy and attention of most faculty...Allegiance is first to their discipline 
and second to their institution (p. 905). 
 
In contrast, focus on a sponsor’s needs instead of on a researcher’s interest will, at some 
point in time, even if only in the long-run, benefit the sponsor (Geiger, 1990).  If one follows the 
same logic that Del Favero (2003) discussed above, a researcher will then form a new allegiance 
with the sponsoring agency.  With the ability to secure multi-million dollar grants and contracts 
from such sponsors, researchers’ work has often gravitated toward satisfying the interests and 
needs of these funding sponsors, especially in tight financial times. 
Kerr (2001) points out that over the past 20 to 40 years, there has been a dramatic 
increase in federal and private grants and in industry contracts to university researchers and also 
in the influence these governmental and private external funding entities have had on these 
researchers.   At the same time as these external funding amounts increased, there also was a 
shift from funding only sponsor-created programmatic research areas to a more detached 
approach in which faculty, once again, often were able to choose their areas of research focus 
(Stahler & Tash, 1994).  Researcher allegiance shifted once again, only this time, it created a 
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researcher’s allegiance to oneself.  As a result, well-funded researchers became even more 
independent. 
External funding often provides a substantial percentage of salary and laboratory support 
for the faculty member and staff, based on research topics developed on his or her own terms, 
with the university itself usually exercising little control over the focus of the research projects 
its faculty are awarded.  As such, these research projects are typically created and negotiated 
outside the purview of the academic administration for the most part (Kerr, 2001).  As a result, 
faculty academic freedom, at least in terms of university administration control, has remained 
healthy. 
Recently, we have seen another shift in funding source direction, with state-generated 
public funds and industry-based sources taking center stage.  Administrators and external 
entities, such as state legislatures and economic development consortiums, are calling for more 
oversight of research direction and focus in order to secure funds from the available coffers and 
also allow for more control by these financial sponsors (Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004).   
Gumport (2000) recognized that at times of consolidation and restructuring, faculty and 
institutions are required to turn to alternative sources and methods of funding and operation.  
Many academic medical and health sciences centers have done just that beginning in the 1990s, 
when a series of catastrophic financial events caused them to find immediate solutions to fiscal 
crises.  The downward financial spiral began with the onset of managed care, which brought with 
it an immediate decrease in revenues of nearly 50% (Van Der Werf, 1999).  To offset such 
drastic funding deficits, academic centers turned to whatever revenue streams they could 
establish, without immediate regard for unintended, long-term consequences. 
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The tensions and conflicts facing faculty go beyond those related to financial conflicts of 
interest regarding independence in research.   These tensions also include the desire for 
administrations to maximize revenue streams through faculty-awarded grants and contracts, 
while faculty question how this requirement allows for shared governance (Gumport, 2000).  To 
complicate matters even more, the increase in desire to commercialize academic-based 
technologies has added sponsors to the mix of players in shared governance. As a result, new, 
shared governance alliances and oppositions have formed among faculty, administrators, 
legislators, sponsors, and industry.   
Research vs. Technology 
 Since academic departments were first and foremost teaching units, the exponential 
growth of research funding along with the accompanying rise in stature of faculty receiving these 
funds resulted in increased tensions within departments for control of finances and of the faculty 
members themselves.  These extramural research funds did not typically include revenues to 
cover teaching expenses (Geiger, 1990).  In addition, it became necessary for faculty who had 
secured such large research grants and contracts to spend a substantial amount of time on their 
research at the expense of teaching.  Tensions over research and teaching requirements 
heightened as both departments and funded faculty vied for limited resources (Stahler & Tash, 
1994). 
 Some of this heightened tension was due to the fact that federally-funded research grants 
are typically awarded to an individual, known as a Principal Investigator (PI), not directly to an 
academic institution, although the academic institution recovers an indirect cost percentage or 
overhead that is a pre-determined percentage over and above the direct dollars awarded to a PI.  
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The same is seen at the state level, at least as reported in California’s science and technology 
committee to the state government. 
 The state also is a stakeholder in the intellectual property generated by its funding  
of public universities and other research institutions.  Clearly, consistency with  
federal statutes and policy suggests that ownership of IP resulting from state  
sponsored research also should reside with the grantee (California Council on  
Science and Technology, 2006, p. 9). 
 
In other words, if a university's federal indirect cost rate is 50%, then the university will 
receive $500,000 over and above the $1,000,000 a PI is awarded, for a total of $1,500,000 given 
to the institution.  With indirect cost rates at most research universities typically ranging from 
40-60% of the total direct research grant award, bringing in a “star” PI also means bringing in 
substantial amounts of additional money, which requires an institution to do nothing more than 
hire that “star” researcher (NIH, 2007). 
 Yet, if a PI leaves the university and moves to another academic institution, typically, the 
research grant moves with the researcher, and the added overhead dollars also leave that former 
institution and move to the new one.  This portability gives the individual researcher great power 
and clout within his or her current institution, as well as with any potential future university 
(NIH, 2007).  Yet the revenue from such sponsored research rests in university coffers, and 
includes the attractive percentages of overhead (indirect) costs.  Since these overhead dollars 
sometimes total more than half of what the direct grant or contract dollar amount may be, and are 
earmarked as discretionary funds for the academic institution, administrations are reluctant to 
dissuade top researchers from going after such awards even though they recognize that the 
allegiance of researchers is at best, fragmented (NIH). 
This situation is an example of the social exchange theory, which researchers believe is a 
valuable mechanism for studying the relationship between faculty and administration.  By 
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identifying social rewards and looking into the ongoing process between these two groups, one 
can determine what factors motivate productive interactions and provide motivation for 
successful outcomes between them (Del Favero, 2003).  The more reciprocal and trusting the 
relationship is, the more confidence the parties have in the governance process.  In addition to 
this relationship based on sponsored research funds, faculty and administration have seen a 
growing give and take surrounding academic commercialization. 
Commercialization of Academic Research 
 The seminal activity that began this academic research commercialization movement was 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, by the U.S. Congress (Bayh-Dole Act, 1980).  The 
major purpose of this federal legislation was to give universities the right to the intellectual 
property from their inventions and discoveries that had been funded through federally-sponsored 
research (Schmidt, 2002). 
Prior to the enactment of Bayh-Dole, no organized mechanism of commercialization 
existed for federally funded technology.  In the 1960s and 1970s, government sponsored 
academic research increased through grants and contracts awarded through the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Defense (DOD), 
Department of Energy (DOE), and five other federal agencies.  "Basic research was considered 
to be in the public interest, since it led to a dramatic increase in the discovery and development 
of new knowledge, which, in turn, had the potential to strengthen the country's economy" 
(Goodwin, 1996, p. 323).  At that time, any invention or discovery derived from this sponsored 
research was owned by the federal government, yet no organized mechanism for licensing and 
commercializing these technologies existed. As such, few discoveries reached commercial 
success.  By 1980, more than 30,000 patents had been issued but only five percent were for new 
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or improved products or processes.  Fewer than 150 of these patents were issued to the 
universities that had developed them (Goodwin, 1996). 
In order to improve the opportunities for commercializing these technologies, and thus, 
increasing the overall public good, the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted in December 1980.  This law 
was the first in a series of federal legislation designed to give incentives to universities and their 
researchers to commercialize their intellectual property by granting them the rights to their 
inventions and discoveries (Goodwin, 1996).  With this legislation in place, the new academic 
function of technology transfer emerged.  Only 25 universities had any ongoing technology 
transfer activities in 1980, while 200 were engaged in the process by 1992.  Bayh-Dole was the 
first in a series of federal legislative acts that were passed enabling universities to promote 
industry collaboration and technology commercialization (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). 
 As part of this series of legislative acts, the Small Business Innovation Development Act 
of 1982 mandated that 1.25% of federal expenditures from agencies with more than $100 million 
dollars be earmarked for research to be performed by small businesses.  This act was opposed by 
large research universities, which argued that this money should be given to them instead for 
basic research, yet "overall, in the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. policy at the federal level shifted so 
that colleges and universities were able to engage in academic capitalism" (Slaughter & Leslie, 
1997, p. 48).  Federal policy supported academic capitalism and commercialization of research.  
Faculty were encouraged to participate in more commercial research and minimize curiosity-
driven projects (Etzkowitz, 1994; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997). 
Ironically, 20 years later, universities and small businesses have developed quite a 
sophisticated mechanism for transferring academic-based technologies to small business start-up 
and spin-off companies, with the universities sharing in the royalties and equity ownership in 
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these companies.  Often these small businesses are created around inventions and discoveries 
made by academic researchers.  Federal technology transfer grants are awarded to small 
businesses with researchers acting as the Principal Investigators (PIs) and universities as the 
business partners (Gaither, 2003). 
Yet, such relationships, although promoted by the federal government through these 
agency grants and contracts, have led to financial conflicts of interest (COIs) and eligibility 
problems for faculty PI’s.  Recently, small businesses with majority ownership resting within 
venture capital firms were declared ineligible for federal small business research grants.  The 
impact of this is great considering that, in 2002, the federal government awarded $1.5 billion 
dollars to 5,000 companies through small business awards (Gaither, 2003). 
Emergence of Biotechnology 
In recognizing the enormous contributions that U.S. biomedical research had made to 
scientific progress, the federal budget for academic research in these areas rose from $3 million 
to $76 million between 1941 and 1951 (Washburn, 2005).  When NIH funding grew flat in the 
mid-1980s, many medical researchers became more entrepreneurial.  This timing coincided with 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and the emergence of new academic-based technology transfer 
offices. Even in the first decade following the passage of Bayh-Dole and related-
commercialization regulations, much of the focus was on the development of biomedical-related 
academic technologies, due to their potential for financial success (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). 
Although the push to develop university-based technologies is not concentrated in any 
one area of research, many agree the major academic sector earmarked for success is 
biotechnology.  As the new millennium began, industry's investment in basic biomedical 
discovery and clinical trials within universities totaled $55 to $60 billion dollars (Moses & 
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Martin, 2001).  A large portion of the discoveries and inventions arising out of biotechnology 
companies are "often based directly or indirectly on ideas generated by university scientists" 
(Hall & Scott, 2001, p. 553). 
The number of human subject clinical trials, which are sponsored by large 
pharmaceutical companies, rose from 33,000 in 1990 to 60,000 in 1998 (Martin, 2002).  This $97 
billion biotechnology industry boasts strong relationships between business and academe.  
"Private industry is one of the largest sources of funds for university research in these areas, and 
nascent biotechnology companies often lack the investment capital needed to conduct research 
on their own" (Schmidt, 2002, p. A-42). 
This drastic change in university research focus at academic health centers (AHCs) and 
teaching hospitals was the direct result of the crisis in the 1990s that removed discretionary 
funds.  AHCs turned to biotechnology commercialization, partnering with pharmaceutical 
companies and working to create biotechnology companies around university-based discoveries.   
This push toward development of biomedical technologies coupled with the change in federal 
legislation to encourage commercialization of academic intellectual property has resulted in 
tremendous expansion of academic technology transfer activities at most research universities 
(Association of Academic Health Centers, 2005). 
Even so, because the crisis that faced AHCs a decade ago was so sudden and severe, little 
long-range planning accompanied the universities’ move toward commercialization.  They had a 
much more immediate need to stop revenue drains, save jobs and programs, and keep their 
academic institutions intact.  Now, though, these university-based centers are realizing that the 
entire academic technology transfer model needs to be revisited, improved, and monitored in an 
ongoing manner (Association of Academic Health Centers, 2005). 
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Academic Health Centers 
 Traditionally, health insurance reimbursements for AHCs and their teaching hospitals 
was 40% higher than the normal reimbursement rate.  The additional revenue covered academic 
biomedical research studies and salaries for residents and interns.  But with the onset of managed 
care, not only did the excess dollars from insurance disappear, but the overall reimbursement rate 
from health insurance dropped dramatically.  Almost overnight, this academic revenue stream 
was reduced by nearly 50%, leaving AHCs in the red (Van Der Werf, 1999). 
  In 1993, for example, Loyola of Chicago was the wealthiest of the 28 Jesuit colleges and 
universities in the nation, with an endowment of $425.2 million, 150 degree programs, new 
campuses opening in suburban areas, and a financially successful AHC.  Just two years later, the 
university lay in ruins.  The medical center was struggling to break even, the endowment value 
decreased 29%, suburban campuses could not meet expenses, several degree programs had no 
students, enrollment dropped more than 12%, and tuition rose by 74% (Van Der Werf,  2000). 
In the years that followed, AHCs scrambled to find solutions for their shortfalls.  Some, 
like Tulane University, sold interest in their teaching hospitals, with mixed results (Van Der 
Werf, 1999), while others, like Stanford University and the University of California San 
Francisco, merged their health systems, lost billions of dollars and parted ways after continued, 
disastrous results (Mangan & Blumenstyk, 2000).  By the late 1990s, AHCs were still searching 
for a viable solution. 
Loyola was blindsided so drastically by this external change in health care reimbursement 
that it caused a total restructuring of the entire institution.  This university was forced to create a 
wholly-owned subsidiary to protect the AHC from further financial depletion.  New campuses 
and expanded degree programs which were not self-supporting and had been relying on the 
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health sciences center surplus for funding, were cut.  In addition, the endowment, which had 
counted on its income from surplus AHC revenues, was forced to redirect its efforts toward 
fundraising (Van Der Werf, 2000). 
Loyola was not the only major research university to be dramatically altered by the 
managed care debacle.  Public universities as well as private ones scrambled to find immediate, 
although less than perfect, solutions to their budget crises.  Allegheny University of the Health 
Sciences declared bankruptcy in 1998.  The University of Minnesota, George Washington, 
Indiana, Tulane, and Saint Louis universities all sold a portion of their entire teaching hospitals 
as a way to correct the revenue drain (Van Der Werf, 1999).  As noted above, Stanford 
University and the University of California San Francisco took the merger route, but the outcome 
was still negative.  Nearly 2,000 jobs were lost in the California merger.  In 1999, the two centers 
were showing a $37.7 million dollar loss (Mangan & Blumenstyk, 2000).  In 1998, the medical 
center at the University of Pennsylvania lost nearly $90 million, while the losses at Georgetown 
University neared $120 million. 
Even after taking such drastic measures, these academic health centers were still losing 
revenues.  The initial mechanisms they enacted were not viable, long-term solutions to their 
financial woes.  "Often, the impetus for reinvention is some sort of external shock which forces 
the organization to recognize that it can no longer remain viable with its present mode of 
thinking and operating.  The blow may come suddenly" (Souba, 1998, p. 115) as it did with the 
onset of managed care, leaving the universities with little time to regroup or plan financial 
alternatives. 
Marcia Angell, MD, past editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, has written that 
the boundaries between academic biomedical research and industry have blurred in recent years.  
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She describes the three circumstances that have led to the current overlap.  First, new drugs and 
devices coming out of university inventions and discoveries are the results of technology 
transfer, which involves close relationships between academics and investors and industry.  
Second, many academic medical centers have needed significant alternative revenue streams 
since the reduction of Medicare and third-party payments for patient services.  Finally, the 
percentage of clinical trials being conducted through academic institutions has dropped in recent 
years from 80% to 40% (Angell, 2000). 
Pisano (2006) does not see any indicators that biotechnology has transformed 
pharmaceutical R&D productivity.  Even more worrisome is the continued observation that 
venture capitalists are still retreating.  Since 2001, after the downturn in investment interest in 
genomics waned, investors have moved further away from risk. 
Rather than forming so-called molecule-to-market companies, whose first product 
revenues might be more than a decade away, entrepreneurs and investors have begun to 
look for lower-risk, faster-payback models, such as licensing existing projects and 
products from other companies and then refining them” (p. 118). 
 
The exuberance over the development of biotechnology commercialization has been 
labeled irrational by at least one academic researcher in the field.  Joshua Powers (2006) reports 
that more than half of universities consistently lose money on technology transfer while conflicts 
of interest issues have risen. One reason for this disconnect may be that technology transfer is a 
much more difficult process than previously acknowledged, according to Everett M. Rogers 
(2003), and as technology transfer offices become more experienced, they realize that this 
process is both comprehensive and complex. 
State and Federal Funding 
This current commercialization situation in research universities has developed over a 
period of time and has involved many players, both inside academia and outside of it.  As 
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pointed out in the 2005 report from the Association of Academic Health Centers (AHC), the 
university-based financial climate is still shifting while, at the same time, traditional health 
services and government avenues of revenue are continuing to grow tighter.  The AHC report 
points out that in the past, state governments supported public higher education with tax dollars 
but expected no measurable economic return.  Now, elected officials no longer solely base their 
financial support for higher education on the advancement of knowledge. This old scenario has 
been replaced with a hybrid financial and economic structure in which allocations for future state 
revenues are assessed on the economic returns from past funding (Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 
2004; Spack, 2005). 
As a result, lawmakers' requirements for returns on state revenues have increased, 
holding public universities more accountable in terms of the economic impact they bring to their 
respective states.  One mechanism of enforcement is to tie the state dollars these public 
universities receive to the commercialization of academic-based research discoveries and 
inventions.  As Powers (2006) points out  
“…legislators must realize what they now do to stimulate irrational behavior.  One 
problem is that they are offering universities incentives to contribute to economic 
development—like targeted grant programs or funds available only to institutions that 
meet certain development goals.  One natural response to the incentives is for a university 
to set up its own technology transfer office, business incubator, or business-development 
program, all of which require substantial investment of resources” (p. B-18). 
 
Acknowledging that such requirements can cause conflicts for academic institutions, state 
legislatures "are willing to put universities in the position of having to routinely wrestle with 
potential conflicts of interest if that is what it takes to give the institutions a larger role in 
economic development" (Schmidt, 2002, p. A26). 
Consequently, academic administrators have declared to faculty that, due to pressures 
from state legislators and decreases in government support, they are being asked to take 
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measures to help increase the economic impact that the university has on the state or local 
community.  These new requirements for measurable economic returns have caused tension 
between those who believe that the university stands for the free exchange of ideas and those 
who now believe that commercialization success better measures the worth of academe (Gordon, 
2004; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). 
Throughout the institutions there was a belief that more competitive market processes for 
allocating state monies to academic departments were being introduced and a view that 
departments and faculty were being pressured to find external resources to supplement 
institutional funds.  That sense of scarcity and increased pressure was complemented by 
perceptions of heightened competition for external revenues, particularly with regard to 
research monies (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004, p. 183). 
 
Some scholars, researchers, and administrators worry that the existing university research 
model could actually be at risk, as scientists protect and keep confidential their research findings 
and discoveries, focusing on transforming their intellectual property into profitable products 
instead of sharing their results with the public for the greater good (AHC, 2005; Spack, 2005). 
While the issues surrounding the role of public universities are debated, the financial and 
economic changes facing higher education, especially in the biomedical research areas, continue.  
Simultaneously, a growing focus on promoting the commercialization of academic inventions 
and discoveries as an alternative revenue generator is developing, despite the fact that some 
believe the entire infrastructure of academic research may have been irreparably eroded by this 
commercialization (Newman, Couturier & Scurry, 2004). 
According to Slaughter and Leslie (1997), the drive by academic administrations to foster 
closer relationships with industry can impact many areas including faculty autonomy and 
academic freedom.  Even so, the climate has changed within the last decade (Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2004) and several authors suggest that finding an intermediate path or balance between 
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traditional and newly developing missions is best for the future of research universities 
(Mendoza & Berger, 2005; and Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
Given the current state budget constraints and the expansion of academic focus on 
technology transfer activities, it seems unrealistic to believe that this promising new revenue 
stream will be curtailed in order to keep intact the original research model that developed not 
long after World War II (Tereskerz, 2003).  As described by Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), the 
climate has changed within the last decade. 
We now point to the internal embeddedness of profit-oriented activities as a point of 
reorganization (and new investment) by higher education institutions to develop their 
own capacity (and to hire new types of professionals) to market products created by 
faculty and develop commercializable products outside of (though connected to) 
conventional academic structures and individual faculty members (p. 11). 
 
Instead of returning to the past model of separating commercialization from academic pursuit, it 
seems more plausible and attainable to redefine and improve the current  university research 
model by finding a more workable balance between commercialization activities and scholarly 
endeavors (Newman, Coururier & Scurry, 2004; Spack, 2005). 
Following in the footsteps of pioneer states such as Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and 
New York, a new wave of support for commercialization of academic biotechnology began to 
take hold at the close of the 20th century.  Michigan proposed a "life sciences corridor," 
Republican Midwestern governors campaigned for substantial increases in support to build 
biotechnology-industry hubs, California created the "Institutes for Science and Innovation," and 
Alabama approved $100 million for biomedical research building construction (Schmidt, 2002). 
In 1999, American universities collected $641 million in royalties and other license fees 
for discoveries developed from university technologies.  The number in patent applications rose 
from 6,518 in 1998 to 7,612 just a year later.  Total university-based royalties rose 10% while the 
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number of spin-off companies remained virtually the same (279 in 1998 and 275 in 1999).  Three 
thousand seventy-nine (3,079) patents were issued in the U.S. during 1999, and licenses or 
options totaled 3,295 (Blumenstyk, 2003b). 
In 2001, the American Council on Education and the National Alliance of Businesses 
issued a report, which concluded that heads of higher education institutions should encourage 
and support collaborations between academic researchers and private industry.  But, the report 
also noted that not all university leaders and researchers agreed with this advice.  Many raised 
the issues of conflicts of interest and ownership of intellectual property rights stemming from 
such joint ventures (Basinger, 2001).  Nils Hasselmo, president of the Association of American 
Universities and co-chairman of the panel that wrote the report warned that “the nature of these 
working relationships can shape the research agenda and environment of a university, and 
universities have to safeguard against becoming research-and-development arms of 
companies…" (Basinger, 2001, p. A27). 
To help resolve these issues surrounding conflicts of interest and intellectual property 
rights, the report suggests that universities enter into master agreements with industry when they 
are creating these partnerships, sign confidential disclosure agreements, retain intellectual 
property ownership rights, and close licensing deals without prolonged negotiations designed to 
wear down unsuspecting academic institutions .  Critics of the report questioned whether 
universities should involve themselves more in such partnerships and cautioned against moving 
the focus from education to entrepreneurism (Basinger, 2001).  
Professor Leon Rosenberg, MD (2001), of Princeton University, who had also served as 
Director of Research at Bristol-Meyers, noted that partnerships in the biotechnology industry.  
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“…cannot be limited to government-industry collaboration, simply because university research 
plays such a critical role…” (p. 114). 
Even if such precautions are taken, conflicts of interest, bitter power struggles, and fights 
over patent and other intellectual property rights will still occur.  Adding to the mix, which 
makes these relationships even more complex and prone to difficulties, are two factors:  1) the 
strong push by state officials and lawmakers to move their public universities into industry-
partnering relationships riddled with potential conflicts of interest, and 2) the recent information 
technology collapse and the overall economic downturn (Fischer, 2006). 
A few years ago, states were brimming with high tax revenues, beginning to receive their 
share of tobacco settlement dollars, and ready to change their investment cultures (Healy, 2002).  
A study conducted in 2001 by the Maryland Technology Development Corporation (Tedco), 
directly linked approximately 2,200-6,800 high-paying jobs to the technology incubators in the 
state.  This economic development resulted in tax revenues as high as $96 million and 
encouraged state lawmakers to continue to support the partnership (Washington Post, 2002).  
These examples of economic success led to an increase in university venture capital funding in 
which institutions invested portions of their endowment funds for ownership equity in spin-off 
and startup companies coming out of campus discoveries and inventions (Desruisseaux, 2000).   
 Once again, the economic climate has shifted, and universities are now being asked by 
their own state lawmakers to first show a return on past investments prior to asking for new 
public funds earmarked for economic development (Newman, Couturier & Scurry, 2004).  So-
called angel investors are passing on funding early-stage academic technologies (Spack, 2005), 
and federal funding for small business technology transfer funds has tightened (NIH, 2007).  
How has this come to pass? 
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 In recent years, the shift of traditional venture capital funds (VC’s) away from early-stage 
biotechnologies has had a negative effect on angel and seed investors.  As VC’s have moved 
further down the commercialization continuum, they have also reduced the return on investment 
they provide to earlier-stage investors (typically angel and seed funds).  This has resulted in a 
decreased amount of available money for the angel and seed funds to use to invest in early-stage, 
often academic-based biotechnology inventions and discoveries (Bouchie, 2004).  
As described by Prem Das, the Director of technology licensing at Harvard Medical 
School in Boston, academic biotechnologies have been hard hit.  Das and the Angel Capital 
Association professional organization agree that the time and investment is often monumental 
(Bouchie, 2004).  According to them, it typically takes upwards of 8 to 12 years for 
biotechnology inventions to be comprehensively developed into pharmaceutical drugs or other 
regulated products, clear the clinical trial and manufacturing requirements set up by the FDA, 
and be approved for the marketplace. But time is not the only roadblock, the Association points 
out, because it often takes over $20 million until a seed or angel investor can exit a biotech 
investment.  As a result, angel and seed investors have also reduced their funding of early 
biotechnologies, exacerbating the early-stage funding gap (Bouchie). 
New Commercialization Models 
Since academic involvement in biotechnology commercialization is still a young and 
evolving partnership, few good models exist that address the R&D commercialization gap.  
Research budget constraints and limitations on the ability of academic institutions to compete in 
the marketplace serve to inhibit university intellectual property commercialization, which 
shortchanges the potential value of the technologies that are licensed (Dueker, 1997). 
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Traditional academic biomedical research funding sources, such as the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) do not typically grant awards to fund the early developmental stage of research.  
Also, the NIH Small Business Innovation Research and Technology Transfer Awards 
(SBIR/STTR) fund a very small percentage of the academic technologies that sit at this early 
stage of development (NIH, 2007).  As a result, promising inventions and discoveries lie 
dormant because they are not appropriate for NIH funds, yet are too preliminary to draw interest 
from early-stage investors without giving away too much of their potential market value 
(Association of Academic Health Centers 2005; Spack, 2005). 
Some new university/industry biomedical commercialization models are being developed 
to address these issues, but at this time, have not been entirely successful.  On the plus side, these 
new models have improved the technology transfer process and related activities that have 
blossomed at research universities.  As progressive and successful as they have been from an 
academic technology transfer organizational and operations perspective, they admittedly fall 
short in two major areas:  1) finding appropriate early-stage funding sources (Kouri, 2006; 
Nowak, 2006; Olivieri, 2003; Spack, 2005; Tereskerz, 2003) and 2) strategically placing 
experienced individuals to lead the management teams in these new startup companies formed 
around these technologies (Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006).  As a result, it has become even more 
difficult for an early-stage academic-based invention or discovery to successfully move along the 
commercialization continuum than in decades past. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is a growing problem in securing adequate financing for 
discoveries that have  moved beyond the traditional biomedical research funding stage but are 
still too early for current early-stage investors (Association of Academic Health Centers, 2005; 
Friedl, 2006; Gordon, 2004; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Spack, 2005).  This situation is referred 
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to as the "funding gap" or the “valley of death” by academic commercialization experts (Kouri, 
2006; Nowak, 2006) and is acknowledged by investors and academics alike.  Currently, few new 
funding models have been developed to successfully address this problem (Spack, 2005). 
Based on past experience, research universities traditionally have been expected to 
implement the following options to resolve this funding issue: 
1) license the early-stage technology to industry or an aggressive early-stage   
  investment fund for a very small financial and/or equity return; 
2)  rely on "friends, fools, and family" to fund the developmental research; 
3)  apply for federal NIH grants from the Small Business Innovation and Research 
Fund (SBIR/STTR), although the wait time is often more than one year and the 
amount and the number of awards are small; or, 
4)  implement some combination of the above options (Angell, 2000). 
To date, these existing mechanisms have not met with much success.  But, these 
alternatives have developed out of necessity, since even early-stage venture capitalists (VCs) 
have left a growing number of emerging academic technologies trapped, declaring that more 
developmental work needs to be completed prior to any investment interest on their part.  Yet, 
turning to industry collaboration is not the best alternative, since such partnerships have led to 
conflicts of interest and undervaluation of academic biomedical technologies (Gelejins & Thier, 
2002; Spack, 2005).  The AHC and others are now recognizing that changes are needed in the 
academic biomedical commercialization process in order to increase the success of 
commercialization and reduce conflicts of interest and other unintended consequences 
(Association of Academic Health Centers, 2005; Spack). 
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Nowak (2006) has described the current funding problems in relation to funding gaps in 
the commercialization continuum.  He explained that there is a growing chasm between the 
funding given to academic researchers that result in inventions and discoveries, and the place in 
the commercialization continuum when even the earliest-stage investment funds will consider 
taking a risk and invest in these inventions and discoveries.  This gap in the commercialization 
continuum is illustrated in Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1.  Commercialization Gap for Early-stage Biotechnologies 
At the 2006 AUTM national meeting in March, Nowak (2006) described this funding gap 
as the “valley of death,” a term also used by Friedl (2006), indicating it is the place along the 
continuum where even the most promising invention or discovery coming out of a university will 
die unless there is a viable mechanism in place to provide for the funding and related business 
development components necessary to bridge this dangerous gap. 
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  Nowak (2006) discussed that this commercialization gap between research and products 
is growing and is occurring on a much more regular basis than before.   Even so, he declared that 
few successful strategies to overcome these serious commercialization problems have been 
developed to date.  Several who have recognized this commercialization gap (Friedl, 2006; 
Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Spack, 2005) have suggested that funds and expertise are needed in 
order to move these promising, yet nascent technologies, along the commercialization continuum 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Bridging the Funding Gap 
Nowak pointed out that this is an ongoing issue that requires workable solutions, such as 
the development of academic-based bridge funding and the creation of specialized curriculum-
based programs.  Although initially, these strategies appear to be very different in their 
approaches to the commercialization problem, upon further exploration, Nowak pointed out that 
they have much in common. 
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Curriculum Development 
As part of his 2006 AUTM session, Nowak introduced Richard Kouri, PhD, who was 
Entrepreneur-in-Residence, Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill at that time,   Kouri provided an overview of the program begun in the MBA 
program at UNC.  He agreed that there is a growing funding gap facing university-based 
technologies, but Kouri adds that this gap is not only related to funding, but also in finding the 
necessary business expertise in order to develop such biotechnologies.  Since the inventions and 
discoveries created at research universities are often made by faculty working in the biomedical 
fields, these technologies require sophisticated business development expertise in a highly 
specialized industry (Kouri, 2006). 
This situation presents a dilemma because the inventors who understand these 
technologies most are not experienced in business management or development and traditional 
business experts do not understand the highly specialized biotechnology industry.  UNC’s 
solution has been to establish their biotechnology industry program as a different strategic 
approach to resolving the commercialization gap.    
Recently, others have also voiced the growing need for developing specialized experts 
who will be able to meet the early-stage biotechnology industry needs for leadership, 
management, financial analysis, and scientific development.  One response has been to create 
new academic programs, including the PhD/MBA joint degrees at institutions such as the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and San Diego State University (Gewin, 2005).  A 
much more comprehensive model combining early stage funding and specialized curriculum 
programs has been established at the University of San Diego.  The School of Medicine 
SOM/CONNECT solution is part of a comprehensive program that includes an educational 
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pipeline as well as a an extensive translational medicine and developmental research program 
(Holmes, 2006). 
Educational Entrepreneurship was also researched by Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) who 
found that many of the leading research institutions have reported that new or expanded focus is 
being placed on graduate degrees incorporating the mechanisms of entrepreneurship and 
commercialization.  Some master’s programs were created or expanded to target individuals who 
had already earned undergraduate degrees. The original goal was to expand masters degrees into 
“executive” programs, many without the requirement of writing a thesis.  Another, unintended, 
graduate program began to take hold as well, the entrepreneurial-based degree.  As will be 
researched in this study, the University of North Carolina built its biotechnology 
commercialization MBA program around an entrepreneurial core, while the University of San 
Diego has expanded its existing graduate and professional degree programs and has instituted 
cross-disciplinary research and training programs to add a concentration focused on educational 
entrepreneurship (Holmes, 2006). 
Other new biomedical technology industry programs are being developed or are already 
in place.  The Biodesign Innovation Program, a three-course Biotechnology Track program in 
the graduate school at the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center in Shreveport, is 
based on the premise that graduate schools do not train scientists but educate them, leaving them 
lacking in the ability to be able to perform in the biotechnology commercialization field.  This 
program also includes an internship in a company or other entity involved in the biotechnology 
industry (Giordano, 2006). 
Responding to alumni and students it has surveyed, Stanford University has announced a 
new MBA curriculum which will begin in the fall of 2007.  This new curriculum is described as 
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customized and flexible, to reflect the needs of the marketplace and employers (Gloeckner, 
2006).  Yet, this does not solve the problem of how to provide business management and 
development education to those faculty who are have already or could some day develop a 
biomedical invention nor how to give business experts or MBA students the necessary 
experience and information regarding the biotechnology industry. 
Biotechnology industry experts agree that being an expert in the biomedical sciences has 
no relation to being a successful business entrepreneur (Gewin, 2005).  Scientists and business 
school deans agree that there is a growing need for academic scientists to learn on-the-job 
biotechnology industry business training to be most effective in assisting in the 
commercialization process (Powell, 2004).  Such approaches are helping to broaden the 
understanding of the biotechnology industry at universities but they, alone, do not directly 
resolve the problem of the growing technology transfer chasm.  The comprehensive approach 
taken by the MBA program at UNC addresses the issues related to faculty, business experts, and 
investors and is therefore, a program that seems quite appropriate to study further. 
Conflict over the Mission of the University 
 There are opposing viewpoints about whether or not academic investment in 
commercializing inventions and discoveries provides social benefits or not.  Some argue that 
since so much university research is funded from either state or federal taxpayer dollars, at least 
this shows some initiative in trying to secure a return on that investment.  Others argue that 
universities should not be "distracted from their primary missions of teaching and research, and, 
in any case, should not behave like big business" (Desruisseaux, 2000, p. A44). 
 A faction of university faculty are resisting the push for academic institutions to increase 
their focus on economic development, while some universities are taking even stronger steps to 
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ensure just such a commitment (Fischer, 2006).  Texas A&M University announced earlier this 
year that a faculty member’s involvement in patents and commercialization of technologies will 
be considered on par with teaching, research, and service in terms of tenure and promotion 
(Lipka, 2006).  
Even though some have frowned upon such investment, several universities have already 
funded startups.  Although the examples described in this discussion include both public and 
private academic institutions, the focus of this research study is on public universities.  That 
being said, the examples are highly transferable from private to public entities.  The Ohio 
University has joined state money with private funds to form the Appalachian Development 
Fund, with the university putting up $2 million of the total to provide technical assistance to new 
companies.  Vanderbilt University has invested several million dollars in seven companies that 
were offshoots from academic research and Boston University pulled $120 million from its 
endowment fund into one company, Seragen, which is now a subsidiary of Ligand 
Pharmaceuticals.  Unfortunately, the university has only recovered a small portion of that 
investment (Desruisseaux, 2000). 
  With the push toward commercialization of research technologies and the 
encouragement of faculty to increase collaboration and partnerships with business and industry, 
some faculty and administrators alike are wondering how this new scenario will affect the 
relationship between faculty and administration, the impact this new model will have on tenure, 
and just how this shift in expectations for faculty will play out in terms of academic freedom.  
The American Association of Academic Health Centers points out in its report that the academic 
commercialization trend has affected the relationship between faculty and administrators 
(Association of Academic Health Centers, 2005).  AHC is calling for a new study to take a closer 
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look at the entire academic technology transfer model to help ensure that the best model, 
leadership, and expectations can be implemented. 
At the same time, many educational researchers are studying and searching for new 
approaches to leadership in higher education.  For many, the power struggle between 
administration and faculty, called shared governance, tops the list of leadership models that 
needs further study and possible revision.  Even though most educational scholars agree that 
universities need both academic and administrative leaders to be effective, they also agree that 
this unique power sharing causes tensions on both sides.  The new commercialization model in 
higher education is one such example of the growing tensions between faculty and administrators 
(Gumport, 2000). 
Anna Neumann (1991) points out that the research on collegiate leadership has focused 
on how leaders act and not on how they think.  Yet, other than when faced with fiscal issues, the 
research shows little understanding of how college leaders organize themselves in their roles as 
heads of institutions or large components of these universities. 
 Shared governance is unique to colleges and universities, but evolved over time within 
the academic environment.  The idea is based on the concept that institutions of higher education 
need both administrative and scholarly expertise to function well (Morphew, 1999).  Historically, 
even though universities required both scholarly and managerial expertise, power was not 
divided equally.  The college president had the exclusive authority to oversee operations of the 
university, including the disciplining and teaching of students.  Such a model was imported from 
the English collegiate model, where faculty were not trusted by college founders and trustees 
(Lazerson, 1997). 
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But collegiate America questioned such unilateral authority.  In 1825, the faculty at 
Harvard protested the developmental authority and oversight of the curriculum and won the right 
to take internal control away from the president for the content of instruction, as well as of 
disciplining students (Morphew, 1999).  This internal faculty control grew over time into what is 
known today as academic freedom. 
Some argue that the present day interpretation of academic freedom is far different from 
the seeds established at Harvard more than a century ago.  According to Lazerson (1997), one of 
the negative outcomes of a broadened notion of academic freedom has been that faculty have 
extreme difficulty working toward common goals.  This has influenced the faculty's take on what 
constitutes their authority under shared governance.  Lazerson points out that this notion of 
faculty being in charge of their own operations had sometimes gotten to the point where some of 
them saw "the primary purpose of the institution was to serve each individual faculty member.  
Faculty definitions of shared governance tend to revolve around vetoes and resistance" 
(Lazerson,  p. 15). 
Morphew (1999) comments that shared governance, including faculty control over the 
instruction and evaluation of students, has taken such a hold on American higher education that it 
is the given model for governing our collegiate institutions.  Additionally, in his research, 
Lazerson (1997) has found that shared governance has other, unintended, often exercised 
consequences.  For example, if faculty or administration wants an easy way to enforce the status 
quo, either can use the excuse that bureaucracy and the slow process of approval in a complex. 
 On one side, for example, administrators have declared to faculty that, due to pressures 
from state legislators and decreases in government support, faculty are being asked to take 
measures to help increase the economic impact that the university has on the state or local 
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community.  For example, licensing and other aspects of commercialization of university-based 
technologies, adds approximately $40 billion or more to the U.S. economy annually.  Just under 
one billion ($1 billion) dollars was received by American universities in 2003 from its 
commercialization of technologies (AUTM, 2006). 
Even so, for the time being, the amount of royalty money can be far greater than anyone 
has imagined.  For example, the faculty member who discovered the Taxol technology at Florida 
State University received approximately $30 million in royalties for 1999 (Blumenstyk, 2003b).  
Notice of such salary supplements cannot help but circulate among other academic researchers 
around the country.  Such amounts also do not escape the notice of administrators as well, who 
hope that their royalty-split will be incentives for faculty to continue to work at academic 
institutions. 
As a result, the dynamics of shared governance have changed in recent years, with new 
players being added to the mix.  As described in Chapter 1, state governments and academic 
boards have weighed in more strongly, especially with regard to economic development.  
Another new academic-based group now shares in influencing university governance with regard 
to commercialization.  Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) describe the shifting administrative 
structure in which technology transfer officers now share some of the administrative oversight 
and are integral in incorporating the commercialization focus into the overall research agenda. 
The most comprehensive curriculum model is being developed by the NIH, and will 
encompass 60 comprehensive academic bioscience programs when it is completed in the year 
2012.  Key to the success of this NIH model are two components: 1) the belief that each 
academic research environment has unique characteristics, including advantages and barriers 
which, when utilized correctly, will provide for the highest success at that institution; and 2) the 
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necessity for university-based customized academic programs to educate and train professionals 
in order for them to possess the skills necessary for key aspects of translational research, 
including technology commercialization (NIH News, 2006). 
The NIH has recognized that such academic site differences are inherent and has built its 
new CTSA program within a flexible framework, thus allowing for each university to maximize 
its unique potential.  The NIH wisely recognizes that many key factors at each academic center 
are very unique or not easily changed and, therefore, so integral to the overall institutional 
structure, that it is imperative to base the CTSA transformation project on both flexibility and 
adaptability (NIH, 2007). 
For more than 40 years, a highly-regarded NIH paradigm has existed in which  
comprehensive, flexible mechanisms and adaptable strategic planning have been implemented to 
maximize translational research success. This model is the highly successful National Cancer 
Institute (NCI) comprehensive cancer center program, which  is based on find the best fit for an 
institution, using flexibility and customization.  This NCI program has contributed significantly 
to the advancements in treating and detecting cancer and in success in the commercialization of 
cancer-related inventions and discoveries (NCI, 2007).  Many of the NCI program’s key 
components are part of the new NIH CTSA initiative. 
Similarly, the best biotechnology cluster model, which includes the University of San 
Diego (UCSD) health sciences center program, is tailored around flexibility in order to maximize 
the advantages and minimize the disadvantages at that institution and in the San Diego region 
(Holmes, 2006; Milken, 2006).  The UCSD model contains the two major characteristics being 
compared in this research study: 1) a specialized research and development fund; and 2) a 
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customized academic curriculum program, both of which focus on commercialization.  These 
two components are part of the five key components necessary for commercialization success. 
 As the NIH CTSA program indicates, a more broadly-based, comprehensive change in 
structure and function is needed in order to ensure a long-term and overall momentum shift in 
focus and outcomes.  As recognized by the NIH, a transformative change needs to occur which 
requires additional research, scrutiny, planning, and testing before a more balanced, long-term 
level of success for academic biomedical commercialization will emerge (Association of 
Academic Health Centers, 2005; NIH, 2007; Spack, 2005). 
 Augmenting this shift is the revamped translational training programs, which are 
receiving $10 million from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI).  This HHMI program 
was implemented after academic biomedical research leaders recognized that new discoveries 
were not being pursued partly due to the lack of expertise and understanding of just how to 
proceed.  The academic institutions receiving these funds to augment and restructure their 
programs are the following: 
 Baylor College of Medicine 
 Cleveland Clinic Lerner College of Medicine at Case Western Reserve University 
 Harvard University 
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 Rice University 
 Stanford University 
 University of Alabama, Birmingham 
 University of California, Davis 
 University of California, San Diego 
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 University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
 University of Pennsylvania 
 University of Washington, and 
 Yale University. 
As discussed above, the University of California at San Diego has been designated the 
best model for early-stage biotechnology development and the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel was one of the three academic models analyzed in this research study (Kuehn, 2006). 
Unintended Consequences and Resultant Issues 
The resulting perceived or real conflicts of interest are just beginning to be addressed by 
academia and its research sponsors (NIH, 2006; G-2 Compliance Report, 2006).  The tension 
between tenured and other faculty is one of several unintended consequences that stem from 
universities and faculty doing whatever they can to maximize external funding source (Kirp, 
2003).  If a model of scholarship more akin to the one Boyer (1990) proposed was the norm, in 
which scholarships allowed for research-focused faculty to coexist in academe alongside faculty 
with teaching-oriented duties, some of the present-day tensions might have been reduced or 
eliminated. 
Yet, even in Boyer's (1990) model, if the research-oriented or discovery-focused faculty 
were treated as superstars and the applied or teaching faculty were not allotted the same or 
equivalent status, the rise of the union would probably have still happened.  Boyer's model seems 
a better fit for research universities as long as faculty-controlled outside research funding is not a 
factor.  Boyer's model does not seem to provide a solution for how to control for the inequities in 
faculty status when star researchers or PIs bring large research and contract revenues with them, 
which also include substantial overhead dollars for the institution (Bok, 2003; Kirp, 2003). 
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Another unanticipated result of encouraging scientific research faculty to seek outside 
income was the rise in financial conflicts of interest.  As researchers' relationships with industry 
grew, so did the perceived, as well as the actual, possibility that the conduct of their research, as 
well as the results, could be influenced by the sponsor (Bok, 2003; Kerr, 2001; Kirp, 2003).  The 
most controversial situation to date involved a $25 million research deal between the University 
of California at Berkeley and Pharmaceuticals (Blumenstyk, 2003a; Nature, 2001).  Berkeley 
entered into a five-year contract with the pharmaceutical company in which Novartis agreed to 
pay $5 million per year to researchers from the Department of Plant and Microbial Biology for 
independent, non-programmatic research projects, which included already-ongoing research 
projects not funded by Novartis in addition to those the company funded and also controlled 
what technologies would be patented (Nadis, 2000). 
As the research project progressed, the level of industry control grew as well.  Even 
doctoral dissertation topics and findings by Ph.D. students were subject to Novartis scrutiny.  To 
complicate matters, Novartis sold its plant research division to another company, Syngenta, 
which took over the Berkeley research contract.  In December of 2002, Syngenta announced it 
was shutting down its California research center and ending its collaboration with Berkeley.  The 
industry-sponsored research relationship was the subject of so much scrutiny that the Berkeley 
administration hired an outside group of consultants to assess whether the research that faculty 
had conducted was influenced by Novartis or Syngenta.  Several faculty are under scrutiny at this 
time to determine the quality and independence of their Novartis and Syngenta research 
(Blumenstyk, 2003a).  When the Berkeley administration initially announced the Novartis 
research project, they spoke of it as the beginning of a positive, new era in academic-industry 
collaboration (Nadis, 2000). 
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According to Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), conflicts of interest are the most serious 
issues facing faculty in terms of professional choices and career development.   
“The greatest points of conflict for professors were issues that pushed them to make choices 
between public service and an academic capitalist knowledge regime.  These issues were 
publishing versus patenting, access versus secrecy, and contested ownership of a wide variety of 
intellectual property” (p.113). 
 In response to these issues, Nature (2001) published a list of policies aimed at managing 
the conflicts of interest that may arise when universities enter into research and development 
relationships with industry.  These recommendations for universities, industry, and the federal 
government included the following: 
1) vigilance and ability to speak out regarding perceived or real conflicts 
2) transparency regarding such conflicts of interest or commitment 
3) debate at the national level regarding these potential conflicts; and 
4) cooperation by industry to sustain the public trust. 
 All of the above examples demonstrate new problems that have surfaced as a result of the 
push by research universities toward increased external funding and more competitive recruiting 
of science faculty superstars that were not anticipated by those institutions or faculty when they 
set out to improve their academic status and rankings.  But, the unintended consequences that 
have resulted from such actions have created additional issues and problems for both faculty and 
universities that require new involvement and actions in order to manage and resolve or they will 
remain as unresolved issues. 
This research study was based around the five criteria outlined in Chapter 1.  These 
criteria have been designated as essential in the successful establishment of the best early-stage 
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biotechnology funding model (University of San Diego Health Sciences Center).  This study 
explored three existing models of early-stage academic commercialization and analyzed how 
these models were designed and operated (Holmes, 2006, Kuehn, 2006; NIH, 2007).  The goal of 
this study was to analyze three distinct mechanisms for early-stage academic biomedical 
commercialization and determine what components of each might be applied to a broader range 
of public institutions.  In order to conduct the study, the following questions were answered: 
1) What is the individual process by which: 
a. the GRA model works? 
b. the PBRC model works? 
c. the UNC model works? 
2) How do the five key components play out in each setting (GRA, UNC, and 
PBRC) in terms of organization, implementation, and in relation to 
commercialization? 
3) What are the similarities and differences among the three models and how do they 
compare to the UCSD model? 
4) Are there additional key components considered essential for commercialization 
success? 
5) How do the three models address the issues related to unintended consequences,  
such as conflicts of interest, faculty roles, and the overall mission of the  
university? and 
6) Which findings can be applied to other public research universities? 
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CHAPTER 3. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Design of the Study 
This research study was designed as an exploratory study which focused on analyzing the 
following:  1) the mechanisms for commercializing early-stage biotechnology inventions and 
discoveries, and 2) the processes that could be implemented to minimize or remove unintended 
consequences resulting from such commercialization activities.  The goal of the study was to be 
able to present possible models, mechanisms, and best practices that other public universities can 
use to successfully commercialize their early-stage biotechnologies while preserving the overall 
mission of the university and minimizing or eliminating related unintended consequences. 
This study looked at different biotechnology commercialization mechanisms used at 
different public research universities with substantial research dollars which rank them among 
the top funded U.S. institutions for biomedical research with the majority of funding originating 
from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, is 
ranked fourth among all public research universities in the U.S. in total research dollars and  
ninth in biomedical-related research among public institutions while the Louisiana State 
University System, including the Pennington Biomedical Research Center (PBRC), ranks 44th 
overall.  The University of California San Diego (UCSD) ranks fifth among all public 
universities in biomedical research funding (Lombardi, Capaldi, Mirka, & Abbey, 2005).  The 
Georgia Research Alliance model was studied with a focus on how the GRA model played out at 
the University of Georgia.  GRA is a statewide biomedical research and commercialization 
program for the top six research universities in the state (GRA, 2007). 
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This study analyzed these three different models for commercializing early-stage 
academic inventions and discoveries.  The PBRC mechanism is based on the creation and 
implementation of an early-stage research and development investment platform.  This program 
also includes other academic components, a research foundation, and an early-stage investment 
fund, among others.  The goals of the program include commercialization of early-stage 
inventions and discoveries and the elimination or management of related conflicts of interest and 
other unintended consequences, while preserving the mission of the university (PBRC, 2007). 
The UNC MBA biotechnology entrepreneurship model is a program that reinforces the 
academic core missions of education and training and also increases the chance of 
commercialization success for academic biotechnologies.  This model also helps to grow the 
number of local biotechnology industry experts in finance, management, and regulatory areas 
(Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007). 
The GRA model is focused around four programs which have been designed to maximize 
the research and development advantages that are in existence in the state of Georgia.  The GRA 
is a collaboration of six universities, the state of Georgia, and private investors (GRA, 2007).  
The GRA model has been created as a catalyst for biomedical commercialization at these top 
research universities in the state.  The program has been in existence for over 16 years and has 
contributed to the development of 18 centers of biomedical excellence in the state, the creation of 
more than 125 new companies, and the infusion of $2 billion of biotechnology research and 
development in the state (GRA, 2007). 
The three models were compared to each other and then to the University of California at 
San Diego (UCSD) biotechnology economic development program, which is considered the best 
model for academic biotechnology commercialization based on the creation of biotechnology 
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commercialization start-up companies (Milken 2004; Milken, 2006).  The Milken Institute has 
recently issued a comprehensive report on the U.S. biotechnology and life science clusters.  One 
of the key areas this report analyzed surrounded start up companies based on university 
inventions and discoveries.  The UCSD School of Medicine has created more than 65 start up 
companies based on its biotechnologies (Milken, 2006). 
Edward Holmes, MD, former Dean of the UCSD School of Medicine and Vice 
Chancellor for Health Sciences, attributed much of this success on several factors, and they have 
been combined with the Milken components as follows: 
1) the small size of the School of Medicine and the Health Sciences Center; 
2) the high ratio of research dollars per faculty member; 
3) a very entrepreneurial community; 
4) the UCSD College of Integrated Life Sciences (COILS); and 
5) the School of Medicine CONNECT program, a specialized biotechnology 
commercialization program which includes a structured mechanism for taking 
university biotechnologies, providing them with early-stage funding, expertise in 
developing their commercial concepts, and a springboard for creating new business 
partnerships (Milken, 2004; Holmes, 2006; Milken, 2006) . 
The Milken Report (2004) points out that few U.S. geographic areas have an 
entrepreneurial culture along with a critical mass of academic biotechnologies.  The UCSD 
model is located in a geographic region which has demonstrated the existence of a well-
developed, long-term entrepreneurial cluster with biotechnologies ready for commercialization.  
The existence of both characteristics seldom exists in a single geographic location.  For example, 
in many regions where academic biotechnology opportunities are prevalent, a correspondingly 
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high level of entrepreneurial spirit does not typically exist.  If these geographic locations are 
entrepreneurial, they typically do not contain a critical mass of biotechnologies (Milken, 2004; 
2006). 
Two of the commercialization mechanisms, UNC and PBRC, were chosen for this study 
because each approach to commercialization was very different from the other and each 
contained only a subset of the five UCSD key characteristics described above.  Since each of 
these two cases studied contained a different subset of the key characteristics, each was 
characterized as an extreme or deviant case.  The third model, the GRA program, has been 
regarded by many as a highly successful biotechnology commercialization program which could 
be adapted for use by a myriad of other universities, and therefore, it was considered a critical 
case in this study (BOR, 2007; GRA, 2007; Patton, 2002). 
 These models were explored in depth, and the research has produced thick descriptions 
and key data which were used in illuminating the research questions and comparing the five 
essential commercialization characteristics (Tashakkouri & Teddlie, 1998) which are presented 
in Table 1. 
The curriculum model at the University of North Carolina (UNC) Chapel Hill sits in what 
is known as the Research Triangle, and has been ranked third by the Milken Report (2006) in 
terms of biotechnology start-up success.  The UNC Chapel Hill campus has also experienced a 
significant funding gap for early-stage biotechnology inventions and discoveries. 
In order to combat this funding gap at UNC Chapel Hill, a curriculum-based program in 
the business school has been developed as part of the masters degree curriculum in business 
administration (MBA).  This MBA program has been designed to provide education and hands-
on practice for faculty inventors and MBA students alike.  The program targets academic-based 
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technologies which emanate from UNC faculty and other researchers, evaluates and analyzes 
them in terms of commercialization potential, and then proceeds to further develop a select 
number of these technologies.  The process includes creating a comprehensive business plan, 
setting up a new company, hiring appropriate business development and management personnel, 
raising necessary funding, and further developing the technologies with commercialization as a 
goal (Kouri, 2006). 
A newly-formed research investment platform has been established to benefit the 
Pennington Biomedical Research Center (PBRC), a research campus of the Louisiana State 
University System.  The purpose of this investment platform is to provide financial support and 
business expertise to develop business plans, form new startup companies, and move academic 
technologies generated out of PBRC further along the commercialization continuum.  Despite 
the existence of the fund, many PBRC early-stage technologies are not being commercialized at 
the rate it was hoped due to the early-stage status of the technologies (PBRC internal documents, 
2007). 
The GRA is a highly successful biotechnology commercialization program which has 
played a key role in generating more than $2 billion in new federal funding and investment 
capital for research conducted within the state of Georgia.  The University of Georgia is one of 
the six research universities participating in the program.  GRA has developed more than 125 
new startup companies and created more than 5,000 new jobs (GRA, 2007). 
All three models were analyzed on a holistic basis as well as by looking at embedded 
units (Yin, 2003).   Holistic analysis (Denzin, 1989; Moustakas, 1994; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003) 
was of great importance in this study because the basic structures of these three mechanisms are 
very different.  Very few defined parameters existed in the formation of these models and, as of 
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yet, no single technology commercialization model has been proposed as working for all 
academic institutions.  The GRA model has been studied by many states, including Louisiana, 
but not adopted intact elsewhere, although the comparisons to GRA continue while universities 
and states search for a better way to commercialize their technologies (BOR, 2007). 
The current environment has allowed each of the three research institutions studied here 
to design and develop a commercialization strategy based on its own institutional and 
environmental strengths and weaknesses.  The three models studied have been designed to 
augment technology transfer while managing or alleviating the hurdles surrounding academic 
biomedical research commercialization.  Yet, the models are at different stages of development 
and success. 
In this study, the models were looked at in terms of what processes and mechanisms were 
used to create their programs and what new ideas are being considered for the future to help 
them in their quest to accomplish the following: 
1)  bridge the funding gap; 
2)  support developmental research; 
3)  minimize conflicts of interest and other unintended consequences; and 
4)  further the preservation of academic research by finding a balance between: 
 a)  traditional and new missions of academic biomedical research; and 
b)  parameters and limitations imposed by organizational, governmental, 
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Sampling Procedures 
This study was based on the following sampling procedures: 
1) purposive sampling:  two examples of commercialization strategies  
(PBRC and UNC) were based on extreme/deviant cases each exhibiting some but not all 
of the five characteristics considered critical in the UCSD best model design (Tashakkori 
& Teddlie, 1998); 
2) critical case sampling:  the GRA model was defined as a critical case due to the 
assessment that this program is one that could, at least theoretically, be adapted to work 
in most university settings (Patton, 2002); and 
3) convenience sampling:  access to the key individuals and organizations involved with 
these three commercialization strategies were ones that were readily available  (Patton, 
2002). 
More than 20 key individuals were interviewed for this study (see Appendix A), which 
included one on one interviews, focus group sessions, and other meetings and discussions.  The 
GRC, UNC, and PBRC strategies were assessed in relation to the five key areas described in 
Table 1 and then compared in relation to the UCSD best practices model as part of the interview 
sessions. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Data were collected using a variety of methods and procedures.  A significant portion of 
the study was based on interviews, focus groups, and other meetings.  Current and significant 
historical documents were collected, reviewed, and analyzed, and whenever possible, records of 
how each strategy had been developed were gathered (Patton, 2002).  In addition, emerging 
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documents and other developing data were collected.  Multiple occasions for observation became 
part of the research process. 
By implementing various data collection procedures, the accuracy and trustworthiness of 
the data were increased through triangulation of data sources (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, 
2003).  Also, using such diversified data sources increased the construct validity of the study 
(Yin, 2003). 
 The main research collection methods included the following: 
1) focus group sessions and individual interviews; 
2) observations (including participant observer opportunities); and 
3) document review. 
1)  Focus Group Sessions and Individual Interviews: 
 Interviews with the key informants for PBRC, the GRA program, and the UNC model 
included those who were central in the development and implementation of their programs.  The 
methods of interviewing all key informants were varied and adapted according to the format 
used.  Some of the interviews of key informants were one on one, some were in small groups, 
and some were during focus group meetings (See Appendix B). 
 Focus group sessions included semi-structured interviews and included exploratory and 
explanatory questions beginning with broad-based low risk inquiries and grand tour or mini tour 
questions (Spradley, 1979; 1980) followed by more focused questions.  Follow-up questions 
used as probes specifically asked about the five key components outlined in Table 1.  At the end 
of the focus group sessions, the participants were asked about any other issues that had not been 
discussed. 
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 Focus group sessions have strengths and weaknesses.  On the plus side, focus group 
sessions may include more topics, more extensive discussions, and aspects of a topic that an 
individual being interviewed might not discuss.  At the same time, there are some downsides to 
this research method.  Because of the confidential nature of some technologies and activities 
which are inherently part of intellectual property commercialization, some issues and discussion 
topics could not be discussed by researchers or others in group sessions.  In addition, there is a 
possibility that a type of group think or thematic bias can occur in a focus group session.  To help 
with trustworthiness and to be able to gather information not conducive to focus group sessions, 
individual interviews were also conducted (Patton, 2002). 
 Semi-structured individual interviews involved the key persons described in Appendix A.  
The interviews often began with specific issues and worked toward more general inquiries.  The 
individuals might be the ones initiating the meeting with the researcher about some aspect of 
technology transfer at which time the researcher asked probing, more specific questions about 
the topic being discussed.  The researcher also asked these key individuals about the five key 
components outlined in Table 1 wherever this fit into the interview process. 
2)  Observations: 
 Due to the position of the researcher as the Director of Technology Transfer at the 
Pennington Biomedical Research Center and one of the key individuals involved in the creation 
of the PBRC research investment platform, the researcher became a participant observer for the 
Pennington-related mechanism being analyzed in this study and continues to be an insider 
viewing the ongoing development of this particular model (Patton, 2002; Spradley, 1980; Stake, 
1995). 
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 Ongoing, extensive observations were conducted in many instances and these 
observations were described using thick descriptions obtained from extensive written field notes 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 2002; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, 2003).  At times the 
researcher was a participant/observer in the situation.  In such cases, the researcher was able to 
observe others while also actively participating in the process by entering in the dialogue and 
asking questions. 
 On several occasions involving the Louisiana Board of Regents/Louisiana Recovery 
Authority (BOR) project led by Regional Technologies Strategies, Inc. (RTS), the researcher was 
a participant/observer.  These occasions included a session where the researcher was interviewed 
by RTS, one town hall meeting which conducted in part like a focus group session, and then a 
subsequent reporting session in which the researcher and other key participants also asked 
questions of RTS.  This BOR project also provided extensive information, meeting summaries, 
background research reports, and proposed project information to the participants which the 
researcher used as background and supportive documentation for this study. 
3) Document Review: 
 Many internal documents were studied and reviewed in the process of gathering in-depth 
data.  Extensive field notes were taken and a reflexive journal was kept.  These data were 
augmented by public documents and external websites to corroborate information from 
interviews, observations, and document gathering.  These research sources were also used to 
assist in the interview guide and the formation of specific interview questions.  All of these 
methods of gathering research data were used to increase the credibility and trustworthiness of 
the data gathered and the observations involved in this study. 
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 Mechanisms such as informal conversations, the interview guide model, and open- and 
closed-end interview sessions (Patton, 2002), employing unstructured interviews anticipated in 
the process of ethnographic observation (Spradley 1979), grand tour questions triggered by 
ethnographic observations and participant observations (Spradley 1979; 1980); and more 
structured sessions were employed to gain specific information.  Specific questions and 
interview guide documents are available in Appendix B.  The key informants provided both 
historical information and valuable insight into the current status and anticipated future activities 
of all three models. 
Data Analysis 
 Case-specific data were captured and reported in field notes, reinforced by documentation 
in a reflexive journal, and discovered in historical and other documents as well as through thick 
descriptions and through individual and focus group interviews.  In this study, these data were 
then analyzed using several methods.  Overall data analysis included constant comparative 
analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) based on unitizing the data into information units and then 
categorizing these units into thematic categories.  Units were further examined in order to 
discover any emerging patterns and themes not previously described, which led to several new 
components being identified (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003).  These categories included the five key 
commercialization components (Table 1) as well as emerging trends not included in these five 
defined categories. 
 As described above, none of the three programs studied were build around an already-
established model.  All three models were interventions with no pre-set solutions prescribed for 
them, except that the common goal was to increase the success of biomedical research 
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commercialization (Stake, 1995).  Content analysis (Patton, 2002) was used to identify 
underlying themes, assumptions, and beliefs related to the academic commercialization process. 
 In addition to analyzing the three cases in terms of categorical analysis and comparisons 
of detailed information based on the five key components described above and emerging data 
and themes, the data from all three strategies were reviewed and analyzed holistically (Denzin, 
1989; Moustakas, 1994: Stake; Yin, 2003).  The resulting new key components and other 
findings were added to the comparison chart in Table 5 while other new results were discussed in 
the findings section. 
 The second part of the study explored how the GRA, UNC, and PBRC commercialization 
mechanisms address the related unintended consequences, including those surrounding the 
overall mission of the university, faculty roles, and conflicts of interest.  The data collected were 
also analyzed using constant comparative analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and content analysis 
(Patton, 2002).  The results included new suggestions for minimizing unintended consequences 
and supporting the overall mission of the public research university, both of which are discussed 
in depth in Chapters 4 and 5. 
  The goal of the study was to be able to present options for other public universities to 
adopt so that they could accomplish the goals related to commercializing early-stage biomedical 
inventions and discoveries while managing or eliminating unintended consequences such as 
conflicts of interest, competing faculty roles, and preserving the overall mission of the university. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This was an exploratory study which focused on analyzing the following:  1) specific 
mechanisms for commercializing early-stage academic biotechnology inventions and 
discoveries, 2) the processes implemented to minimize or remove unintended consequences 
resulting from such commercialization activities, and 3) how such mechanisms and processes fit 
into the mission of the public research university.  The goal of the study was to present possible 
best practices that other public universities might use for successful commercialization of 
biotechnologies while preserving the overall mission of the university and minimizing or 
eliminating related unintended consequences. 
Initially, this study intended to analyze two different mechanisms to develop early-stage, 
academic biomedical inventions and discoveries at two different public universities.  One model, 
that of the Pennington Biomedical Research Center (PBRC) as part of the Louisiana State 
University System, is based on an early-stage research and development investment platform, 
while the second, an MBA entrepreneurial program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, is focused around a curriculum specialization core in the graduate school MBA program.  
However, during the initial research phase, an opportunity to study a third model became 
possible though a hired consultant with extensive experience with the Georgia Research Alliance 
(GRA).  Since the GRA model is seen as one which could be adapted successfully in a wide 
array of research universities, its inclusion as a critical case, was deemed important.  As a result, 
this study was expanded to include an analysis of the Georgia Research Alliance (GRA), as a 
third commercialization model.  With the addition of the GRA mechanism, the comparison chart 
below (Table 1) has been revised to reflect the inclusion of this third model. 
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Table 1 












Small Size of Institution Y N Y N 
Higher than Norm for Research Money per 
Biosciences Faculty 
Y N Y Y 
Extremely Entrepreneurial Community Y Y N Y 







 N N N 
Integrated Commercialization Track 
 Funding 
 R & D Expertise 


















Y = yes 
N = no 
TBD = To Be Determined 
UCSD = University of California - San Diego 
UNC = University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
PBRC = Pennington Biomedical Research Center 
GRA = Georgia Research Alliance 
 
 Since this study involved many tiers of research, observation, and analysis, this chapter is 
divided into six major sections as follows: 1) background description and performance of each 
studied model (each individual process), 2) how the five key components play out in each model, 
3) the similarities and differences among the three models and compared to the UCSD best 
practice model, 4) identification of any additional key components considered essential for 
commercialization success, 5) conflicts of interest, unintended consequences, the overall mission 
of the research university contained within the models, and solutions to problems related to these 
issues, and 6) which findings might be applied to other public research universities.   
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Part 1 
Background Description of Each Studied Model, including Each Individual Process 
 
GEORGIA RESEARCH ALLIANCE 
 What began as a failure to keep Atlanta-based Microelectronics and Computer 
Technology Corporation (MCC) from relocating to Austin, Texas, in 1984, turned into one of the 
biggest success stories for the state of Georgia six years later.  In response to its inability to keep 
MCC in Georgia, the state had an outside assessment conducted.  McKinsey & Company issued 
a report to the Georgia Governor in 1985, outlining what measures needed to be taken to prevent 
other companies with highly-skilled employees from leaving the state (Consultant, 2007; GRA, 
2007).  After several years involving studies and planning, the Georgia Research Alliance (GRA) 
was founded in 1990.  Representing a partnership of the state’s six research universities, the 
business community, and state government, GRA’s mission was and is to foster economic 
development within the state to develop scientific and technology-based industry, commerce, 
and business (GRA, 2007). 
 The overall GRA plan was focused on attracting pre-eminent scientists to Georgia’s 
research universities and providing them with an environment in which they could pursue 
programs of research and development in promising areas of bioscience. The goal was to create 
and enhance partnerships with industry to commercialize technologies developed in the research 
laboratories of these scientists.  According to the GRA, such targeted recruiting and research 
would produce new high-skilled jobs for the state and expand related economic opportunities for 
the Georgia population (Consultant, 2007; GRA, 2007). 
 The state of Georgia has been very successful in developing the GRA as a partnership 
between the six research universities in the state (Clark Atlanta University, Emory University, 
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Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia State University, Medical College of Georgia, and The 
University of Georgia) and private partners.  Since its inception, the GRA has played a key role 
in the generation of more than $2 billion in new federal funding and investment capital for 
research conducted within the state.  Furthermore, GRA has contributed directly by investing 
$400 million dollars on behalf of the state during the past 16 years (GRA Report, 2006; GRA, 
2007). 
 Leveraging the research capabilities of the universities within the state of Georgia 
remains a key function of the GRA.  The GRA has seen positive results in promoting and 
expanding university-based research and development to create a robust, skilled, high technology 
economy.  The six GRA research universities have increased their research collaborations with 
industry 800 percent (800%) since the inception of the GRA.  Overall bioscience venture capital 
investments for the state of Georgia from 1995 to 2000 grew from $200 million to $1 billion 
dollars (GRA Report, 2006).  The State of Georgia has prioritized its state funding to include 
substantial financial support for this program as a cornerstone of its economic development 
strategy.  As a statewide initiative, the GRA focuses on maximizing its collective academic 
research expertise and coupling it with research grants and private sponsorship and investments.  
The GRA realizes a return of $5 for every $1 invested (GRA, 2007). 
 Part of the success of the Georgia model has been its focus on a narrow set of goals and 
the implementation of only a few programs.  Key among these programs are the Eminent Scholar 
Challenge Grants, the GRA Innovation Fund, and VentureLab.  Each of these programs has had 
a history of success for Georgia academic institutions and researchers.  In addition to the impact 
for research and scholars, the GRA has launched more than 125 start-up companies since its 
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inception, created more than 5,000 high-value, high-skilled jobs, and generated more than $600 
million in private investment start-ups (GRA, 2007). 
Eminent Scholars Program 
 To attract and retain research scholars of excellence, the GRA created the Eminent 
Scholar Program, which has been awarded to more than 50 recipients.  These permanent 
endowments of $1.5 million each are a 50%-50% match between GRA and private funds for the 
purpose of recruiting exceptional research scientists to Georgia and providing funds for their 
research laboratories (GRA. 2007).  Although the Eminent Scholar awards sit outside the 
individual universities, each scholar has an academic appointment at one of the six research 
universities.  The GRA philosophy for the Eminent Scholars is to focus money on the top people 
in the top universities by attracting the best and brightest while combining public and private 
funds to strengthen this research and development structure (GRA Report, 2006). 
There is a challenge grants program designed specifically for the Eminent Scholars.  
Annual awards of up to $50,000 are given to a team of at least two Eminent Scholars to promote 
scientific collaboration.  The scope of work is judged on technical merit and the potential for 
future commercial success as well as on other funds the scholars have in place to support the 
project for which Challenge Grant funding is sought (GRA Report, 2006). 
 For example, Eminent Scholar Challenge Awards are made to support research 
development in the scientists’ areas of expertise, with one criterion for eligibility being the 
amount of related sponsored research held by the applicant. GRA also funds 18 national Centers 
of Research Excellence and has seen more than $1 billion in new grants awarded around GRA 
activities (GRA, 2007). 
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GRA Innovation Fund 
 As part of its goal to grow the economic development of the state, the GRA  
Innovation Fund makes competitive research awards to faculty already working in collaboration 
with a Georgia company.  The Fund is to be used to further the development of already-existing 
technologies or to begin creating new ones.  All awards are made directly to researchers with the 
goal that the work will lead to Georgia economic development (GRA, 2007). 
 The fund distributes awards in three different areas of research, 1) bioscience, 2) 
nanoscience, and 3) advanced materials.  The innovation grant can be awarded for a maximum of 
$100,000, and requires a one-to-one match from a Georgia industry partner.  Although 
preference is to fund new projects or new partnerships, past recipients are also eligible for 
follow-up funding if their previously awarded project has been successful (GRA, 2007).  The 
philosophy behind this program is that promoting scientific collaboration could result in an 
increase of new inventions and discoveries not otherwise generated (GRA, 2007). 
VentureLab 
 Support for the VentureLab program includes $2,000,000 in annual funding which is 
divided among awardees in a peer-reviewed, competitive process from a pool of eligible 
applicants from the six Georgia academic research institutions.  VentureLab’s goal is to provide 
support for early-stage technologies so that they can gain venture funding and entrance into an 
incubator program as start-up companies.  VentureLab was designed to provide funding and 
expertise to bridge the funding gap for early-stage inventions and discoveries.  Each of the six 
participating research universities has the ability to tailor the VentureLab program to meet the 
needs of that particular institution.  VentureLab addresses many of the valley of death issues 
pointed out by Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006), and Nowak (2006).  The program provides a way of 
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negotiating the difficulties associated with biotechnology management and market analysis.  
Entrepreneurial coaches are partnered with inventors to provide guidance for finding the best 
avenues to commercialize their technologies (Consultant, 2007; GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
 To initiate the VentureLab process, each university receives seed grant funding for its 
own VentureLab program after submitting a detailed application of how the funds will be spent 
at its institution and what outcomes will be measured.  This document then serves as the 
benchmark for evaluating that particular university’s VentureLab program.  The individual 
universities are required to provide the following as a match in order to receive the funds: 
1) office space and infrastructure for its university-based VentureLab program; 
2) access to that particular university’s Eminent Scholars, other research faculty, and 
other activities and researchers dealing with intellectual property where appropriate; 
and 
3) salaries for key personnel, including: 
a. fellows – professional managers with expertise in new business formation who 
can serve as chief executives for new companies; and 
b. commercialization catalysts – individuals who serve in the capacity of mentors or 
coaches and are able to function as liaisons between faculty and industry (GRA 
VentureLab, 2007). 
 Fellows and commercialization catalysts are required to be university employees in order 
to allow any related intellectual property to remain connected to that associated research 
university.  The commercialization grant program is divided into the three phases described 
below: 
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1) Phase I – Awards are made to the researcher in two equal traunches of $25,000 each with 
each traunch available for validating the market value of a chosen technology which can 
be pursued by hiring experts in the research and commercialization area and in beginning 
the development of a business plan, also assisted by hiring outside experts. 
2) Phase II – Awards are made to the researcher in two equal traunches of $50,000 with 
each traunch available for the further development of the business plan and in beginning 
the pre-incorporation activities and negotiations with the universities; and 
3)  Phase III – An award is given as a convertible loan directly to the new company, with 
the amount of the award determined on a case-by-case basis in this phase (Consultant, 
2007; GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
University of Georgia and Research Foundation 
  A further analysis involved studying the GRA was applied at a single university, the 
University of Georgia and the University of Georgia Research Foundation, Incorporated 
(UGRF).  UGRF functions as the recipient entity for all University of Georgia sponsored 
research and licensing funds.  Having the grants and licenses rest in the UGRF has allowed it to 
grow two revenue categories, 1) unrestricted licensing royalties and other milestone payments, 
and 2) restricted grant funds.  These revenue streams have been instrumental in allowing the 
UGRF to create seed funds which are not limited by state constraints, many of which are related 
to GRA activities, and also develop an internal grants program which is very important in 
supporting the humanities and the liberal arts (Consultant, 2007; UGRF, 2007). 
All intellectual property (IP) created and developed by University of Georgia faculty and 
staff are assigned to the UGRF, which takes responsibility for all commercialization of the 
University’s IP.  UGRF has the ability to take equity ownership in start-up companies and is 
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directly involved in other aspects of commercialization (UGRF, 2007).  UGRF works in 
conjunction with the GRA in funding university researchers and commercializing inventions and 
discoveries. 
Georgia Venture Partners 
The structure described above has worked well overall for the UGRF and the GRA, but, 
even with such continued success, there remained a two-fold problem regarding the 
biotechnology investments in Georgia, namely, 1) a lack of biotechnology early-stage capital, 
and 2) limited access to seasoned biotechnology management.  Instead of waiting for the State of 
Georgia to intercede, three of the six GRA’s research universities decided to create a small seed 
fund on their own in 2004 (GVP, 2007).   
Emory University, Georgia Institute of Technology, and the University of Georgia 
Research Foundation, Inc. developed a $5 million seed fund called Georgia Venture Partners 
(GVP) by combining $1 million from each of the academic institutions with $2 million from 
private investors.  The GVP is a professionally managed fund at arms-length from the 
universities and the GRA.  The fund has two principle functions, 1) to generate substantial 
investment returns focused on capital gains, by investing in new companies, and 2) to increase 
the economic development of life sciences in Georgia through seed or early-stage investments in 
start-up companies generated from academic inventions and discoveries and in other life sciences 
companies.  Initial investments range from $100,000 to $200,000, with a cap on total 
investments in a single company of $1 million dollars (Consultant, 2007; GVP, 2007). 
Although there are other components in the Georgia Research Alliance model, they are 
not directly related to the commercialization activities being assessed in this study.  The initial 
discussions and information regarding the GRA program were conducted with the PBRC 
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consultant.  The information obtained from the consultant was further corroborated and 
augmented with information obtained directly from formal GRA and other related sources. 
PENNINGTON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER 
 The Pennington Biomedical Research Center (PBRC, Center) is one of the 11 institutions 
which comprise the Louisiana State University (LSU) System, a public university organized 
under the laws of the state of Louisiana (LSU System, 2007).  PBRC is a research campus where 
the Executive Director holds the equivalent status of a campus Chancellor and reports directly to 
the LSU System President, who reports to the LSU Board of Supervisors.  PBRC is a biomedical 
research campus, with a focus on nutrition, obesity, diabetes, chronic diseases such as 
cardiovascular disease and cancer, and their prevention.  As an academic research campus, the 
majority of the research funding at PBRC is generated from the NIH, other federal agencies, and 
the pharmaceutical and food industries (PBRC, 2007). 
 Although the research revenues are very strong for PBRC, the majority of the Center’s 
inventions and discoveries are very early-stage and often require further development prior to 
outside investment interest (PBRC internal documents, 2007).  Recognizing that a gap existed 
between initial invention or discovery and the potential for investment, PBRC key individuals 
began to address possible solutions for this problem.  The initial step taken was to create an 
early-stage seed fund to provide necessary capital to further develop the Center's nascent 
technologies.  A $12 million dollar fund, Themelios Venture Partners (TVP), an arms-length 
venture fund, was formed to support PBRC inventions and discoveries.  A small percentage of 
inventions and discoveries from outside companies can be partnered with PBRC IP as part of 
TVP (TVP, 2007; PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
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 Even though TVP has already invested in several PBRC technologies, it has turned down 
the majority of the technologies it has reviewed, claiming that the discoveries are too early for it 
to consider for investment.  As a result, PBRC has found itself facing the same funding gap 
described by Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006), and Nowak (2006), even after the formation of TVP 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
 Because of this situation, the administration of PBRC realized that a mechanism was 
needed to successfully bridge this biotechnology funding gap.  The process for finding an 
appropriate solution has evolved and expanded over a period of approximately two years.  As the 
project moved forward, the key individuals at PBRC combined efforts with that of the 
Pennington Biomedical Research Foundation (PBRF, Foundation), realizing that a more complex 
solution was necessary to further develop PBRC technologies and increase the probability of 
attracting venture funding.  Through collaborative efforts, the Center and Foundation have been 
working to expand the opportunities to create the most appropriate commercialization 
mechanism for Pennington-based technologies (PBRC internal documents, 2007; PBRF internal 
documents, 2007). 
Pennington Biomedical Research Foundation 
 C.B. “Doc” Pennington and his wife, Irene, donated $125 million to the Louisiana State 
University System in 1980, which established the Pennington Medical Foundation, a charitable 
trust, and in 1988, created the Pennington Biomedical Research Foundation.  This Foundation, a 
not-for-profit 501(c)3 entity, was created with the goal of supporting the mission of PBRC.  The 
Foundation recognizes that its mission includes expanding the capabilities related to technology 
commercialization (PBRF, 2007). 
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 Within the Foundation rests a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary, Pennington 
Discoveries, Inc. (PDI), which was developed several years ago with the intent to serve as a 
vehicle for commercialization opportunities (PDI internal documents, 2007).  Up to this point in 
time, PDI has concentrated its efforts on two primary ventures, a line of spices geared to 
augment healthy eating, and a minority ownership in a specialized clinical trials company, 
Pennington Management of Clinical Trials, L.L.C. (PMCT).  The Foundation has invested in 
both of these endeavors in the past, and is now committed to expanding its support of PBRC 
commercialization activities.  The Foundation is in the process of determining how it can best 
support the enhancement and further development of the PBRC technology transfer program, 
which includes participating in the creation of a customized commercialization mechanism for 
PBRC technologies (PBRC internal documents, 2007; PBRF internal documents, 2007). 
Outside Consultants 
 As part of its direct involvement, the Foundation has hired an outside consultant who has 
expertise regarding the Georgia Research Alliance (GRA).  The consultancy is focused on 
assisting PBRC and the Foundation in creating their own specialized commercialization 
mechanism aimed specifically at early-stage bioscience inventions and discoveries.  In the past, 
the consultant was one of several directly involved with the LSU System in its formation of the 
LSU System Research and Technology Foundation (LSUR&TF), and in the creation of 
Louisiana Fund 1, a State/private venture fund partnership (Louisiana Fund 1, 2007; LSUR&TF, 
2007; PBRF internal documents, 2007; PBRC internal documents, 2007).  Because of the 
consultant's past involvement with the LSU System, which also included the PBRC campus, the 
consultant is familiar with the structure and function of the LSU System and its research 
campuses, including PBRC.  PBRC and the Foundation believe the consultant will be able to 
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provide customized expertise related to developing a best model for commercializing the early-
stage inventions and discoveries which make up the majority of PBRC’s intellectual property 
technologies. 
 Several programs within the GRA have been reviewed and discussed and the consultant 
has made recommendations on specific components which might be adapted by PBRC and the 
Foundation in their quest to create a customized commercialization mechanism.  The three 
specific programs that were studied in-depth and are included for further study and possible 
development in the PBRC plan are 1) the VentureLab Concept, 2) the GRA Innovation Fund, 
and 3) Georgia Venture Partners (GVP), all of which were described previously in the GRA 
section of this chapter (PBRF internal documents, 2007). 
 Other key entities and situations, described below, affect the operations and performance 
of the PBRC commercialization mechanism, whether directly or indirectly. 
Louisiana Board of Regents/Louisiana Recovery Authority 
 The Louisiana Board of Regents (BOR) and the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) 
began a study aimed at strengthening the research infrastructure in the state of Louisiana in the 
months following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  The first phase of this study was focused on 
assessing the research needs of Louisiana academic institutions, businesses, and industry 
impacted directly by the hurricanes (BOR, 2007). 
 The second phase, which is currently underway, is to develop a plan to strengthen 
Louisiana research capabilities throughout the entire state.  The BOR and the LRA hired an 
outside consulting group, Regional Technologies Strategies, Inc. (RTS).  A series of six BOR 
focus group meetings were held in April, 2007, in the three major cities in the state, with two 
meetings each being held in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport.  On August 22, 2007, a 
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follow-up meeting was held in Baton Rouge in which the interim results were discussed.  A 
fellow meeting was held on October 9, 2007 (BOR, 2007).  The final report by RTS to the BOR 
is due in late fall, 2007. 
 In addition to these focus group meetings, smaller meetings, with key individuals who 
were already involved in Louisiana research commercialization, were also held in April, 2007.  
The key technology transfer individuals from several LSU System campuses, included PBRC.  
The interim findings of the report acknowledged that the research infrastructure in the state was 
fragmented even prior to the hurricanes, which further weakened the state’s research capabilities 
and bases. 
 Life sciences R&D within the state are not exceptionally strong, but some strengths exist 
in specialized areas (BOR, 2007).  The following items were recognized as areas needing to be 
addressed in order to develop more successful research capabilities in Louisiana: 
1) disconnect between academic activities and what businesses need; 
2) conflict in faculty roles related to commercialization and faculty promotion and 
tenure; 
3) lack of an experienced workforce to manage and develop start-up biotechnology 
companies; 
4) weakness in  statewide entrepreneurial culture regarding research and development of 
biotechnologies; and, 
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Baton Rouge Area Foundation 
 Many states are hoping to capitalize on the GRA model approach, including Louisiana.  
The Georgia model for commercialization is seen as one that can be adapted to other 
environments and states with an expectation of success.  John Spain of the Baton Rouge Area 
Foundation (BRAF), adds in the BOR April memo,  
We have been following the tremendous success of the Georgia Research Alliance for 
several years and are excited about the possibility of creating a similar program in 
Louisiana.  We look forward to being a part of a public-private partnership that brings 
world class scientists and research to our state (BOR, 2007). 
 
  Support of BRAF is especially important to PBRC and the Pennington Foundation 
because BRAF is one of the key investors in the PBRC-based venture fund, TVP, which has 
been established to commercialize its early-stage inventions and discoveries (PBRC internal 
documents, 2007).  Spain, BRAF and the BOR/RFA have been studying the GRA model and 
working with local and state-affiliated entities to determine what type of mechanism to 
recommend as described in the February, 2007, Phase One report in the BOR documents (BOR, 
2007). 
This is not only essential work for Louisiana, but can also provide useful strategic and 
tactical information for states elsewhere.  Every state wants to become more of a player 
in the knowledge economy; every state examines from time to time the challenge of re-
engineering its system of higher education.  (BOR, 2007, p. 28). 
 
 The key individuals at PBRC and PBRF are moving forward with their plans of 
developing their own commercialization model.  Meanwhile, review and study continues to 
assess the needs for a better research and development infrastructure and increased opportunities 
for the entire state. 
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UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA MBA CURRICULUM PROGRAM 
 Many academic research institutions have encouraged faculty and other employees to 
commercialize their inventions and discoveries, and have set up offices of technology transfer to 
oversee these activities.  Often, this initiative is still not enough to ensure success in the 
marketplace for university-based technologies. 
 One way to increase the rate of success associated with academic biotechnology transfer 
is to provide a mechanism to bridge the gap between early-stage inventions and early-stage 
investments.  The development of an integrated, interdisciplinary curriculum-based 
biotechnology commercialization program is one example of such a mechanism. 
Unlike the approaches taken by the Georgia Research Alliance and the Pennington 
Biomedical Research Center, the University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill has 
implemented a curriculum-based approach to help resolve its biotechnology funding gap issue.  
This program received $3.5 million from the Kauffman Foundation Entrepreneurship Grants 
program and is matched by UNC on a two-to-one basis, with in-kind and actual funds totaling $7 
million, resulting in a $10.5 million program (Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007). 
 Out of this grant award, UNC created the Carolina Entrepreneurial Initiative (CEI) which 
includes the Carolina Challenge and an MBA curriculum-based program for students and 
inventors.  The CEI is comprised of several classes in the MBA program as part of the 
entrepreneurial track.  Students wishing to create an area of focus in entrepreneurism participate 
in specific classes and in the Carolina Challenge (UNC MBA, 2007). 
 The MBA program covers an academic year, beginning with the fall semester feasibility 
phase and a spring semester launch phase.  During the first phase, students have the opportunity 
to initiate their own ideas for a start-up company or chose to develop a business 
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conceptualization plan for a university-based invention or discovery that is available to the 
students through the UNC technology transfer office.  Requirements for the Carolina Challenge 
include the development of a business plan, analysis of the potential market and competition, and 
launch of the plan (Kouri, 2006). 
Like other academic research institutions, UNC had experienced the same biotechnology 
funding gap, where its early-stage inventions and discoveries were not being commercialized.  
As part of the Carolina Challenge and the MBA program, several medical equipment, device and 
treatment technologies which were chosen for development, have resulted in the formation of 
start-up companies, further development of the technologies, and outside investment funding.  If 
a university-based technology is chosen for development as part of the MBA project, the 
inventor is required to participate in the two-semester program and the Carolina Challenge 
alongside the MBA students if he or she wishes to remain actively involved in the start-up 
process (Kouri, 2006). 
  Even with its success, the researcher who was instrumental in developing the program, 
Richard Kouri, Ph.D., discussed at the AUTM Annual Meeting in 2006, that the model seemed 
limited to biotechnologies which do not require the longer, more complex, highly regulatory 
drug development route.  For example, the program has produced business plans, additional 
funding, and company start-ups with technologies that fall into the categories of medical device, 
testing kits, diagnostics, and other related areas.  No similar successes have been documented for 
more complex biotechnologies (Kouri, 2006). 
On a related topic, the former UNC Entrepreneur-in-Residence, Dr. Kouri, who was 
instrumental in using the MBA model as a way to bridge the biotechnology funding gap, recently 
left UNC for North Carolina State (NC State), to head up the NC State College of Management’s 
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BioPharma Management Initiative.  The MBA program at NC State which has been designed for 
students with a background in life sciences, provides them with a comprehensive platform of 
knowledge about the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries and related legal and 
regulatory issues.  The new program, headed up by Kouri, is focused on developing skilled 
professionals who will be able to lead and manage companies from small start-ups to the largest 
in the biotechnology industry (NCSU, 2007). 
As discussed in this study, finding the best candidates to develop a highly-skilled 
workforce in the biotechnology industry is one of the major concerns even the most successful 
biotechnology clusters have acknowledged, such as San Diego and Boston.  Individuals at the 
mid-level and support levels are finding it difficult to remain in these areas due to the high cost 
of living (Coombs, 2007). 
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Part 2 
How The Five Key Components Play Out in Each Model 
GEORGIA RESEARCH ALLIANCE 
Component 1:  Organizational Efficiency Based on a Flat Hierarchy and the Relative Small Size 
of the Institution: 
 
 The Georgia Research Alliance has characteristics of both a statewide super-structure and 
a very small organization.  On one hand, it has a very large sweep, reaching all six major 
research universities within the state, and providing more than $2 billion in research-related 
funding since its inception in 1990.  It has created and controls the parameters surrounding 
recruiting and retaining the state’s more than 50 Eminent Scholars, and provides the millions of 
dollars in funding to steer their research toward commercialization (GRA, 2007). 
On the other hand, the GRA is a separate entity from any of Georgia’s six research 
universities, directly employing very few individuals. Another reason for the success of the 
Georgia model has been its focus on a narrow set of goals and the implementation of only a few 
programs.  Key among these programs are the Eminent Scholar Challenge Grants, the GRA 
Innovation Fund, and VentureLab (GRA, 2007).  
It appears that the GRA model contains a hybrid organizational structure, combining 
characteristics of both a small and a very large organization.  This hybrid structure has benefited 
the GRA program.  Since GRA projects and operations sit outside of academic and state 
institutions, there is little bureaucracy and a flat GRA organizational hierarchy.  This type of 
structure can lead to operational efficiency and effectiveness.  Since GRA funds remain external, 
the goals and focus of the Georgia Research Alliance are not subject to other internal operations 
needs of the research universities or the state government (GRA, 2007). 
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Component 2:  Higher than Norm for Research Money per Bioscience Faculty: 
 Since the faculty being studied are limited to the 50-plus Eminent Scholars who are 
funded by the GRA, the research money per GRA bioscience faculty member is higher than the 
norm, regardless of which of the six research institutions employs the Eminent Scholar.  The 
unique characteristic of the GRA model is that this research money ratio is based on a pool of 
expert researchers only.  The resultant higher than normal ratio is due to the fact that these 
faculty members are experts in their field and have been recruited based on their external funding 
and interest in commercialization.  These characteristics translate into a very high ratio of 
research money per faculty member. 
Component 3:  Extremely Entrepreneurial Community: 
 By promoting a statewide initiative in 1990 which led to the creation of the Georgia 
Research Alliance, the entrepreneurial message from the academic, government, and private 
partners was clearly sent.  The ongoing support, development, expansion, and successes of the 
GRA and other related initiatives and activities reinforce the commitment to fueling the 
entrepreneurial spirit within the state of Georgia.  As stated in the Georgia Research Alliance 
Annual Report of 2006, 
The Georgia Research Alliance creates opportunities to grow Georgia’s economy 
through scientific discovery.  We help recruit enterprising scientists to Georgia…fuel the 
launch of companies that create high-value jobs…and broker working partnerships 
between businesses and universities.  The impact of GRA’s opportunity creation is both 
deep and far-reaching.  Communities all over Georgia reap the rewards of Georgia’s 
investment in GRA.  They are home to laboratories, established corporations and start-up 
companies, all with a connection to our state’s research universities – and all helping to 
grow the Georgia economy (GRA Report, 2006, p. 12). 
 
In addition to GRA’s entrepreneurial culture, the state, the industry partners, and the universities 
which participate in the GRA program are supportive of this statewide commercialization 
initiative for biosciences (GRA, 2007). 
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Component 4: Integrated Life Sciences Curriculum Program: 
This component does not directly apply to the GRA model.  However, if one pulls back 
to analyze the GRA model as containing an integrated life sciences research scholars program, 
which substitutes faculty for students and research programs for curriculum, then the GRA can 
be viewed as a version of an  integrated life sciences program focused not on students, but 
instead, on faculty. 
Component 5:  Integrated Commercialization Track: 
a)  Funding: 
Since its inception in 1990, the GRA has played a key role in the generation of more than 
$2 billion in new federal funding and investment capital for the state, with more than $600 
million in private investments for new start-up companies.  The GRA contains its own funding 
programs, including the Eminent Scholars and VentureLab programs and the GRA Innovation 
Fund.  The Eminent Scholar awards are permanent endowments of $1.5 million each, with an 
equal amount being matched by the GRA and private investors.  Eminent Scholar Grants consist 
of up to $50,000 in annual funding given to a team of two Eminent Scholars to promote scientific 
collaboration.  VentureLab awards total $2,000,000 annual funding, and the GRA Innovation 
Fund requires a one-to-one match with a Georgia industry partner for a total of $100,000 (GRA, 
2007; GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
Despite such ongoing funding and resultant success, GRA was still suffering from the 
funding gap described by Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006), and Nowak (2006).  Emory University, 
the Georgia Institute of Technology, and the University of Georgia have teamed up with private 
investors to create the $5 million Georgia Venture Partners Fund for early-stage biotechnology 
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investments generated from these three universities.  GVP initially invests between $100,000 and 
$200,000 in each new technology, with a maximum investment of $1 million (GVP, 2007). 
b)  R&D Expertise: 
At the beginning of the GRA, the state did not have a critical mass of biotechnology 
experts, which was anticipated in the structure of the GRA.  To deal with this deficit, funding to 
hire consultants with specified expertise has been included as part of the VentureFund program.   
The first step of the VentureLab program is crucial to its success.  In the initial phase, an 
in-depth technology assessment is conducted.  Not only is the technology analyzed for its 
technical merit, but it is also evaluated in terms of how timely the invention is, and whether or 
not it will interface successfully into the current marketplace (GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
 This step is often conducted in a less than optimal manner in academic technology 
transfer offices due to the lack of expertise and resources.  Being able to thoroughly assess early-
stage technologies is often difficult due to the nature and stage of the technologies.  Traditional 
sources for due diligence often are not adequate when trying to assess an early-stage technology.  
The GRA VentureLab service is a very important first step which should be considered by any 
entity wishing to establish a comprehensive early-stage commercialization program (GRA, 2007; 
GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
Over the years as the available Eminent Scholars, R&D, and bio-business experts have 
increased due to the success of the GRA, Georgia began to grow its own R&D expertise, yet the 
ability to use funding to hire outside experts remains a key component of the VentureLab 
program (GRA, 2007; GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
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c)  Springboard for New Companies: 
Several opportunities exist as a springboard for new company start-ups in the state of 
Georgia.  The GRA has the ability to loan funds to start-up companies as part of its Phase 3 
VentureLab program.  As pointed out, there have been many successful start-ups, with more than 
125 new companies formed and more than 5,000 new jobs created.  In addition, GRA provides 
the infrastructure to promote the creation of new companies through the Eminent Scholar 
Challenge grants, the GRA Innovation Fund, and additional funding for research centers of 
excellence and research laboratories and equipment (GRA, 2007). 
Yet, even with its well-planned, comprehensive GRA program, early-stage inventions 
and technologies still suffered from the biotechnology funding gap.  As a result, Emory 
University, the Georgia Institute of Technology, and the University of Georgia partnered with 
private industry to form the $5 million Georgia Venture Partners Fund, which invests between 
$50,000 and $250,000 in new start-up companies.  GVP has recently begun to invest in early-
stage biotechnologies (GVP, 2007). 
PENNINGTON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER 
 As described previously, five key components have been identified which are considered 
important to the overall commercialization of early-stage academic biotechnologies (Holmes, 
2006; Milken, 2004; 2006).  Only a subset of these five key components were present at PBRC 
prior to the decision to implement a comprehensive commercialization program.   PBRC 
possessed, at least in part, some of the following key components deemed necessary for 
biotechnology commercialization success. 
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Component 1:  Organizational Efficiency Based on a Flat Hierarchy and the Relative Small Size 
of the Institution: 
 PBRC’s organizational structure is very similar to that of an organized research unit 
(ORU), which was discussed in Chapter 2.  Unlike traditional ORUs, in which internal divisions 
such as departments and research units vie for faculty revenue, areas of specialty, and time 
related to teaching and research; PBRC faculty are not subject to these competing demands in the 
Center’s organizational structure.  The Center is based on a flat hierarchy which employees 
approximately 650 employees, including 85 faculty, with few levels of management bureaucracy 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
 A small-sized institution is considered one of the five key components defined as 
necessary to ensure academic biotechnology commercialization success (Holmes, 2006; Milken, 
2004; 2006), without reference to the type of research at the small institution.  Unlike larger 
institutions and typical academic research universities, where the technology disclosures span a 
very wide range of disciplines and areas of expertise, the PBRC faculty work in a much more 
narrow area of research.  Since the majority of research funding for the faculty for basic science 
research comes from the NIH, the majority of PBRC's technology disclosures are for very 
nascent discoveries which are based on discoveries such as gene targets, proof of concept ideas, 
and other promising technologies (PBRC internal documents, 2007).  Therefore, not only does 
PBRC fit the description of a small institution, PBRC also conducts research in a narrow area of 
basic science.    
 The PBRC technology transfer office (TTO) is part of the flat hierarchy and became a 
separate office in 2002 (See Figure 3).  The overall activity in the office has increased in the past 
several years and the number of technology disclosures has increased greatly since 2000. The 
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office is currently expanding its staff and operations and further development is being planned 
for the office.  TTO personnel are accessible to faculty and other PBRC employees, and the 
office operates under the philosophy that each technology is unique and should be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis in order to maximize the commercialization opportunities for that particular 









Figure 3.  Pennington Biomedical Research Center Organization Chart for Technology Transfer 
 Close interaction exists between the TTO and the researchers in order to minimize 
artificial hurdles or barriers to successful commercialization.  Because of the close physical 
proximity of the technology transfer office to the researchers, no part of the campus is more 
distant from the TTO office than five to ten minutes away on foot.  This allows the parties to 
interact easily in person and increases the level of familiarity and the frequency of interactions.  
The small campus size also reduces the time and effort needed to meet in person, since no one 
needs to drive or walk long distances for such interactions (PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
In most day-to-day operations, the Center does not suffer from the problems associated 
with a large bureaucracy, but, as described earlier in the chapter, there are some restrictions 
facing the commercialization process because PBRC sits within a much larger academic 
organization, the LSU System.  The overall commercialization culture at various LSU campuses 
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within the past few years are changing the situation, as discussed earlier in this chapter (PBRC 
internal documents, 2007). 
 Despite these issues, PBRC is partnering with the Pennington Foundation to move 
forward in developing a integrated, multi-function commercialization mechanism.  The key 
players recognize there is a balance to be maintained between the Center’s obligations to the 
LSU System and the need for flexibility, some of which is obtained by shifting some of the 
commercialization activities to the Foundation.  With PBRC’s characteristics of a flat hierarchy, 
minimum bureaucracy, and physical proximity to its researchers, the groundwork is in place 
which allows for efficient and effective operations.  Since the Foundation is a separate entity not 
subject to university or government restrictions, it can provide additional flexibility in 
operations. 
Component 2:  Higher than Norm for Research Money per Bioscience Faculty: 
 With PBRC being a research campus with no teaching duties, faculty promotion and 
tenure is based on research performance, which includes securing self-generated sponsored 
research funds that satisfy the overall mission of the Center.  Approximately 40% of the faculty 
are on a five-year rolling tenure track.  The remaining faculty members are hired on a more 
limited basis, with much of their performance assessment related to their research success, such 
as securing NIH and other grant awards, research-driven pharmaceutical clinical trials, and 
research-focused industry contracts.  The faculty has grown to approximately 85 individuals, but 
even though PBRC has expanded the overall number of faculty, support researchers, 
laboratories, and clinical units during the past ten years, several faculty researchers are let go 
each year due to non-performance and lack of funding (PBRC, 2007; PBRC internal documents, 
2007). 
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 The AUTM Survey (2006) cites the strong relationship between NIH funding and the 
number of invention disclosures, patent applications, and licenses.  Technology transfer experts 
find a high correlation between the research success of faculty by comparing sponsored research 
grant award funds to subsequent inventions disclosures (AUTM, 2006).  The PBRC faculty 
perform at a much higher ratio of research dollars per faculty member than the average for 
academic research institutions (PBRC internal documents, 2007).   
 The overall rate of technology disclosures per faculty member at PBRC is also higher 
than the norm for research universities, although the status of those technologies is typically very 
early-stage (Table 2).  Due to the early stage status of the technology disclosures, PBRC has a 
lower rate of licensing per disclosure than the average research university PBRC internal 
documents, 2006).  The PBRC administration believes this lower ratio is an example of the 
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Component 3:  Extremely Entrepreneurial Community: 
 Pennington Biomedical Research Center 
 PBRC's highly-competitive research culture has, by its very nature, faculty members 
who, typically, possess a higher level of comfort with risk-taking and identify themselves as self-
starters who gain satisfaction from forging new research paths.  This results in a high ratio of 
faculty to research dollars which is considered one of the key components necessary for 
biotechnology commercialization success, according to Edward Holmes (2006), former Vice 
President for Health Sciences at UCSD. 
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 In addition, PBRC faculty are expected to generate their own funding after a negotiated 
initial period of institutional support.  This funding requirement tends to weed out faculty who 
are more risk-averse and less entrepreneurial.  As a result, the faculty who do remain part of 
PBRC typically possess qualities and interests which put them in line with the culture and 
characteristics more closely associated with commercialization success (PBRC internal 
documents, 2007). 
 Much emphasis at PBRC has been placed on commercialization of technologies and on 
the importance of PBRC in contributing to the overall economic development of the region and 
the state.  On average, for every dollar given PBRC, the Center generates three to four times that 
amount in economic impact, but these numbers are based primarily on research dollars generated 
and not on technology commercialization revenues (PBRC, 2007), unlike the Georgia Research 
Alliance’s five-fold return on commercialization investment (GRA, 2007). 
 Louisiana State University System 
 Historically, the technology transfer administrative culture in place at the LSU System 
level and on some of the other LSU System campuses has not been as entrepreneurial as at 
PBRC.  For several years, like the situation at many research universities, the technology transfer 
initiative was not given high priority and was often plagued with roadblocks or barriers to 
commercialization.  Recently, some shifts have occurred at various levels within the LSU 
System to promote technology transfer and economic development (LSU System, 2007).   
 Such changes include 1) the formation of the Louisiana State University Research and 
Technology Foundation (LSUR&TF, 2007); 2) the opening of the LSU Emerging Technology 
Center (2007), a  partnership between the Louisiana Department of Economic Development 
(LED) and the University, which includes office space as well as wet labs and core  research 
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facilities for start-up companies; 3) LED matching funds used to form several venture funds set 
up to focus on commercializing academic-based technologies (Louisiana Fund 1, 2007); and 4) 
an increase in budget and personnel for technology transfer activities at several individual 
campuses and at the LSU System level (LSU System, 2007).  Although it is recognized that the 
outcomes of such changes will take time to disseminate into the larger technology transfer 
community, these shifts have been very well-received at PBRC and have resulted in a more 
entrepreneurial academic culture. 
 The Greater Baton Rouge Region and the State 
 According to Richard Florida (2002) in his studies of the creative class in the United 
States, the Baton Rouge community ranks as one of the more creative areas in the U.S. for 
medium-sized regions with populations between 500,000 and one million residents, while 
Houma, Louisiana, ranks near the bottom of the list, even though it is less than 100 miles away 
from Baton Rouge.  In Florida’s more recent study, published in 2005, the New Orleans area is 
ranked as one of slow creative growth and a higher than average divide among socio-economic 
classes, a characteristic his studies have shown to be counterproductive to entrepreneurial 
development.  Florida's assessments can be helpful in trying to understand the overall 
entrepreneurial culture differences within the State of Louisiana. 
 At the local level, another positive outcome is that, for the past several years, the Greater 
Baton Rouge Area Chamber of Commerce has been promoting the Pennington Biomedical 
Research Center and its value as an economic development asset in the community.  PBRC is 
one of the five key areas the Chamber of Commerce is focused on promoting and developing as 
central drivers of the local economy.  With its membership of local leaders in business and 
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industry, the Chamber’s constant support of and dissemination of information about PBRC 
continues to be pivotal (Baton Rouge Area Chamber, 2007). 
 At the state level, the Louisiana Department of Economic Development (LED) has 
funded the construction of three state-of-the-art biotechnology incubators (one of which sits on 
the LSU A&M Campus in Baton Rouge), provided matching dollars for three venture capital 
investment funds geared toward academic technology transfer, and is working on new legislative 
initiatives to attract the biotech industry into the state.  Several start-up companies are residing in 
these new business incubators (BOR, 2007; Emerging Technology Center, 2007). 
 A critical mass is building regarding the necessity for the Baton Rouge area and the state 
to plan a course of action that can create a twenty-first century model of biotechnology 
commercialization success.  This shift in awareness was demonstrated at the Louisiana Board of 
Regents and Louisiana Recovery Authority meeting, August 22, 2007, (BOR, 2007) where the 
following interim recommendations were made. 
1. Enhance research in focused areas 
2. Attract top faculty to the state 
3. Grow technology companies through student internship clinics 
4. Increase university-industry technology training workforce development, and 
5. Find or train technology managers due to shortage. 
The following overall observations were made 
1. Culture building is extraordinarily important 
a. "Tipping" can occur with right leadership promoting entrepreneurship 
b. Business schools as cultural leaders 
2. Training of support staff at the community college level 
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3. Flexibility in organizations 
4. Emphasize few programs, and 
5. GRA promotes cross-collaboration (BOR, 2007). 
 As a result, although the PBRC community is entrepreneurial, the overall culture of the 
region and state is mixed in terms of being risk-averse and encouraging the development of the 
creative class.  The proactive changes made to move the LSU System and other campuses, Baton 
Rouge, and the State of Louisiana toward being more entrepreneurial, are very important and 
timely, but it will be some time before these initiatives have a lasting effect on the overall 
entrepreneurial status of the community and the state. 
 In the interim, PBRC finds itself still needing to expand its own entrepreneurial culture in 
order to increase biotechnology commercialization success.  The question remains as to whether 
or not having a very entrepreneurial culture (PBRC and PBRF) which sits within a larger, mixed-
risk culture at the LSU System, regional, and state levels, is enough to cultivate overall 
commercialization success.  As pointed out above, the need for an entrepreneurial culture is one 
of the five key components recognized as being necessary for academic biotechnology 
commercialization success (BOR, 2007; Holmes, 2006; Milken, 2004; 2006).  Currently, PBRC 
finds itself in a culture which is only partially entrepreneurial. 
Component 4:  An Integrated Academic Life Sciences Curriculum Program: 
 The Pennington Biomedical Research Center is a research campus which does not offer a 
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Component 5:  A Specialized Biotechnology Commercialization Program: 
 a)  Funding: 
 As described in Part 1, in late 2005, an early-stage venture fund was created to help 
bridge the commercialization funding gap for inventions and discoveries emanating from the 
Pennington Biomedical Research Center (TVP, 2007).  The PBRC administration realized that 
the Center was experiencing difficulties with commercialization of its inventions and 
technologies very similar to that described by others such as Friedl (2006), Khouri (2006), and 
Nowak (2006).   The following chart (Figure 4) was produced by PBRC in order to convey the 
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Figure 4.  Commercialization Flow from Academic Research to Product Development 
 
Themelios Venture Partners, LLC (TVP), the venture fund that was created, allows for 
flexibility in the type of technologies which are commercialized.  Sixty to seventy percent (60% 
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to 70%) of the technologies must be generated from within the PBRC, with the remaining thirty 
to forty percent (30% to 40%) of the technologies originating from outside PBRC which can be 
combined with PBRC expertise and technologies as part of the commercialization platform 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007; TVP, 2007). 
 This venture fund, which currently has a value of $12 million, has already invested in two 
PBRC-based technologies and is reviewing several others.  After two issued patents and a decade 
of laboratory results, the first investment for TVP is a cancer technology start-up company, 
Esperance Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  Even TVP and its investment partners, including Louisiana 
Fund 1, determined that more research was needed on the technology, after agreeing to invest.  
The second technology the fund has decided to invest in includes an interactive software and 
behavioral psychology assessment tool that can be used by a wide range of behavioral therapists 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
 Even with TVP’s investment, the majority of the remaining technologies, approximately 
four out of five, are still caught in the valley of death funding gap.  The venture funds which 
have reviewed these technologies are all early-stage investors and have all determined that the 
inventions are still too early for them to invest in at this time. The PBRC inventors realize they 
cannot receive additional traditional funding to further this research, as described by Karl Friedl 
(2006) in Chapter 1, and they do not have the internal financial resources nor the developmental 
expertise to know how to move along their own technologies.  At the same time, the technology 
itself is often too embryonic to consider application for NIH small business grant awards (NIH, 
2007). 
This situation has led to the realization at PBRC that even with its new venture, the 
majority of PBRC technologies are still caught in a commercialization standstill.  As a result, 
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PBRC, in conjunction with PBRF are analyzing mechanisms to expand the commercialization 
activities in order to bridge this gap. 
b)  R&D Expertise: 
PBRC key individuals recognize that there is a lack of R&D expertise in the Baton Rouge 
area and the state.  A critical mass is building regarding the necessity for the Baton Rouge area 
and the state to plan a course of action that can create a twenty-first century model of 
biotechnology commercialization success.  This shift in awareness was demonstrated at the 
Louisiana Board of Regents August 22, 2007, meeting, where discussions surrounded how to 
implement a customized plan to bring research and development expertise to the state (BOR, 
2007). 
c)  Springboard for New Companies: 
As discussed previously, several mechanisms have been developed to help with the 
creation of new companies.  TVP has been established as a PBRC-focused early stage venture 
fund, Louisiana Fund 1 has been created by LED and the LSU System.  Louisiana Fund 1 has a 
mission of commercializing inventions and discoveries by Louisiana's universities.  Louisiana 
Fund 1 has invested in the new cancer start-up company, Esperance Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and is 
negotiating investments in several other PBRC-related technologies.  Despite this activity, 
Louisiana Fund 1, like TVP, has turned down the majority of the PBRC technologies it has 
reviewed (PBRC internal documents, 2007).   
Other Discussions and Analyses 
 Although the interactions with the faculty play a very central role in how PBRC will 
develop its new commercialization model, there are additional players and issues which are 
integral to this process.  The relationship between the Center and the Foundation in terms of the 
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best placement of specific commercialization programs and activities is a crucial one.  The 
Foundation is also determining which of the activities it decides to oversee should be housed 
within a non-profit organization and which would better fit in a for-profit entity.  One advantage 
to creating an integrated, multi-tiered R&D commercialization mechanism at this time is that 
there are some outside examples already in place which can be reviewed and adapted in order to 
create the most appropriate application in a new setting.  At the same time, the examples from 
the outside can also provide so much information that choosing a path becomes a fragmented 
process which could weaken the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the newly created 
mechanism.  The PBRC and PBRF key individuals are aware of the need to find the right 
balance between assessing other models and creating a sound, achievable commercialization 
mechanism for their specific needs.  The process is still ongoing. 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA MBA CURRICULUM PROGRAM 
Component 1:  Small Size of the Institution: 
 Although the University of North Carolina is one of the largest public research 
universities in the state, the MBA entrepreneurial curriculum program at UNC Chapel Hill is a 
highly-focused graduate program available to a limited number of students and university 
inventors (Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007).  The result is that the small scale of the MBA 
program mimics a small-sized institution even though it sits within a very large organization.  
Some of the same benefits that a small academic setting can offer, such as a flat hierarchy, 
minimal roadblocks and bureaucracy, and links to essential personnel and key organizational 
components.  This small-scale program is in place within a much larger academic setting 
comprised of 16 campuses located throughout the state (UNC, 2007). 
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Component 2:  Higher than Norm for Research Money per Bioscience Faculty: 
 Since this MBA curriculum program does not focus directly on research activities from 
the bioscience faculty, this key element does not apply directly to the UNC model. 
Component 3:  Extremely Entrepreneurial Community: 
 The Research Triangle region of North Carolina is a highly entrepreneurial area, with its 
main focus on the biosciences.  Like the Georgia model, the North Carolina Research Triangle 
initiative was a planned, collaborative partnership among the three research universities in the 
region, the state of North Carolina, and private industry (Milken, 2004; 2006; Washburn, 2005).  
With a 20-year history of pharmaceutical industry and related businesses operating in the area, 
the Research Triangle is home to numerous experts in various areas of bioscience research and 
development who are willing to participate in the MBA program as mentors and advisors to the 
participants.  Some experts have even played an integral role in securing venture funding for the 
biotechnologies being developed as part of the Carolina Challenge (Kouri, 2006; UNC, 2007). 
Even with an inherently entrepreneurial community and easy access to a large number of 
local experts, the UNC MBA model has only been able to successfully commercialize 
biotechnologies in the areas of medical devices, diagnostics, and testing and not in the drug 
development area.  It remains to be seen if the launch of the $1.5 billion North Carolina Research 
Campus will have a positive impact on early stage biotechnology commercialization culture at 
UNC and the other major research universities in the state.  In the North Carolina Research 
Campus project the state has committed nearly $30 million annually, focused on hiring academic 
researchers.  The participating universities are preparing to hire for new faculty members, UNC 
is looking to fill 18 faculty positions while NC State is slated to hire 13 faculty (Fischer, 2007). 
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Component 4:  Integrated Life Sciences Curriculum Program: 
 Since no direct link exists between any life science curriculum programs and the MBA-
based program, this component does not apply.  Instead, the UNC MBA program is a business 
curriculum based program, with commercialization of technologies as one of the outcomes to 
this MBA program. 
Component 5:  Integrated Commercialization Track: 
a)  Funding: 
 Other than the Kauffman Foundation and matching UNC funding which comprise the 
bases for the Carolina Entrepreneurial Initiative, there is no specifically designated university-
based fund to springboard early-stage academic technologies for commercialization as a direct 
part of the MBA entrepreneurial program (Kouri, 2006).  If a technology wins the Carolina 
Challenge, the winners receive a $25,000 prize to further develop the technology (UNC MBA, 
2007).  Some statewide funding is available through other organizations, and the Carolina 
Challenge participants might be eligible for the following related funding sources: 
  1)  Eno River Capital 
A specialized biotechnology revenue source, the Eno River Capital fund, was created in 
1998 to commercialize life science technologies developed in North Carolina’s public academic 
universities through the formation and development of locally-based start-up companies.  In 
addition, the fund was charged with creating new, high-paying, high-skill jobs and attracting new 
capital from later stage investment firms.  The core expertise of Eno River Capital is in 
technology commercialization, with a major focus on transforming discoveries into products or 
services and turning a profit.  Areas of expertise are described as deal-structuring and intellectual 
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property licensing along with operational experience in the areas of information technology and 
the life sciences.  Consulting services are also provided (Eno River Capital, 2007). 
As part of its responsibilities, Eno River Capital manages the $26 million North Carolina 
Bioscience Investment Fund (NCBIF), which is a seed-stage venture capital fund for life science 
inventions and discoveries.  NCBIF’s activities center on the research universities and other 
research institutions in North Carolina (NCBIF, 2007). 
  2)  North Carolina Bioscience Investment Fund 
In June, 2007, it was reported that NCBIF’s $10 million dollar investment in the Eno 
River Fund had a net worth of approximately $1.3 million.  Of the 10 companies the Eno fund 
has invested in, eight have been sold or are out of business.  Norris Tolson, newly elected 
Director of NCBIF, who has recently resigned from his position as the state of North Carolina 
Secretary of Revenue, to take the NCBIF appointment, admitted that the Eno River Fund has not 
performed well, although he cited other investments in new companies that did result in new 
jobs.  The report indicates that NCBIF received approximately $12 million in annual funding 
from the state of Georgia (Weisbecker & John, 2007, 2007).  At the present time, funding for 
further development of early-stage biotechnologies is in transition. 
3)  North Carolina Research Campus  
Seven universities in North Carolina are partnering with Dole Foods owner, David H. 
Murdock, to build a $1.5 billion biotechnology research complex 30 miles northeast of Charlotte 
(Fischer, 2007).  Although specific R&D funds have not yet been defined, it is anticipated that 
commercialization will play a key role. 
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b) R&D Expertise: 
 A significant number of highly-skilled biotechnology experts live in the Research 
Triangle area and are available to help develop new biotechnologies in the region.  Such a 
concentration of experts can prove to be highly valuable to biotechnology start-ups and inventors 
in the area.  Since the biotechnology field is such a highly specialized one, experts are difficult to 
find in most geographic areas.  Having such a high concentration of biotechnology experts, 
including senior management, developmental scientists, bio-business experts, highly-skilled 
research technicians, and others, is unusual and very valuable to the UNC MBA program and the 
participants in the Carolina Challenge.  Several of these experts participate in the Carolina 
Challenge to assist inventors and the MBA teams with their business plans and with other issues 
necessary to ensure successful commercialization.  The collaboration is typically done on a 
voluntary, informal basis (Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007).   
The creation of the North Carolina Research Campus will provide a new infusion of 
R&D experts.  In the North Carolina Research Campus project, the state has committed nearly 
$30 million annually, focused on hiring academic researchers.  The participating universities are 
preparing to hire new faculty members.  UNC is looking to fill 18 faculty positions while North 
Carolina State is slated to hire 13 new faculty (Fischer, 2007).  
 Unlike the other models, the larger North Carolina biotechnology commercialization 
program does contain a workforce development component which has been implemented at the 
North Carolina community college level to educate and train this very important component of 
skilled biotechnology workers (NCBIF, 2007). 
The state of North Carolina has implemented a program through its community colleges 
to train these individuals for workforce deployment.  Expanding this community college program 
  130 
is a major area of focus in the North Carolina Research Campus.  Rowan-Cabarrus Community 
College has initiated a specialized biotechnology program to train students to become laboratory 
technicians, and biomanufacturing workers (Fischer, 2007).  This focus, in conjunction with the 
UNC MBA entrepreneurial program, may provide a significant cadre of regionally grown 
biotechnology employees necessary for growing this specific biotechnology component for 
economic development in the state. 
c) Springboard for New Companies: 
It appears that the UNC Chapel Hill MBA curriculum program and the state of North 
Carolina have had mixed results in creating success as a springboard for new companies.  The 
UNC MBA entrepreneurship curriculum program and the Carolina Challenge have produced 
some biotechnology successes.  Yet, these new companies are limited to those in the medical 
device, diagnostics, and testing areas (UNC MBA, 2007). 
As discussed in this study, the UNC model has not worked for the more complex, highly 
expensive process of taking a biological compound through the numerous hurdles and significant 
expenses, often lasting more than 10 years and costing upwards of $800 million dollars 
(Feldman, et al., 2002).   Supporting the existence of this inherent difficulty surrounding the 
commercialization of pharmaceutical drugs, the Alfred E. Mann Institute for Biomedical 
Engineering at the University of Southern California acknowledges that its extensive 
commercialization program has only been put in place at this time to commercialize medical 
devices.  The Fund acknowledges that immense time and funding surrounds more complex 
biotechnologies and is too expensive for implementation at this time (Robbins-Roth, 2007). 
Another option for Carolina Challenge participants is to look to the NCBIF for possible 
development funding.  Although NCBIF has established several years ago, its main funding 
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remains state dollars and start-up success has been inconsistent, even though some new high-
skilled, high-paying jobs have been created since the inception of NCBIF.  Yet, as recently as 
late June, 2007, the NCBIF is undergoing restructuring efforts and the ties between NCBIF and 
the Eno River Capital fund appear to be under review (Weisbecker & John, 2007, 2007). 
As described above in the funding section, NCBIF has been established to promote and 
commercialize North Carolina bioscience inventions and discoveries, primarily generated from 
the state’s academic research universities.  The Eno River Capital fund investments have not 
been as successful as hoped, but newly-elected NCBIF Director Norris Tolson declared that the 
NCBIF’s other investments have created new jobs and produced returns on investments 
(Weisbecker & John, 2007, 2007).  The state of North Carolina invests approximately $12 
million dollars annually into the NCBIF (NCBIF, 2007). 
A future catalyst for starting up new companies could be part of the North Carolina 
Research Campus project (Fischer, 2007).  Specifics regarding early-stage biotechnology 
commercialization programs in relation to the program have not yet been described.  Projected 
funds for the program are currently estimated at $1.5 billion (Fischer, 2007). 
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Part 3 
Similarities and Differences among the Three  
Models and in Relation to the UCSD Best Practice Model 
 
 This section will compare the three models with each other and with the UCSD best 
practices model.  The five components analyzed throughout this study will be revisited by 
comparing all models in terms of each component.  The following chart (Table 3) outlines the 
five key components present in the UCSD best practices model and the three models analyzed in 
this study. 
Table 3.  












Small Size of Institution Y N Y N 
Higher than Norm for Research Money per 
Biosciences Faculty 
Y N Y Y 
Extremely Entrepreneurial Community Y Y N Y 







 N N N 
Integrated Commercialization Track 
 Funding 
 R & D Expertise 


















Y = yes 
N = no 
TBD = To Be Determined 
UCSD = University of California - San Diego 
UNC = University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
PBRC = Pennington Biomedical Research Center 
GRA = Georgia Research Alliance 
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By comparing the UCSD best practice model with the three models analyzed in this 
study, it is possible that the results will show that not all five components are necessarily the best 
fit for other institutions. 
Perhaps the best example of this is the often-believed misconception that “if you  
could only create an organization like San Diego’s Connect, we could transform  
this state into the next biotech capital of the world!”  Consequently, my caveat to  
this chapter is that, just because the programs described here are producing results  
at UCLA, they may not work well at your university (Neighbour, 2006,  p. 13). 
 
Component 1:  Small Size of the Institution: 
 None of the three models studied fit the traditional definition of a small institution, yet 
each contains some of the characteristics of a small-sized institution deemed important in the 
UCSD model.  For example, the UNC MBA model can be described as a small organization 
when looking only at the MBA curriculum program.  This program is well-defined and focused, 
based on a flat hierarchy, and subject to little bureaucracy.  In addition, the majority of the funds 
for the program are generated from sources outside of the university.  The fact that the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is one of the largest single campuses in the state, 
does not seem to have a negative impact on the efficiency or effectiveness of the MBA 
curriculum program (UNC MBA, 2007). 
 Similarly, the GRA model is also based on a small organization which directly employees 
very few individuals.  The GRA is comprised of a focused program, flat hierarchy, and little 
bureaucracy.  In the GRA model, the mission is to serve the biotechnology commercialization 
needs for Georgia’s top six research universities, but GRA functions as its own separate entity.  
The difficulties often encountered in large organizations, such as bureaucratic gridlock, 
fragmentation, and multiple layers within a multi-tiered hierarchy, do not penetrate the GRA, 
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even though the state government and six major universities are collaborative partners in this 
alliance along with business and industry (GRA, 2007). 
With both the UNC and GRA models, it appears that when a specific program is 
contained within a small organization, it can work well, even if that small organization sits 
within or adjacent to a very large organization.  This success depends on whether or not the 
mechanism is directly dependent on a larger organization for its operations, direct funding, and 
survival, no matter whether or not the mechanism sits within or in parallel to that large 
organization. 
 A somewhat different situation exists at the Pennington Biomedical Research Center, 
which is one of 11 institutions in the Louisiana State University System.  PBRC employs more 
than 650 individuals, but has a narrow research focus and no teaching component.  PBRC is 
modeled on the organized research unit (ORU) structure with the advantage that the funding 
sources and faculty duties are not bifurcated.  The culture of the Center is to be efficient and 
effective and the administrative organization is very lean and flat (PBRC internal documents, 
2007). 
In most day-to-day operations, the Center does not suffer from the problems associated 
with a large bureaucracy, but, as described earlier in the chapter, there are some restrictions 
facing the commercialization process because PBRC sits within a much larger academic 
organization, the LSU System.  The overall commercialization culture at various LSU campuses 
and at the LSU System level has been inconsistent, but new programs and directions undertaken 
within the past few years are changing the situation, as discussed earlier in this chapter (PBRC 
internal documents, 2007). 
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 Despite these issues, PBRC is partnering with the Pennington Foundation to move 
forward in developing a integrated, multi-function commercialization mechanism.  The key 
players recognize there is a balance to be maintained between the Center’s obligations to the 
LSU System and the need for flexibility, some of which is obtained by shifting some of the 
commercialization activities to the Foundation.  With PBRC’s characteristics of a flat hierarchy, 
minimum bureaucracy, and physical proximity to its researchers, the groundwork which allows 
for efficient and effective operations.  Since the Foundation is a separate entity not subject to 
university or government restrictions, it can provide additional flexibility in operations. 
In the end, none of the three commercialization models fits the definition of a traditional 
small institution, and none has the structure that is in place at UCSD, yet there have been 
significant successes generated out of the three models.  In addition to being a small-sized 
organization, the following characteristics of an organization also appear to be important for 
commercialization success: 
1) efficient and effective operations whether the overall organization is small or 
large; 
2) separate funding sources which are not part of traditional university coffers, and if 
possible, rest outside of the overall university umbrella; 
3) well-focused, small scope, targeted commercialization program; and 
4) a flexible approach in order to implement non-traditional activities such as 
industry partnerships, research development funding for faculty, patent activities, 
and R&D expertise in a fluid commercialization marketplace. 
These four characteristics appear to play an important role, at least to some degree, in how 
efficiently the organization runs. 
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Component 2: Higher than Norm for Research Money per Biosciences Faculty: 
 In the traditional definition of the ratio of research money per bioscience faculty, the 
Pennington Biomedical Research Center is the only one of the three models that contains this 
component.  Yet, PBRC finds itself faced with a serious early-stage technology funding gap, 
with a small number of invention disclosures translating into viable venture startups or licensed 
technologies.  Therefore, the ratio of research money per faculty does not equate with successful 
commercialization at PBRC, even though this component was deemed essential in the UCSD 
model. 
 The UNC MBA program is different from the other two models analyzed because it 
involves a small number of technologies and therefore, a small number of faculty.  Mostly near-
commercialization possibilities such as medical devices and testing and diagnostics products 
become part of the Carolina Challenge (Kouri, 2006).  The small number of participating faculty 
and their technologies do not capture the collective research funding of the UNC bioscience 
faculty.  Therefore, it is not feasible to apply this funding ratio to the small group of 
biotechnology researchers participating in the UNC MBA entrepreneurial program. 
 The Georgia model does meet the criterion of higher than norm research money per 
bioscience faculty member if its GRA Eminent Scholars are the only researchers in the pool.  
The GRA model is an example of a very successful commercialization program that does not 
depend on an overall high ratio of funding for all bioscience faculty.  Instead, this model 
leverages and maximizes traditional biosciences research funding only for Eminent Scholars by 
combining it with GRA’s funding sources and collaborative programs.  This results in higher 
than normal research dollars and fuels even more funding for the select Eminent Scholars (GRA, 
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2007).  The high ratios of combined research dollars per Eminent Scholar have translated into 
exceptional commercialization success over the past 16 years. 
Keep in mind that GRA’s success is for a mix of public and private universities with 
different inherent levels of bioscience research funding and bioscience faculty strengths, and the 
program works well in all of the six universities.  Targeting a much smaller group of faculty is a 
GRA formula that works for both public and private research universities and reinforces the 
belief that a version of the Eminent Scholar program could be adapted for use by a range of 
research universities. 
  Ironically, the only model which meets the traditional definition of this higher than norm 
research ratio is PBRC, which finds itself needing to implement a more comprehensive 
commercialization program in order to be consistently successful.  As mentioned above, the 
UNC model is very limited in the number of faculty participating and the scope of technologies it 
can commercialize, so it is not feasible to calculate the ratio of research funding per faculty 
involved in the Carolina Challenge. 
For this component, it appears that the most successful model is the GRA program, one 
which contains some basic characteristics which are different from the UCSD model.  The GRA 
model only applies the funding ratio to the targeted group of Eminent Scholars.  Small, focused, 
similar programs applied to select faculty might be easily adapted by other universities.  In 
actuality, it might not matter if there is an overall high ratio of research dollars per bioscience 
faculty members as long as there is a high ratio for those targeted faculty researchers who 
actually participate in the commercialization mechanism. 
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Component 3:  Extremely Entrepreneurial Community: 
The ongoing support, development, expansion, and successes of the Georgia Research 
Alliance and its related initiatives and activities such as the Georgia Venture Partners Fund, 
reinforce the state of Georgia’s commitment to fueling the entrepreneurial spirit.  As described 
by the GRA itself, its mission is to create the opportunities to grow the economy of the state 
through scientific discovery and related commercialization activities (GRA, 2007; GVP, 2007). 
Unlike San Diego or the North Carolina Research Triangle, historically the state of 
Georgia had not been culturally entrepreneurial regarding bioscience development prior to the 
creation of the Georgia Research Alliance in 1990.  Yet, the GRA is an example of a statewide 
initiative that includes partnerships of academic, government, and private organizations that have 
proven very successful in meeting its mission (GRA, 2007).  Nevertheless, even with all of the 
success and the highly entrepreneurial culture in Georgia, there is a commercialization gap for 
early-stage academic biotechnologies, which led to the formation of the Georgia Venture 
Partners Fund in 2004 (GVP, 2007). 
Although inherently entrepreneurial, PBRC finds itself needing to expand its broader 
entrepreneurial culture in order to move ahead with successful biotechnology commercialization.  
The question remains as to whether or not having a very entrepreneurial internal culture at PBRC 
is enough to cultivate a successful, broader-based mechanism for commercialization success.  
PBRC sits within a larger, mixed-risk culture in place at the LSU System, the greater Baton 
Rouge area, regionally, and around the state.  There is some movement toward the development 
of a more creative class within the overall traditional, conservative, risk-averse setting, but it 
remains to be seen if this movement is enough to be a catalyst for PBRC's economic activities. 
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Like UCSD and Georgia, the Research Triangle region of North Carolina also has been a 
highly entrepreneurial area for several decades, with its main focus on biosciences R&D.  The 
Research Triangle has been home to Glaxo Smith Kline, a pharmaceutical company for several 
years and has, within its region, a large number of experts in the biotechnology field.  Like the 
Georgia model, the North Carolina Research Triangle initiative was a planned, collaborative 
partnership among the three research universities in the region, the state of North Carolina, and 
private industry.  But upon closer inspection, the Research Triangle appears to more closely 
resemble the overall entrepreneurial culture of the San Diego area than it does that of Georgia. 
Despite its long-term culture of entrepreneurship, UNC also found itself faced with the 
same biotechnology valley of death that has been described in detail throughout this study 
(Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006).  In such an entrepreneurial climate, UNC still could 
not successfully commercialize its early-stage biotechnology inventions and discoveries.  The 
overall culture of entrepreneurship was not enough to guarantee biotechnology success at UNC, 
as witnessed by the need for the MBA entrepreneurial program and the Carolina Challenge 
(Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007).   
On the state level, the North Carolina government has more recently declared the need to 
overhaul the North Carolina Bioscience Investment Fund which was created to commercialize 
inventions and discoveries generated in the state.  The state government also made the admission 
that its past mechanisms for commercializing biotechnologies have had mixed results (NCBIF, 
2007).   
It appears that an entrepreneurial culture or community is important to successful 
commercialization, but this entrepreneurism can be deliberately created, as was the case in 
Georgia, and still result in a positive economic impact.  Conversely, the presence of a highly 
  140 
entrepreneurial community does not guarantee, in and of itself, a corresponding success rate for 
commercializing early–stage biotechnologies, as witnessed in North Carolina.  The emergence of 
the new North Carolina Research Campus may provide North Carolina with a more 
entrepreneurial culture.  As part of the new movement, UNC System President Erskine Bowles 
has declared that economic development is part of the university's mission (Fischer, 2007). 
Component 4: Integrated Life Sciences Curriculum Program: 
This component is not directly related to any of the three commercialization models 
studied, yet its importance may be undervalued in this study by virtue of the characteristics of the 
particular models being analyzed.  One reason that the importance of an integrated life sciences 
curriculum program might have a much larger overall impact on an academic institution than is 
present in the three models, is based on a new NIH program.   
The NIH has realized that it has been largely unsuccessful in its ability to translate its 
federal clinical research funding into an adequate number of positive outcomes related to patient 
care and new bioscience discoveries to improve the overall health of the population.  As a result, 
the NIH has launched a new initiative called the Clinical Translational Science Awards (NIH, 
2007). 
Both the UCSD model and the NIH Clinical Translational Science Awards emphasize a 
new approach to training bioscience researchers at least partly through an integrated curriculum.  
This new NIH program is geared toward breaking down the barriers or silos of research so that 
cross-collaboration and a broader spectrum of possibilities becomes the norm for the individuals 
being trained.  The belief is that, by cross-training clinical researchers, an increase in broader-
based translational research activities will occur, as will an increase in treatment initiatives 
(Holmes, 2006; NIH, 2007). 
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In its own way, the GRA has accomplished some of these same outcomes in terms of 
developing cross-trained translational researchers by its requirements and criteria for its Eminent 
Scholars Program and Eminent Scholars Innovation Fund.  Unlike the UCSD model or the NIH 
CTSA program, the Georgia Eminent Scholars are senior, expert bioscientists, not students, who 
are awarded funding based on cross-collaboration and commercializable areas of research.  In the 
GRA model, the requirements for the Eminent Scholar programs are substituted for the 
curriculum requirements of the life sciences students. 
It might be possible in certain circumstances, for example, at the Pennington Biomedical 
Research Center, to implement a version of the Eminent Scholars model as an alternative to the 
UCSD model because PBRC has no students and does not confer degrees, yet needs to improve 
its ability to generate biotechnology commercialization opportunities for its research faculty.   In 
the focus group discussions and in individual meetings with PBRC faculty, they welcomed an 
opportunity to vie for membership in a program similar to the GRA Eminent Scholars program. 
Overall, a more comprehensive model might include a combination of the UCSD 
integrated life sciences curriculum program, the NIH CTSA program and the GRA Eminent 
Scholars program.  A parallel program involving both senior researchers and life sciences 
students, including graduate, medical, doctoral, and postdoctoral students, could produce a more 
immediate impact from the researcher level and a longer-term sustainable impact from the 
education and training levels.  The combination of these programs might even result in 
synergistic overall commercialization successes beyond what has been observed in any one 
model alone, including that at UCSD. 
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Component 5:  Integrated Commercialization Track: 
a) Funding: 
Despite its very successful, well-planned, statewide, comprehensive program in place, the 
problem of commercializing early-stage bioscience inventions and discoveries still appeared in 
Georgia.  Since it was recognized as such a critical issue, three of Georgia’s research universities 
decided to create a small seed fund on their own and not wait for the state to intercede.  Emory 
University, Georgia Institute of Technology, and the University of Georgia developed a $5 
million fund called Georgia Venture Partners (GVP) by combining $1 million from each of the 
academic institutions with $2 million from private investors.  The GVP is a professionally 
managed seed fund at arms-length from the universities and the GRA (GVP, 2007). 
The fund has two principle functions, 1) to generate substantial investment returns, 
primarily through capital gains, by investing in a portfolio of companies; and 2) to increase the 
economic development of life sciences in Georgia through seed or early-stage investments in life 
sciences start-up companies based around academic inventions and discoveries.  GVP initially 
invests between $100,000 and $200,000 in a single company, with a maximum investment 
capped at $1 million dollars for that company.  The fund just recently began investing in new 
technologies (GVP, 2007). 
 A different scenario was in place at PBRC.  The majority of PBRC’s inventions and 
discoveries are very early-stage and often require further development prior to outside 
investment interest.  The initial step taken to correct this problem at PBRC was to create an 
early-stage seed fund to provide the necessary capital for inventors to further develop their 
nascent technologies.  A $12 million dollar seed fund, Themelios Venture Partners (TVP), an 
arms-length venture fund, was formed to support in PBRC inventions and discoveries and also 
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allow a small percentage of investments in outside companies which would partner with PBRC 
on specific commercialization projects (PBRC internal documents, 2007; TVP, 2007). 
 The overall structure of TVP is similar to that of the Georgia Venture Partners.  In 
PBRC’s case, the seed fund was created first and the commercialization platform is being 
developed after TVP, while, in Georgia, the commercialization platform was created first, 
followed by the seed fund.  Even though TVP has already invested in several PBRC 
technologies, it has turned down the majority of the technologies it has reviewed, claiming that 
the discoveries are too early for it to consider.  As a result, PBRC has found itself facing the 
same funding gap described by Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006), and Nowak (2006), even after the 
formation of TVP.  PBRC and PBRF are now exploring additional funding mechanisms such as 
some adaptation of GRA’s VentureLab fund and a corporate sponsorship to help with further 
development of its nascent technologies. 
A third situation exists in North Carolina.  Other than the Kauffman Foundation and 
matching UNC funding which comprise the bases for the Carolina Entrepreneurial Initiative, 
there is no specifically designated university-based fund to springboard early-stage academic 
technologies for commercialization as a direct part of the UNC MBA entrepreneurial program.  
If a technology wins the Carolina Challenge, the winners receive a $25,000 prize to further 
develop the technology.  Some statewide funding is available through other organizations, but 
there has been a reassessment of those sources recently (Kouri, 2006; NCBIF, 2007). 
The first fund discussed was the Eno River Capital and the second was the North 
Carolina Bioscience Investment Fund (NCBIF).  The Eno River Capital fund, which was created 
in 1998 to commercialize life science technologies developed in North Carolina’s public 
academic universities through the formation and development of locally-based start-up 
  144 
companies, has been under close review recently.  The fund was initially charged with creating 
new, high-paying, high-skill jobs and attracting new capital from later stage investment firms.  
The core expertise of Eno River Capital is in technology commercialization, with a major focus 
on transforming discoveries into products or services and turning a profit.  Areas of expertise are 
described as deal-structuring and intellectual property licensing along with operational 
experience in the areas of information technology and the life sciences.  Consulting services are 
also provided (Eno River Capital, 2007). 
Until recently, Eno River Capital has managed the $26 million North Carolina Bioscience 
Investment Fund (NCBIF), which is a seed-stage venture capital fund for life science inventions 
and discoveries.  In June, 2007, it was reported that NCBIF’s $10 million dollar investment in 
the Eno River Fund had a net worth of approximately $1.3 million.  Of the 10 companies the Eno 
fund has invested in, eight have been sold or are out of business.  NCBIF’s new director admitted 
that the Eno River Fund has not performed well, although he points out other investments in new 
companies that did result in new jobs (NCBIF, 2007).  At the present time, NCBIF receives 
approximately $12 million in annual funding from the state of North Carolina (Weisbecker & 
John, 2007 , 2007).   
The $1.5 billion NCR campus, a collaboration of seven universities, the State of North 
Carolina and Dole Foods owner, David H. Murdock, is just beginning its development (Fischer, 
2007).  Such an enormous statewide research and development initiative could have a major 
impact on economic development for the entire state of North Carolina. 
 The three models are not alone in facing investment difficulties.  Even with its overall 
success, the UCSD model also recognizes some challenges to its commercialization pathway.  
Edward Holmes (2006) points out that there are at least two gaps in the road to clinical 
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translation, 1) between discovery and development (Post-NIH and pre-commercialization) and 2) 
between R&D and clinical evaluation (FDA Phase 1-2 and Phase 3).  Holmes acknowledges that 
funding for the gap between discovery and development or the valley of death as described by 
Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006) and Nowak (2006), is typically not available in the UCSD university 
setting. 
 All three models studied as well as and the UCSD model, appear to indicate that a 
funding source is crucial, but not enough by itself, to ensure commercialization success.  This 
component appears to be closely linked with the need for available R&D expertise.  The PBRC 
situation clearly reflects this need, while the GRA model indicates that the R&D expertise 
without the funding is also not enough for commercialization success. 
b) R&D Expertise: 
Different situations in terms of R&D expertise exist at each of the three models studied.  
In Georgia, the state was not flush with R&D experts when the GRA program was introduced in 
1990, and acknowledging that lack, GRA integrated a planned mechanism for access to R&D 
experts as part of its VentureLab program.  In addition, the GRA program recruits expert 
researchers who are R&D experts for its Eminent Scholars program.  As a result, the GRA has 
proven to be a successful combination of outside expertise and internally-grown R&D experts 
(GRA, 2007). 
The GRA VentureLab program contains fellows and commercialization catalysts which 
have much in common with the local R&D experts in the Research Triangle area of North 
Carolina, with one major difference.  The GRA VentureLab program requires that the fellows 
and commercialization catalysts be employed by the specific research university where they are 
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working.  The UNC MBA entrepreneurial program’s affiliation with its local experts is informal 
and voluntary (GRA VentureLab, 2007; UNC MBA, 2007). 
The model with the highest number of inherent R&D experts is the UNC MBA 
curriculum program which resides within the North Carolina Research Triangle.  A significant 
number of highly-skilled biotechnology experts are available locally to help develop new 
biotechnologies.  Since this part of North Carolina has been home to a major pharmaceutical 
company (Glaxo Smith Kline) in addition to being the center of bioscience activity for several 
decades, there are signification numbers of local R&D experts who are willing and able to 
participate in biotechnology commercialization activities (Kouri, 2006; Milken, 2004; 2006). 
Such a concentration of experts can prove to be highly valuable to biotechnology start-
ups and inventors in the region.  Since the biotechnology field is such a highly specialized one, 
experts are difficult to find in many geographic areas.  Having such a high concentration of local 
experts in many areas of biotechnology, including senior management, developmental science, 
bio-business, and others, is unusual and very valuable to the UNC MBA program and the 
participants in the Carolina Challenge. 
Despite this atypical collection of R&D experts, there is a limited amount of success in 
terms of commercialization of early-stage technologies at UNC and overall in the state of North 
Carolina.  This limited success might indicate that there is a need for a combination of 
components in order to ensure commercialization success, as pointed out by Dr. Kouri in his 
AUTM presentation (2006).  The new $1.5 billion North Carolina Research Campus initiative 
which involves seven North Carolina research universities could be the catalyst for 
commercialization success (Fischer, 2007). 
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 In a related R&D issue, the San Diego area was identified as an area that is finding it 
difficult to retain some of its specialty-trained biotechnology workforce (Milken, 2004; 2006).  
In particular, those individuals at the mid-level and support levels of the workforce are finding it 
difficult to remain in the area due to the extraordinary high cost of living in the region and also in 
the Boston area (Coombs, 2007).  Although this is a newly recognized issue, the need for such a 
skilled workforce is important to the overall success of a biotechnology economy. 
The state of North Carolina has implemented a program through its community colleges 
to train these individuals for workforce deployment.  Expanding this community college program 
is a major area of focus in the North Carolina Research Campus.  Rowan-Cabarrus Community 
College has initiated a specialized biotechnology program to train students to become laboratory 
technicians, and biomanufacturing workers (Fischer, 2007).  This focus, in conjunction with the 
UNC MBA entrepreneurial program, may provide a significant cadre of regionally grown 
biotechnology employees necessary for growing this specific biotechnology component for 
economic development in the state. 
 The need for a support biotechnology type of workforce was also recognized at the 
Louisiana BOR focus group meeting in April, 2007 (BOR, 2007).  Recognizing the lack of R&D 
experts to assist in the further development of early-stage technologies, PBRC and PBRF key 
individuals along with PBRC faculty, expressed the need to be able to access such outside 
expertise.  Faculty suggested some form of mentoring or coaching  as a possible solution to help 
develop early-stage technologies.  The GRA VentureLab model was suggested as one which 
could be implemented. 
PBRC faculty and key individuals also recognized the importance of recruiting senior 
scientific experts to PBRC who have expertise in or who want to focus on commercialization.  
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The key individuals are exploring using some form of the Eminent Scholars program as a model.  
The Louisiana Board of Regents, the Louisiana Recovery Authority, and the Baton Rouge Area 
Foundation also found many aspects of the GRA model, including the Eminent Scholars 
program, as a model that might be adapted for the state of Louisiana (BOR, 2007).  In that case, 
PBRC could benefit from such a statewide academic recruiting initiative. 
c) Springboard for New Companies: 
Of the three models studied, the most comprehensive and overall successful springboard 
for new companies is the GRA model, which has launched more than 125 new companies since 
its inception in 1990.  More than 5,000 new jobs have been created as a result, and more than 
$600 million in private investments in these new companies has occurred.  The program has also 
fueled partnerships with more than 100 Georgia companies.  The combination  of a narrow focus 
along with  well-developed, strategically integrated phases of commercialization funding and 
R&D expertise all play into a successful springboard for new companies (GRA, 2007). 
The successful VentureLab program contains specific requirements which are paramount 
to R&D activities.  These requirements include the further development of the technology, 
design and implementation of a business plan and coordination of the Eminent Scholars’ funding 
sources, which led to the formation of solid new start-up companies.  This series of phases 
provides progressive steps in an overall process geared toward commercialization success (GRA 
VentureLab, 2007). 
Once again, this is not the entire story, because an early-stage funding gap still emerged 
in Georgia, despite the success of the GRA VentureLab program and other economic plans for 
new company development.  As a result, three of the six GRA research universities combined 
with private partners to create a special early-stage biotechnology funding source called the 
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Georgia Venture Partners Fund (GVP).  The GVP has helped to bridge the gap between nascent 
biotechnologies and the next stage of commercialization (GVP, 2007). 
In contrast, PBRC has had mixed results related to creating a springboard for new 
companies.  On one hand, the TVP venture fund has been very supportive in the formation of 
new companies for the few technologies it has invested in, but TVP has declined to invest in the 
majority of PBRC technologies it has reviewed.  TVP cites the early-stage nature of the 
inventions as its reason to decline investment.  Currently, PBRC and PBRF are analyzing what 
multi-tiered commercialization programs it might adapt to further develop PBRC discoveries.  
Focus is on developing local R&D expertise, creating a VentureLab-type program, and recruiting 
expert faculty who commercialize. 
It appears that the state of North Carolina also has had mixed results in providing a 
springboard for new companies.  Even with its cache of locally highly-skilled R&D experts, the 
success of new company start-ups in North Carolina has been inconsistent.  Although the state 
established the North Carolina Bioscience Investment Fund (NCBIF) several years ago, its main 
funding source remains the state, although some new high-skilled, high-paying jobs have been 
created since its inception.  As recently as late June, 2007, the NCBIF was undergoing 
restructuring efforts while the ties between NCBIF and the Eno River Capital fund were under 
review (NCBIF, 2007). 
Yet the North Carolina climate may change very soon with the $1.5 billion bioscience 
research and development program involving major research universities, the State, and Dole 
Foods owner David Murdock (Fischer, 2007). 
The UCSD model is ranked number one by the Milken Report (2004, 2006) in terms of 
new start-up companies created and still in existence.  Even so, there is a growing concern over 
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the high cost of living in the San Diego area, which is of concern when new start-up companies 
are trying to recruit new Ph.D.’s, support scientists, and management teams (Coombs, 2007; 
Milken, 2004). 
 This section has shown that the three models are often different from each other as well 
as from the UCSD model.  As a result, a revised version of the comparison chart is presented 
below (Table 4).  In almost every category, there are some changes in the assessments as to 
whether or not a component is present or absent.  As described in this chapter, a simple yes or no 
answer often is not an accurate reflection of the presence or absence of specific components.  
Sometimes, pieces of a component exist, or a hybrid situation occurs.  This broader interpretation 
of the five essential components could assist academic research institutions in determining what 
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Y = yes 
N = no 
NA = not applicable 
TBD = to be determined 
H = Hybrid 
P = Partial 
UCSD = University of California - San Diego 
UNC = University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
PBRC = Pennington Biomedical Research Center 
GRA = Georgia Research Alliance 
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Part 4 
Additional Key Components Considered Essential for Commercialization Success 
 
The commercialization models analyzed in this study exist in various geographic 
locations, have organizational structures different from each other, include only some of the key 
components of the USCD model, and often exhibit those key components in new, partial or 
hybrid ways.  In addition, the models studied contain additional significant characteristics that 
appear to be very important in terms of commercialization success.  Extensive interviews with 
PBRC faculty were conducted and the issues discussed were germane to this study.  Significant 
parts of these discussions have become part of the additional key components.  Due to the 
significance of these interviews, the eight topics that were discussed are contained below. 
FACULTY ROLES AND EXPERIENCES 
In individual and group meetings with PBRC researchers, these inventors voiced their 
frustrations with the difficulties for moving their technologies forward along the 
commercialization continuum.  Of the nine researchers taking part in individual and focus group 
meetings, the majority of them have had experience with venture capitalists, start-up companies, 
and the biotechnology industry in the past.  Several of them have issued patents and all of them 
have been listed as inventors on patent applications.  Some are or have been equity owners in 
biotechnology start-up companies, and all have been hired at various times as consultants to the 
biotechnology industry (PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
Even with their familiarity with biotechnology investment funds,  start-up companies, 
and the overall industry, all of the faculty interviewed recognize they are not expert investors and 
do not wish to take on that role themselves.  But, because the majority of them have had some 
experience with the commercialization end of the biotech industry and three of them have held 
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positions for extended periods of time within the industry, their observations and analyses are 
based on actual experience.  At the present time, their chosen areas of interest and expertise lie 
within the realms of academic biomedical research, but they include commercialization as part of 
their interests.  In this sense, these researchers are similar to GRA Eminent Scholars. 
At this time, all of these researchers believe that a better way can be developed in which 
their technologies can move forward more successfully.  They have been encouraged to relay 
their concerns and thoughts on how to improve the PBRC commercialization process.  As a 
result, several one-on-one meetings and discussions and focus group meetings have been 
conducted over several months.  The PBRC administration and key individuals in the Foundation 
believe that the faculty, especially those researchers who are inventors, can contribute 
significantly to the entire process of developing a better model of commercialization at PBRC 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007; PBRF internal documents, 2007). 
In the course of the interviews and focus group meetings, the PBRC researchers revealed 
the following concerns and provided suggestions they thought might be implemented in order to 
overcome the commercialization obstacles they have experienced.  Here are the following eight 
suggestions and concerns that the researchers discussed with PBRC and PBRF administrators: 
1) More feedback from venture capitalists (VCs) on the status of technologies after they 
have been reviewed by the venture capitalists; 
2) R&D mentor/coaches to help guide further development of technologies; 
3) Seed funds for continued early stage development of technologies; 
4) Later-stage funds for further R&D work, pre-clinical studies, and federal regulatory 
requirements; 
5) Wider selection of patent counsel with expertise in specialized/niche areas; 
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6) Increased freedom for faculty to operate in start-up activities and the ongoing 
commercialization process; 
7) Business development/interface to promote networking between scientific endeavors 
and commercialization; and 
8) Establishment of special high dollar research commercialization faculty chairs. 
Each of the eight items above will be discussed below in terms of how the researchers perceive 
them as well as how they might be addressed in a new PBRC commercialization model. 
1) Feedback from Venture Capitalists: 
The majority of the faculty members interviewed had been told, at one time or another, 
by the various Louisiana-based venture funds (TVP, Louisiana Fund 1 and others), that their 
technologies needed further developmental work before they would be ready for those 
investment funds to consider.  Even so, the inventors had not received feedback from the VCs 
regarding why their technologies were not funded nor what specific steps they should take in 
order to be reconsidered for future funding.  Even after the inventors asked for feedback on 
several occasions from the VCs and the VCs agreed to do so, the VCs did not provide any 
written or oral feedback to the inventors. 
 Although this lack of feedback appears to be the norm for venture capitalists, it is a  new 
type of  interaction for researchers.  Academic researchers who compete for grant funding are 
accustomed to receiving detailed written feedback from their unfunded grant applications. Often, 
these critiques, written by experts in the same specific scientific field of the application, are the 
cornerstone by which the researchers are able to adjust their scope of work, rewrite their research 
studies, resubmit their applications and often, successfully gain funding.   
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As discussed in Chapter 1, resubmission of grant applications is a common occurrence, 
and researchers acknowledge this as a part of the funding process (Couzin & Miller, 2007).  
Given the extremely high success rate PBRC scientists achieve through resubmission, these 
researchers quite possibly would be able to produce an equivalent high rate of success in 
commercialization given feedback.  PBRC researchers have an exceptionally high re-submission 
success rate at NIH, approximately 80% (PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
In addition, researchers also receive written comments for peer-reviewed manuscript 
submissions, and as part of the process, address these comments by writing additional sections or 
adjusting the focus of their submissions in order to gain approval for publication.  These 
processes are standard in grant and manuscript review in biomedical research areas (NIH, 2007; 
PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
Therefore, academic inventors not only respond to feedback, they expect it in order to 
make adjustments to the scope of work they have proposed or the manuscripts they prepare to 
publish.  Every one of the PBRC inventors discussed the interactions they had experienced with 
the VCs.  They had expected and welcomed some type of feedback from the investors and the 
opportunity to adjust their work, perform additional studies or other research, and then be able to 
meet with the investors at a subsequent time, with technologies which were further developed. 
As the researchers discussed this issue in the focus group meetings, they all felt confident 
that, if they had received feedback from the VCs, they would have been able to address the 
concerns, do additional work in order to move their technologies along, and increase the 
probability that their technologies could be funded.  This belief was held by all of the inventors 
regardless of which venture fund investors they had met with in the past.  It is important to note 
again that several of the researchers being interviewed had past experience with VCs, both in 
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academia and also in industry.  So, the group as a whole had been involved, at least at some 
level, with some of them having had a very intimate and long-term involvement with VCs and 
others in the biotechnology industry. 
2) R&D Mentor/Coaches to Help Guide Further Development of Technologies: 
During the focus group meetings and also in individual interviews, faculty suggested that 
they could benefit from having a mentor or coach, or some other form of customized guidance in 
place to aid the process of technology commercialization.  Even though the valley of death or 
funding gap has been previously described (Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006).  It is 
important to note here that this gap encompasses a range of activities necessary to technology 
transfer, and the steps and time needed to further develop the invention or discovery will vary 
from technology to technology.   
Very often, the next steps needed in the development process are most appropriately 
conducted by the inventor with some guidance or advice from an individual or team of 
individuals who can be described as research and development experts.  These scientists 
typically have backgrounds in industry in addition to working as bench scientists or clinicians.  
Often, these positions are not part of academic research institutions, and so inventors from 
universities have little or no contact with this type of scientist in an academic setting.  The PBRC 
researchers find themselves in a similar position.  Both of the other models studied (GRA and 
UNC) have such experts available.  For example, to aid in overcoming this roadblock, the GRA 
has established the VentureLab program and UNC has included access to this type of regionally-
based biotechnology R&D experts in its Carolina Challenge program (GRA VentureLab, 2007; 
Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007). 
  157 
A suggestion was made that there could be a team of two or three research and 
development experts who would review a specific technology, make written suggestions to the 
inventors, and act as guides or mentors to the inventors as they carried out the suggested next 
steps in research development.  This suggestion was received positively by the faculty in the 
focus groups as well as in individual meetings with researchers.  The faculty felt quite confident 
that, within such a model, they would be able to further their technologies, and add value, 
resulting in a product, method, or treatment which would have a higher chance of being funded 
by early-stage VCs. 
Another suggestion was made by a faculty member that a consultant could also serve as a 
mediator between the researchers and the venture capitalists while aiding in the scientific review 
process.  This idea led to the realization that knowing the right path to take in terms of research 
and development was only one step that was needed, but the inventors would also need to secure 
seed funding to be able to carry out the R&D suggestions made by the commercialization review 
team.  The PBRF consultant pointed out that the GRA VentureLab program contains a 
component that employs individuals called fellows and commercialization catalysts who have 
been strategically put in place to act in these capacities to mentor and coach and advise on 
commercialization. 
3) Seed Funds for Continued Development of Technologies: 
As suggested by the faculty and reinforced by the PBRF consultant, seed funding to 
further the research and development of their technologies was a vital next step in order to 
increase the chances that, eventually, the early-stage VCs would invest in the technologies that 
had been presented to them by faculty inventors.  The consultant used the example of the 
Georgia Research Alliance, which provided these types of seed funding to academic researchers 
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with early-stage technologies.  The GRA offers a seed or grant fund stage, followed by a three-
phase innovation fund with funds of up to $50,000 in the first phase, $100,000 in the second 
phase, and a negotiable convertible loan to the start-up company in the final phase.  The 
consultant also described the GVP fund, which makes awards of up to $250,000 for research and 
development of promising technologies (GRA, 2007; GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
 The faculty were encouraged that such a fund, coupled with written feedback and 
guidance from an R&D team, would go a long way in allowing continued research which would 
advance technologies along the commercialization continuum.  The researchers also felt 
confident that such activities would fit into their faculty roles quite appropriately at PBRC and 
would not fragment their research activities nor require them to out-license their inventions at a 
discount and surrender control to an outside party at such an early stage of development.  The 
faculty were encouraged by the plausibility of success for them to continue moving their 
technologies forward through this approach of coupling a team advisory group with seed 
funding. 
4) Later-Stage Funds for Further R&D Work, Pre-Clinical Studies, and Federal Regulatory 
Requirements: 
 
The researchers thought the seed fund described above would help when their research 
was very early in its development.  The faculty also asked if there could be a second-stage type 
of fund available as well, which would be used as a later-stage, after the initial R&D work was 
completed.  Once again, the PBRF consultant described the Georgia Research Alliance 
VentureLab program, which has the ability to fund both early and more advanced technologies 
(GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
The group of faculty discussed the amount of money which might be appropriate for this 
type of fund, suggesting that a one-time amount between $50,000 and $100,000 would fit with 
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the scope of work anticipated at this stage of research development.  This amount mirrors the 
GRA VentureLab Phase II funding range (GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
The consultant had mentioned that there are specialty funds set up at a few academic 
institutions that offer special, fee-based memberships to leading corporations and other entities in 
industry in related scientific fields as a way to create opportunities for developing collaborative 
research and commercialization.  The consultant suggested that development of a similar fund be 
considered by PBRC and PBRF.    
5) Wider Selection of Patent Counsel with Expertise in Specialized/Niche Areas: 
Several of the faculty members indicated that additional issues existed which impeded the 
technology transfer process.  One such issue is related to the restrictions on what patent counsel 
could be hired by PBRC as part of the LSU System.  Because of state restrictions, the LSU 
System only permits Louisiana law firms to represent its campuses for patent activities, and the 
list of approved law firms is very limited.  Patent counsel can be very good, but the areas of 
expertise any one individual can have are limited.  Therefore, even the most capable patent 
lawyer cannot be an expert in every area of bioscience (LSU System, 2007). 
Since the focus of many biotechnology patent applications are very specialized, it is 
important that expert patent counsel be able to write the patent application since the claims in the 
application form the foundation of protection and define the commercialization monopoly.   
Some of the scientific areas of expertise for the PBRC scientists are very specialized and, at 
times, only select law firms in the entire country, specialize in that specific area of patent work. 
Numerous researchers, especially those who had experience with more specialized 
outside patent counsel in the past, commented that not being able to contract with the most 
knowledgeable patent counsel might limit the range of patent protection which then could limit 
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the potential for commercialization markets.  A related factor is that the LSU System will only 
allow approved outside patent counsel if a licensee or potential licensee will pay for the legal 
work.  The faculty and administrators indicated that this factor could compromise negotiations 
for licensing the technologies and could lead to licensing at a discount just to secure out-of-state 
expert patent counsel.  A proposed solution was to engage the Pennington Biomedical Research 
Foundation in the process of securing outside expert patent counsel, since it is not under the 
same constraints as PBRC. 
Contracting with expert patent counsel is supported by several venture capitalists.  Eric 
Nicolaides, a venture partner with Wildcat Venture Management, explains. 
A firm commitment – especially to patents from university administrators is a key  
element of wooing venture capital.  Nicolaides says, “we understand  
patents are expensive, but [we] will walk away from a project that’s revolutionary 
yet does not have exclusive IP…” Some schools, he adds, basically patent  
everything within reason, while others take a more limited approach.  The latter  
will often say up front that if there’s a patent renewal or patent filing coming up,  
they’ll have to let it go because they don’t have the money.  That puts VCs in an  
understandably precarious position (Technology Transfer Tactics, p. 43). 
 
6) Increased Freedom for Faculty to Operate in Start-Up Activities and the Ongoing 
Commercialization Process: 
 
Several of the faculty members discussed whether or not universities should really  
have the responsibility of technology transfer, mentioning that some European universities give 
their faculty control over their inventions and discoveries.  This IP transfer gives university 
researchers the individual freedom to operate in relation to their own technologies.  In addition to 
the high costs for patent and other legal fees, it was acknowledged that many examples exist of 
researchers not being able to create and oversee a start-up company due to their lack of this 
specialized business expertise. 
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 In response, the PBRF consultant described GRA’s Georgia’s Advanced Technology 
Development Center and the Eminent Scholars Program as possibilities for developing long-term 
returns on investment by maximizing inherent advantages, creating innovative partnerships, and 
recruiting new scholars who know how to or want to commercialize intellectual property (GRA, 
2007).  In such a structure, the faculty have more opportunities to participate in 
commercialization as part of their faculty roles. 
 Other suggestions made by the consultant described a cross-degree program between 
Emory University and the Georgia Institute of Technology as a way to facilitate collaborations 
and expand areas of scientific interest (GRA, 2007).  The Georgia Research Revolving Fund was 
suggested as an example of a funding opportunity to assist with faculty recruiting.  This loan 
program has been created by the state of Georgia in conjunction with federal programs and other 
organizations.  One of the areas of focus is its small business resources, which includes financial 
opportunities and other support activities (Georgia Small Business Resources, 2007). 
7) Business/Development Interface to Promote Networking between Scientific Endeavors 
and Commercialization: 
 
A suggestion was made to set up a symposium and invite key business and industry 
leaders and promote available PBRC technologies.  The consultant discussed that the Georgia 
Center for Entrepreneurial Development (2007) acts as a business interface between researchers 
and business and industry concerns in the state of Georgia.  A similar program might be 
appropriate for the PBRC model.  The particulars of the Georgia model were not discussed, but it 
was acknowledged that there would need to be adaptations to reflect both the different 
composition of industry within the state of Louisiana as well as reflect the scope of the 
biotechnology activities within PBRC and the state. 
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Importantly, the BOR/LRA study concludes that, unlike the state of Georgia, Louisiana is 
not home to Fortune 500 companies which can help to finance such an industry partnership 
program (BOR, 2007).  Therefore, PBRC and PBRF will need to create a different model to 
implement locally. 
Given the early-stage of the PBRC inventions and discoveries, the focus of a business 
development interface should be broader than just commercialization because very few PBRC 
technologies currently sit in a place ready to commercialize.  Instead, the interface should be 
geared toward PBRC’s overall expertise in scientific areas of interest to business and industry.  
In such a way, the value from interacting with PBRC researchers would span a wider range from 
scientific expert to technology inventor (PBRF internal documents, 2007). 
The Foundation is considering the development of a consortium of business and 
industrial partners with participation based on an annual fee which would provide unique access 
to PBRC’s scientific faculty and their areas of expertise, including ideas emanating from the 
researchers while providing the opportunity to consider development of collaborative research 
initiatives or the possibility to review existing technologies (PBRF internal documents, 2007). 
8) Establishment of High Dollar Research Development Faculty Chairs: 
Recruiting and retaining high-quality faculty was acknowledged as an ongoing issue.  In 
addition, several faculty discussed the importance of recruiting researchers who are committed to 
and capable of creating technologies for biotechnology commercialization.   As an example, the 
Georgia Research Alliance Eminent Scholars Program was discussed as a model where faculty 
are recruited based on their success or interest in commercialization.  In addition, GRA grants 
are based on this commercialization focus and on cross-collaboration with other Eminent 
Scholars (GRA, 2007). 
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The PBRC faculty agreed that some version of the GRA Eminent Scholars Program 
might be appropriate for PBRC.  As mentioned previously, this idea is also supported by the 
Baton Rouge Area Foundation and the Louisiana BOR and LRA.  Of all the programs reviewed 
and discussed by the BOR, LRA and BRAF, the Eminent Scholars program is one that all parties 
believe could be adapted most easily for the researches in the state of Louisiana (BOR 2007). 
ADDITIONAL COMPONENTS 
Since these additional components have been instrumental in the success of the 
commercialization processes for the three particular models studied, they are included here as 
possible new key components to consider when another university is looking to develop a plan 
for commercialization success. 
1)  Create a Structured, Highly Focused Funding Gap Program which Includes Outcomes 
Measures and a Formal Evaluation Process: 
 
 In addition to the GRA program focusing on a limited number of goals and a small pool 
of researchers, the GRA VentureLab program has other specific requirements in place which 
have augmented its success.  In order for each of the six GRA research universities to receive  
seed grant funding for their specific VentureLab programs, the universities must submit a 
detailed application of how the funds will  be spend and what outcomes will be measured as 
benchmarks for success (GRA VentureLab, 2007).  These documents serve as a baseline for 
annual evaluation of the project in terms of progress.  Tying goals to measured outcomes is one 
way to ensure that the program remains focused and the goals met.  Since the biotechnology field 
is so fluid and the needs of new companies change along with the marketplace, it is important to 
develop a tie-in between the funding of technology development and the ongoing evaluation of 
the project.  
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The GRA has shown that by narrowly focusing the commercialization components in its 
model, a strong core program can be developed.  In the case of the GRA, this focus is based on 
recruiting the best in biosciences through its Eminent Scholars and their related innovations and 
discoveries, not on transforming the broader business culture of each university. Given that there 
has been such a high rate of success in the GRA program, this limited focus has proven to be of 
importance.  There seems to be a synergistic effect between the success of each individual 
scholar and the GRA program as a whole, much of which is attributed to the narrow focus of the 
program itself and its outcome-directed financial incentives (GRA Report, 2006).  This Georgia 
strategic investment is focused around four programs at the six leading research universities in 
the state:  eminent scholars, research laboratories and equipment, national centers for research 
and innovation, and the overall technology transfer process. 
 In North Carolina, the state is reevaluating the role of the North Carolina Bioscience 
Investment Fund.  By its own admission, the fund has not remained focused on its original 
economic development goals (Weisbecker & John, 2007, 2007). 
2)  Building a Critical Mass of Bioscience Researchers Focused on Commercialization: 
Building a critical mass of translational researchers with a commitment to biotechnology 
commercialization is a key component in the Georgia model.  The Georgia Research Alliance 
program has been very successful with its Eminent Scholars Program, which is a highly focused, 
specialized recruiting and funding program aimed entirely at bringing the best bioscience 
researchers to Georgia specifically for discovery and commercialization activities.  Since its 
inception in 1990, the GRA program has recruited and funded more than 50 Eminent Scholars, 
been integral in securing more than $2 billion dollars in new federal research funding and private 
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investments and creating more than 125 new companies and more than 5,000 new high-skill, 
high-paying jobs within the state of Georgia (GRA, 2007; GRA Report, 2006). 
The GRA awards its Eminent Scholars with Innovation Funds to pursue bioscience 
projects geared toward commercialization if these scholars collaborate with already-existing 
Georgia companies.  The GRA also offers Challenge Grants if the Eminent Scholars work in 
collaboration with at least one other Eminent Scholar, and VentureLab funds for 
commercialization activities geared to further develop early-seed inventions and discoveries.  All 
of these funds are important in and of themselves, but the GRA has gone a step further by 
focusing the awards to a very small pool of Eminent Scholars, with results (GRA, 2007).   
Many recognize that Georgia's bioscience recruiting and funding approach is one they 
would like to adapt for their own institutions or states.  The Pennington Biomedical Research 
Center administrators, the inventor faculty, and the Pennington Foundation key individuals 
suggested that such a program be initiated at PBRC, while the Louisiana Board of Regents, the 
Louisiana Recover Authority, and the Baton Rouge Area Foundation have also voiced interest in 
the GRA model and the Eminent Scholars Program in particular, to boost the research 
capabilities for the academic bioscience researchers in the state of Louisiana (BOR, 2007). 
The UNC MBA curriculum program has taken a different path which has some of the 
same characteristics of the GRA model.  At UNC, there is a requirement for faculty inventors 
who wish to remain involved in the management of their technology to attend the MBA 
entrepreneurship classes and participate in the Carolina Challenge program.  The philosophy 
behind this approach is that science, especially academic-based science, is very different from 
biotechnology commercialization, and the faculty do not have expertise in nor knowledge of 
these areas.  By requiring participation in aspects of the MBA entrepreneurship program and the 
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Carolina Challenge, the role of faculty is automatically focused on to the basic components 
needed for development of the technology and creation of a new start-up company (Kouri, 2006; 
UNC MBA, 2007). 
No matter how it is accomplished, developing a critical mass of bioscience researchers 
focused on commercialization appears to be important for commercialization success. 
3)  Creating Specialized Workforce Development Programs: 
 The UCSD model contains an integrated life sciences curriculum program to train doctors 
and scientists in translational research (Holmes, 2006).  Such programs have become a very high 
priority at the NIH, with its new, 60 site, $700 million dollar program called the Clinical 
Translational Science Awards program (CTSAs).  The CTSA program includes funding for 
educating and training translational researchers in the country’s academic medical centers, both 
public and private.  One of the goals of the CTSA project is to increase the successful 
commercialization of academic-generated inventions, technologies, and treatments more rapidly, 
comprehensively, and efficiently into the patient population (NIH, 2007). 
But training physicians and scientists is not enough to build a successful biotechnology 
environment.  Other highly-skilled workers are also needed as part of the overall economic 
development plan.  The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill MBA Entrepreneurial 
program is geared toward educating and training graduate business school students in the 
specifics of technology commercialization professions such as finance, accounting, business law, 
economics, and management (Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007).  Some technologies that become 
part of the MBA students’ Carolina Challenge projects are biotechnology-based, thus providing 
the students with experience in the biotechnology commercialization industry. 
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One of the ongoing and growing difficulties noted in the Milken Reports (2004; 2006), is 
that ancillary biotechnology professionals are difficult to find, require specialized training, and 
find it challenging to afford being gainfully employed in a high cost-of-living geographic area, 
such as San Diego or Boston (Coombs, 2007). 
 To address this difficulty, the state of North Carolina has initiated a biotechnology 
curriculum program which functions as part of its community college system.  This program has 
been developed specifically to train individuals who are needed in support staff roles in 
biotechnology, including those who receive certificate and associate degrees.  Certain specific 
training areas are targeted, such as those for expanding and new industries, with programs of 
study running in parallel to the technology support needs of the state (North Carolina 
Community College System, 2007). 
It has been discussed earlier in this study that there is a push for many research 
institutions, regardless of their geographic location, increase their ability to commercialize 
academic-based biotechnology inventions and discoveries, create new jobs and new companies, 
and contribute more directly to their region and state in terms of economic impact.  If these 
commercialization programs are located at research universities in various geographic areas, they 
will need to have some mechanism to train and employ these specialized high-skilled workers 
locally, both at the professional and graduate school level and at the undergraduate and associate 
degree level.  Such a program could diminish the impact many sates and regions are suffering 
related to the out-migration of their most highly-trained young professionals.  The new $1 billion 
North Carolina project is just such an example.  Located 30 miles northeast of Charlotte, in 
Kannapolis, this new large-scale economic development project is poised to replace a closed 
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textile manufacturing plant (Fischer, 2007).  Part of this initiative includes a community college 
education program to train individuals for jobs in the biotechnology field. 
The state of North Carolina has implemented a program through its community colleges 
to train these individuals for workforce deployment.  Expanding this community college program 
is a major area of focus in the North Carolina Research Campus.  Rowan-Cabarrus Community 
College has initiated a specialized biotechnology program to train students to become laboratory 
technicians, and biomanufacturing workers (Fischer, 2007).  This focus, in conjunction with the 
UNC MBA entrepreneurial program, may provide a significant cadre of regionally grown 
biotechnology employees necessary for growing this specific biotechnology component for 
economic development in the state. 
There may be an advantage to training and retaining these workers in geographic areas 
where the cost-of-living is more moderate.  Since the number of such highly-skilled workers 
available locally or regionally is small, implementing locally-based education and training 
programs could be very beneficial.  If these programs are located in the same higher education 
institutions or at collaborating institutions in the area, this could also reduce the problem of brain 
drain, where the best and the brightest highly-skilled graduates from an institution leave the area 
or the state.  Such education and training programs could be an important component to the 
success of a region’s or state’s academic-based biotechnology industry while keeping its highly-
skilled workforce in the area (BOR, 2007). 
4)  Creating Cross-Collaborations to Promote New Areas of Discovery: 
 The GRA program's focus on expanding bioscience research through cross-collaboration 
among its Eminent Scholars has yielded successful new ventures which would not have been 
developed otherwise (GRA, 2007).  The GRA Eminent Scholar Challenge Grants have been 
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created to promote cross-collaboration.  This challenge grant program is designed specifically for 
the Eminent Scholars.  Annual awards of up to $50,000 are given to a team of at least two 
Eminent Scholars to promote scientific collaboration.  The scope of work is judged on technical 
merit and the potential for future commercial success as well as on other funds the scholars have 
in place to support the project for which Challenge Grant funding is sought (GRA, 2007). 
Researchers are trained to focus on a narrow research area or research silo, which the 
NIH has acknowledged (NIH, 2007).  But such a narrow approach has resulted in very few 
successful outcomes related to translational research.  The need to remedy the situation has led 
the NIH to initiate a new $700 million Clinical Translational Science Award program (NIH, 
2007). 
 The need to correct this problem has also been recognized at UCSD, which has 
established an integrated life science curriculum program, which focuses on developing and 
training life science students in a multidisciplinary fashion.  Yet, the time line to create a new 
generation of translational researchers is long.  On the other hand, a program that redirects the 
focus of already-established scientists could have more immediate impact.  For example, the 
GRA Eminent Scholars program provides research funds to its scholars who collaborate with 
another eminent scholar, a program which has been very successful.  Combining a student 
curriculum with a research collaboration mechanism could promote near-term (research level) 
and long-term translational science and discoveries. 
5)  Developing Faculty Incentives and Rewards for Commercialization: 
 Faculty rewards and incentives can play an integral role in promoting cross collaboration, 
increasing translational activities, fueling new inventions and discoveries, and providing the 
foundation for new start-up companies. 
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 Traditional promotion and tenure criteria do not include these activities, but a shift in 
direction is beginning.  Texas A&M announced in 2006 that it would include commercialization 
activities in its consideration for faculty promotion and tenure (Lipka, 2007).  The GRA program 
provides specific research funding for projects focused on commercialization and its Eminent 
Scholars program recruits bioscience experts for faculty positions whose research programs 
focus on commercialization (GRA, 2007).  The President of the UNC System, Erskine Bowles, 
recently has announced that economic transformation will now be part of the mission of the 
university, which further strengthens the support for commercialization as an integral part of 
university activities (Fischer, 2007).  The ten component comparison chart (Table 5) reflects the 
original five components and the five new components considered important to commercialize 
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Table 5. 












Small Size of Institution Y N Y N 
Higher than Norm for Research Money per 
Biosciences Faculty 
Y N Y Y 
Extremely Entrepreneurial Community Y Y N Y 







N N N 
Integrated Commercialization Track 
 Funding 
 R & D Expertise 

















Structured, highly focused commercialization 
program with measured outcomes 
 N P Y 
Critical mass of bioscience researchers 
Focused on commercialization 
 N P Y 
Work force development program  Y N N 
Cross-collaboration programs  TBD N Y 
Faculty incentives and rewards for 
commercialization 
 TBD N Y 
 
Y = yes 
N = no 
TBD = to be determined 
P = partial 
UCSD = University of California - San Diego 
UNC = University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
PBRC = Pennington Biomedical Research Center 
GRA = Georgia Research Alliance 
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Part 5 
Unintended Consequences within the  
Commercialization Mechanisms and Solutions to These Problems 
 
 Much discussion has revolved around whether or not biotechnology commercialization 
should be pursued by higher education, and whether or not it fits into the mission of the 
academic research institution.  Proponents on both sides believe that their stance is correct, yet 
commercialization activities still continue whether there is new momentum to increase this 
economic development.  At the federal level, there is the commercialization mandate created by 
the Bayh-Dole Act (Washburn, 2005) and related federal technology transfer regulations, the 
SBIR/STTR technology transfer grant program, (NIH, 2007) and much more recently, the NIH 
CTSA initiative (NIH, 2007).  At the state and local levels, incentives and encouragement also 
point to the fact that there is governmental belief that such economic development activities 
should not only continue, but also increase.  
Over the years, academic research institutions have increased their commitment to 
commercialization with the development of technology transfer/licensing offices, participation in 
research parks and technology incubators, and partnerships with various entities and 
organizations to increase commercialization activities surrounding the biotechnology enterprise 
(AUTM, 2006).  Public universities are taking equity ownership in start-up companies and 
ensuring their state legislatures that they can contribute to the ongoing successful economic 
impact of their regions and states (Fischer, 2006; 2007). 
All these activities are occurring in parallel with other commitments and obligations.  
Public institutions, including public universities, have duties to provide for the public good, 
create social benefits, and, in the case of academic health centers, to improve the public health.  
At the same time, public research universities also have as their core missions the duty to teach 
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and also participate in community involvement.  All of these activities and expectations already 
exist at public research universities, and therefore, the most plausible next step is to create ways 
to balance between these competing initiatives and responsibilities. 
One of the main goals of this study was to explore the possibility of finding a hybrid 
solution for the myriad of unintended consequences related to academic biotechnology 
commercialization.  Such a solution would allow for the commercialization of academic-based 
biotechnologies to stand alongside the traditional roles played by public research universities.   
Yet, it was acknowledged that there have been concerns over some of the commercialization 
relationships and activities entered into by public universities in recent years.  Some believe that 
industry and business-driven activities should remain in the marketplace, not at the doorstep of 
academia. 
Concerns were raised and discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 regarding the idea that some 
technologies are not ready or may never be appropriate for commercialization.  If some 
technologies are not appropriate to commercialize, universities need better mechanisms to 
determine this.  One solution is to implement a type of GRA VentureLab program which 
contains a technology assessment component (GRA VentureLab, 2007).  With a better initial 
analysis process, non-rival goods or technologies could be appropriately disseminated for the 
greater good instead of being held indefinitely without being commercialized or released. Other 
concerns regarding unintended consequences are often focused around faculty roles and 
university involvement in start-up companies, which are discussed in more detail below. 
FACULTY ROLES 
Since the majority of academic-based inventions and discoveries are created by faculty, 
the concern over issues related to faculty roles is very important to biotechnology 
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commercialization.  Chief among the issues surrounding faculty roles are the following: 1) 
faculty activities that raise conflicts of interest, and 2) time off from other faculty duties to 
pursue commercialization activities. 
1) faculty activities that raise conflicts of interest 
Some argue that allowing faculty equity ownership in new start-up companies can be a 
perceived or real financial conflict of interest in regard to the research that is being 
commercialized.  Historically there has been support for this point of view due in part to the 
situation that the University of California had with regard to its plant biology program in 
conjunction with Novartis Pharmaceuticals (Blumenstyk, 2003a; Nadis, 2000; Nature, 2001), the 
relationship of the University of Toronto with a biotechnology company regarding clinical 
research data (Olivieri, 2003), and other similar situations described in Chapters 1 and 2 of this 
study. 
As a result, some public universities have already developed mechanisms to address the 
perceived or real conflicts of interest that can arise with faculty equity ownership.  The LSU 
System has enacted a reporting mechanism that involves the documentation and reporting of 
faculty or university employee ownership in a company doing business with the University.  In 
addition to these disclosures, there is a requirement for removing that individual from the 
negotiating process with the company and, more restrictive, in relation to research, there are 
mechanisms to limit or remove that individual from the overall research process for any 
university activities conducted with that company (LSU System, 2007). 
Some other public universities, such as the University of Texas, have developed an 
internal process to address perceived and real conflicts of interest as part of its larger compliance 
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and oversight requirements (University of Texas, 2007).  Many academic institutions offer 
release time to their faculty to pursue technology development.   
A different approach has been taken by the Georgia Research Alliance, which has 
developed its Eminent Scholars Program around the requirements of biotechnology 
commercialization activities with the goal of generating new start-up companies and allowing 
these Eminent Scholars to participate in the scientific and managerial oversight in a very direct 
fashion.  These Eminent Scholar faculty have been recruited specifically with the intentions of 
having them lead the state in research and development in the biosciences.  The overall mission 
of the GRA is to grow biotechnology research and commercialization activities and create new 
start-up companies for its six top research universities and the state of Georgia. 
Since this is the mission of the GRA and not directly that of the six participating research 
universities, there is an arms-length relationship already in place between the parties.  This arms-
length structure may be one way of ensuring that both commercialization and traditional 
academic missions can coexist while decreasing the perceived or real conflicts of interest.  Also, 
the GRA focuses only on the top six research universities in the state, not on every higher 
education institution.  By doing so, it is only providing its comprehensive program to those 
higher education institutions which have already been classified as research universities. 
2) time off from other faculty duties to pursue commercialization activities 
The federal government has also contributed to the expectation that there should be the 
ability for faculty to participate directly in a significant way in the development of new or small 
biotechnology companies.  The United States Small Business Administration’s SBIR and STTR 
technology transfer grant awards for commercialization have been in existence for several years 
in more than 10 different federal agencies including the NIH (NIH, 2007).  In these programs, 
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not only are faculty allowed to become directly involved in a new company or in small business 
R&D programs, in the STTR program, there is a direct mechanism for faculty to do so while 
remaining employed as faculty at their research universities.  The federal sponsors have 
encouraged this program as an incentive for start-up companies and as a way to promote the 
proliferation of small business growth in the United States (NIH, 2007).  The federal government 
expects that the players will manage the inherent conflicts of interest related to the roles faculty 
play as both university and company employees. 
At the same time, there are already-existing mechanisms to help manage some of these 
inherent conflicts of interest.  The United States Department of Health and Human Services 
Office of Research Integrity oversees the Federal-Wide Assurance (FWA) program, which 
requires all research entities receiving federal human subject research funding to protect these 
human research subjects no matter the source of funds for such research (DHHS, 2007).  This 
protection includes strict guidelines regarding conflicts of interest involving the study Principal 
Investigator (PI) or any other key individual involved in the human research study.  Research 
universities accepting federal research money for human subjects studies have signed the FWA 
agreement and thus, are already required to limit direct research activities of any key individuals 
with financial or other significant interests in human research studies conducted at their 
institutions, regardless of the source of funds (DHHS, 2007). 
The key to managing such conflicts is in keeping the relationships transparent, by 
documenting relationships and activities, and in implementing specific plans to keep the affected 
parties at arms-length.  Some of the examples reiterate that activities involving faculty and 
outside entities are sometimes and regulated by government.  In any event, this reality of public 
private partnerships involving direct faculty roles is not a new one.  If anything, new partnership 
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programs, such as the $1.5 billion North Carolina Research  Campus will only increase dual 
faculty roles (Fischer, 2007). 
TRADITIONAL MISSION OF THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY 
 One way to help ensure the integrity of the traditional mission of the public research 
university in terms of its teaching obligations is to provide funding for such activities.  The 
Georgia Venture Partners Fund (GVP) has included as one of its missions, to provide financial 
support for the humanities and arts at its research universities out of the income that the GVP 
generates.  This fund is an example of how the promotion of increased commercialization can 
directly benefit the traditional mission of the public research university (GVP, 2007). 
 Another way to keep within the mission is to include economic development and 
commercialization in the mission of the university, which has been done at the UNC System.  
UNC System President, Erskine Bowles, has announced that economic transformation is now a 
component of the University’s mission (Fischer, 2007). 
 The responsibilities for public research universities go beyond traditional teaching, 
service, and research obligations.  As stated above, public research universities have duties to 
provide for the public good and the public health, and preserve and expand social benefits 
wherever possible.  One way to fulfill this part of the academic mission is to commercialize 
academic-based bioscience inventions and discoveries which can improve the health of the 
population and contribute to the public good and the advancement of society. 
UNIVERSITY EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
 Recently, there has been an increase in the number of public universities which have 
taken equity ownership in new companies developed from academic inventions and discoveries.  
Arguments against such ownership include the fact that by allowing a university to take direct 
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ownership, it is exposed to increased liability, and that such equity ownership could compromise 
the academic freedom of its faculty and the overall independence of research activities of the 
university (Washburn, 2005). 
 One mechanism to reduce the direct liability of the university regarding equity ownership 
is to have that ownership rest within a university-related foundation, not within the university 
itself, as is the practice at the University of Georgia Research Foundation, Inc. (UGRF, 2007).  
Research foundation ownership can also provide an arms-length position in terms of the ability 
of the academic institution to ensure its academic freedom for its faculty and to allow for 
independent research activities at the university. 
  The  Pennington Biomedical Research Foundation has added another layer of equity 
possibilities to this mechanism.  PBRF’s for-profit entity, PDI, Inc., can invest up to twenty 
percent (20%) of the total investment made by TVP in any new deal.  For example, if TVP has 
invested fifty percent (50%), as a result, the Pennington Foundation’s for profit subsidiary, PDI, 
could invest up to twenty percent (20%) in TVP’s 50% investment, or 10% overall (PBRC 
internal documents, 2007).  These examples indicate that these are possible solutions available to 
overcome the conflicts related to commercialization of academic technologies. 
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Part 6 
Findings Applied to Other Public Research Universities 
 One of the most significant findings from this study that can be applied to other public 
research universities is that not all of the five key components for commercialization success 
studied here need to be present in whole or in part in order for an academic entity to be 
successful at commercializing its early-stage biotechnology inventions and discoveries.  At the 
same time, the following original key components should be present, at least to some extent, to 
help ensure success: 
1) Small size of the organization, 
2) a highly entrepreneurial community, 
3) integrated commercialization track 
a)  funding, 
b)  research and development expertise, and 
c)  a springboard for new company development. 
In addition to these components, the study has indicated that the small size of the 
organization might be just one important component related to organizational structure and 
function.  To support this point, organizational size might not be the definitive necessity, but 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness may be a more accurate description of the important 
part of this key component.  The following characteristics of an organization also appear to be 
important for commercialization success: 
1) efficient and effective operations whether the overall organization is small or large; 
2) separate funding sources which are not part of traditional university coffers, and if 
possible, rest outside of the overall university umbrella; 
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3) well-focused, small scope, targeted commercialization program; and 
4) a flexible approach in order to implement non-traditional activities such as industry 
partnerships, research development funding for faculty, patent activities, and R&D 
expertise in a fluid commercialization marketplace. 
These four characteristics appear to play an important role, at least to some degree, in how 
efficiently the organization runs, regardless of the size of the organization. 
Two of the original five components warrant further study to determine whether or not 
they might be advantageous in specific academic settings.  Due to the nature of the three models 
which were analyzed in this study, these components would not be looked at in-depth.  The 
components noted for further study are as follows: 
1) the ratio of research money per bioscience faculty; and 
2) an integrated life sciences curriculum program. 
Regarding the research money ratio, PBRC was the only model in which the ratio of 
research money per bioscience faculty could be directly calculated.  Ironically, PBRC did have a 
higher ratio than is the norm for research dollars per faculty member, yet the number of licensed 
technologies generated by PBRC is lower than the norm.  In addition, PBRC is working 
diligently to develop a comprehensive commercialization mechanism because it finds itself 
suffering from the valley of death or funding gap for its biotechnologies (Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 
2006; Nowak, 2006). 
The UNC MBA model engages such a small number of biotechnologies, most of which 
are near-production medical devices or diagnostics, that determining this ratio for all of its 
bioscience inventors is neither feasible nor meaningful.  Even so, some of the biotechnologies 
which make it into the Carolina Challenge have been successfully commercialized. 
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The Georgia model does meet the criterion of higher than norm research money per 
bioscience faculty member if the only researchers contained in the pool are the GRA Eminent 
Scholars.  The GRA model is an example of a very successful commercialization program that 
does not depend on an overall high ratio of funding for all bioscience faculty.  Instead, this 
model focuses only on the 50 plus Eminent Scholars and leverages traditional biosciences 
research funding by combining it with GRA’s own funding sources which results in higher than 
normal research dollars for GRA's Eminent Scholars. 
In considering the integrated curriculum program, none of the three models which were 
studied contained a traditional life sciences curriculum.  Thus, this study was not able to analyze 
this component in direct relation to the three commercialization models.  Further study of 
integrated life sciences curriculum programs could offer further insight. What was recognized in 
this study was that the need for an integrated life sciences program  at the faculty and staff level 
could also be of benefit to commercialization success. 
Overall, a more comprehensive model might include a combination of UCSD’s integrated 
life sciences curriculum model for students along with the GRA Eminent Scholars program.  A 
parallel program involving both senior researchers and life sciences students, including graduate, 
medical, doctoral, and postdoctoral students, could produce a more immediate impact from the 
researcher level and a longer-term sustainable impact from the education and training levels.  
The combination of these programs might even result in synergistic overall commercialization 
successes beyond what has been observed in any one model, including that at UCSD. 
In addition to the existence in some form of the five original components listed above, it 
also appears that the following additional components might be necessary, at least to some 
extent, in order to produce commercialization success: 
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1) a structured, highly focused funding gap program which includes outcomes measures 
and an ongoing evaluation process; 
2)  a critical mass of bioscience researchers, including translational researchers, focused 
on commercialization;  
3) specialized workforce development programs; 
4) cross-collaborations to promote new areas of discovery; and 
5) faculty incentives and rewards for commercialization. 
A STRUCTURED, HIGHLY FOCUSED FUNDING GAP PROGRAM WHICH 
INCLUDES OUTCOMES MEASURES AND AN ONGOING EVALUATION PROCESS 
 
With regard to creating a structured funding gap program, the GRA VentureLab model is 
one that can be used as a best practice example.  In order for each of the six GRA research 
universities to receive  seed grant funding for their specific VentureLab programs, the 
universities must submit a detailed application of how the funds will  be spend and what 
outcomes will be measured as benchmarks for success.  These documents serve as a baseline for 
annual evaluation in terms of progress (GRA VentureLab, 2007).  Tying goals to measured 
outcomes is one way to ensure that the program remains focused and the goals met.  Since the 
biotechnology field is so fluid and the needs of technologies and new companies change along 
with the marketplace, it is important to develop a tie-in between the funding of technology 
development and the ongoing evaluation of the progress.  
The GRA model has shown that by narrowly focusing the commercialization 
components, a strong core program can be developed.  In the case of the GRA, this focus is 
based on its Eminent Scholars and their related innovations and discoveries, not on transforming 
the broader bioscience culture of each university. Given that there has been such a high rate of 
success in the GRA program, this limited focus has proven to be of importance.  There seems to 
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be a synergistic effect between the success of each individual scholar and the GRA program as a 
whole, much of which is attributed to the narrow focus and outcome-directed financial incentives 
(GRA Report, 2006). 
 As discussed throughout this study, there has been a recent push away from investments 
in early-stage, nascent technologies by venture capitalists, which has resulted in the 
biotechnology funding gap or valley of death (Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006).  Rather 
than hoping that these investors will reverse their direction and move toward funding such early-
stage technologies, it is more realistic to acknowledge that such a gap exists and work from 
within academia to lessen the gap and build stronger, more narrowly-focused commercialization 
bridges and mechanisms. 
A CRITICAL MASS OF BIOSCIENCE RESEARCHERS, INCLUDING 
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCHERS, FOCUSED ON COMMERCIALIZATION 
 
Building a critical mass of translational researchers with a commitment to biotechnology 
commercialization is a key component in the Georgia model.  The Georgia Research Alliance 
program has been very successful with its Eminent Scholars Program, which is a highly focused, 
specialized recruiting and funding program aimed at bringing the best bioscience researchers to 
Georgia specifically for discovery and commercialization activities.  Since its inception in 1990, 
the GRA program has recruited and funded more than 50 Eminent Scholars, been integral in 
securing more than $2 billion dollars in new federal research funding and private investments, 
creating more than 125 new companies and more than 5,000 new high-skill, high-paying jobs 
within the state of Georgia (GRA, 2007).  Others recognize that Georgia’s recruiting and funding 
approach is one they would like to adapt for their own institutions or states. 
No matter how it is accomplished, developing a critical mass of bioscience researchers 
focused on commercialization may be a more targeted way to achieve a successful 
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commercialization program than by trying to attain the same commercialization success by 
achieving an overall higher than average ratio of research funding per faculty member. 
SPECIALIZED WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
One of the ongoing and growing difficulties noted in the Milken Reports (2004, 2006), is 
that ancillary professionals, such as those trained in the MBA program along with those 
considered support scientific and technical staff in the biotechnology commercialization 
industry, are difficult to find, require specialized training, and find it challenging to afford being 
gainfully employed in a high cost-of-living geographic area, such as San Diego or Boston 
(Coombs, 2007). 
It has been discussed earlier in this study that there is a push for many research 
institutions, regardless of their geographic location, to be increasing their ability to 
commercialize academic-based biotechnology inventions and discoveries, create new jobs and 
new companies, and contribute more directly to their region and state in terms of economic 
impact.  As a result, there will need to be some mechanism to train and employ these specialized 
high-skilled workers locally, both at the professional and graduate school level and at the 
undergraduate and associate degree level.  Such a program could diminish the impact many sates 
and regions are suffering related to the out-migration of their most highly-trained young 
professionals (BOR, 2007). 
There may be an advantage to training and retaining these workers in geographic areas 
where the cost-of-living is more moderate.  Since the number of such highly-skilled workers 
available locally or regionally is small, implementing locally-based education and training 
programs could be very beneficial.  If these programs are located in the same higher education 
institutions or at collaborating institutions in the area, this could also reduce the problem of brain 
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drain, where the best and the brightest highly-skilled graduates from an institution leave the area 
or the state.  Such education and training programs could be an important component to the 
success of a region’s or state’s academic-based biotechnology industry while keeping its highly-
skilled workforce in the state. 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill MBA Entrepreneurial program is geared 
toward educating and training graduate business school students in the specifics of technology 
commercialization professions such as finance, accounting, business law, economics, and 
management (Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007).  Some technologies that become part of the MBA 
students’ Carolina Challenge projects are biotechnology-based, thus providing the students with 
experience in the biotechnology commercialization industry. 
One of the ongoing and growing difficulties noted in the Milken Reports (2004; 2006), is 
that ancillary biotechnology professionals are difficult to find, require specialized training, and 
find it challenging to afford being gainfully employed in a high cost-of-living geographic area, 
such as San Diego or Boston (Coombs, 2007). 
CROSS-COLLABORATIONS TO PROMOTE NEW AREAS OF DISCOVERY 
 The GRA Eminent Scholar Challenge Grants have been created to promote cross-
collaboration.  This challenge grant program is designed specifically for the Eminent Scholars.  
Annual awards of up to $50,000 are given to a team of at least two Eminent Scholars to promote 
scientific collaboration.  The scope of work is judged on technical merit and the potential for 
future commercial success as well as on other funds the scholars have in place to support the 
project for which Challenge Grant funding is sought (GRA Report, 2006). 
As proof of this lack of expertise in academic research, the NIH recently recognized that 
its funding for clinical research and treatment of diseases and conditions was not making the 
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advances it had hoped (NIH website 2006).  NIH determined that it had funded silos of research 
and excellence in the past, which promoted narrowly-focused scientific endeavors, resulting in 
the fact that experts in one area did not often communicate with or collaborate with those in 
other areas. 
A byproduct of this type of narrowly-focused research is that there is little or no scientific 
expertise or experience within academic research centers to know how to bridge R&D, moving 
early-stage biotechnology inventions or discoveries along the commercialization continuum. 
As discussed previously, the NIH is now beginning to address this deficit in its sponsored 
research funding paradigm by launching its 60-site, multi-year, $700 million Clinical 
Translational Science Award (CTSA) project, but the results from its efforts to boost 
translational research will not affect academic researchers for some time.   
FACULTY INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR COMMERCIALIZATION 
 Faculty rewards and incentives can play an integral role in promoting cross collaboration, 
increasing translational activities, fueling new inventions and discoveries, and provide the 
foundation for new start-up companies. 
 Traditional promotion and tenure criteria do not include these activities, but a shift in 
direction is beginning.  Texas A&M announced in 2006 that it would include commercialization 
activities in its consideration for faculty promotion and tenure (Lipka, 2006).  The GRA program 
provides specific research funding for projects focused on commercialization and its Eminent 
Scholars program recruits bioscience experts for faculty positions whose research programs 
focus on commercialization (GRA, 2007).  The President of the UNC System, Erskine Bowles, 
recently has announced that economic transformation will become part of the mission of the 
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university, which further strengthens the support for commercialization as an integral part of  
university activities (Fischer, 2007). 
Unintended Consequences 
 As discussed previously, those in academe have concerns regarding unintended 
consequences related to the increase in commercialization activities at research universities.  
Recognizing that perceived or real conflicts of interest may arise, some higher education 
institutions have put in place some processes to deal with these issues, with the understanding 
that transparency and arms-length relationships can diminish or even eliminate these conflicts 
and make them manageable. 
 Key among such conflicts regarding research commercialization are those affecting 
faculty roles and university relationships with industry.  With regard to faculty roles, examples 
have been given as to how to manage these conflicts.  The Georgia Research Alliance has an 
arms-length relationship with the six research universities it collaborates with for bioscience 
economic development, and is able to provide recruiting and ongoing R&D funding for faculty 
that sits outside the university organizational umbrella (GRA, 2007).  Other universities have put 
in place standard operating procedures to assess perceived and real conflicts of interest on a case-
by-case basis, such as the University of Texas, and manage the conflicts with designated 
organizational and operational requirements for each case (University of Texas, 2007). 
 The federal government has parameters surrounding its SBIR and STTR grant awards 
which inherently include faculty roles that can lead to perceived or actual conflicts of interest.  
Some of these conflicts are managed through the government’s structure in its eligibility 
requirements, and others are documented through related grant documents, such as the Model 
Use Agreement, to outline activities and intellectual property ownership at the university and 
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small business levels (NIH, 2007).  The remainder of the conflicts generated through the 
SBIR/STTR grant award process require oversight and management on the part of the higher 
education institutions and small businesses participating in the awards. 
 University-industry roles have also been under scrutiny.  The concern over outside 
control of academic research by an industry sponsor has sparked debate and has resulted in 
termination of such agreements, as in the University of California situation regarding the plant 
biology Novartis research agreements (Blumenstyk, 2003a; Nadis, 2000; Nature, 2001) and led 
to legal action as in the University of Toronto situation regarding publishing of faculty research 
data and a corporate sponsor (Olivieri, 2003). 
 Continued awareness of such issues is one way to help in managing them.  By creating 
mechanisms for commercialization which reduce or eliminate such conflicts, an ongoing 
monitoring of sorts can be established.  For example, the GRA model has distinct funding and 
activity phases in its VentureLab program.  Awards for business development in Phase 3 go 
directly to the small business, not to the university or faculty inventor (GRA, 2007). 
 Other academic institutions have determined that commercialization activity is better 
coordinated and memorialized through an affiliated research foundation.  The University of 
Georgia Research Foundation, Inc. (UGRF) is an example of a research foundation that engages 
in the contractual relationships for grants, contracts, and licenses for the University of Georgia, 
and works in parallel with the Georgia Research Alliance regarding its programs.  The UGRF is 
the entity which will take equity ownership in any new start-up company that is formed around 
academic technologies (Consultant, 2007; UGRF, 2007). 
 One of the main goals of this study was to explore the possibility of funding a hybrid 
solution to the myriad of unintended consequences related to academic biotechnology 
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commercialization.  Concerns were raised regarding the issue that some technologies are not 
ready to be commercialized or should never be commercialized.  To deal with this issue, an 
institution can implement a version of the GRA VentureLab program that assesses the 
commercial possibilities for technologies.  If it is determined that the technology should not be 
further developed, even if funds are available, then the technology should be released for the 
public good.  If the technology shows promise but is early-stage, then the organization can create 
an early-stage R&D program which also includes funding to further develop the technology. 
 Faculty roles were also discussed.  The GRA Eminent Scholars program hires and funds 
scientists who are expected to commercialize their inventions and discoveries and are 
encouraged to become part of start-up companies.  Rewarding faculty for commercialization 
activities and including these successes in promotion and tenure decisions reinforce the 
importance of economic development.  Some universities have developed formal processes that 
document faculty ownership in companies and manage their other conflicts of interest. 
 There are also ways to preserve the mission of the research university while encouraging 
commercialization activities.  University foundations can play a central role in the licensing and 
equity activities surrounding invention commercialization.  Venture funds can allocate a portion 
of income back to the university to support academic activities, which is part of the Georgia 
Venture Fund mission. 
 Overall, there are ways to manage conflicts of interest and other unintended 
consequences while still preserving the mission of the public research university.  Examples exist 
where the commercialization process brought revenues back to the academic institution to 
support other teaching and research programs.  In other instances, the public health of the 
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population benefits from new medical treatments or drugs or society overall benefits from the 
technology. 
Other Findings 
 In addition to all of these key components and issues, other findings have emerged 
regarding university commercialization.  In all three models studied, it was very important to 
have the ability to take an in-depth look at what type of organization and culture already existed, 
and what other initiatives were planned or in place prior to determining how to develop a better 
program.  There have been examples in higher education of the “me, too” syndrome, where 
universities push quickly to adopt a model from another institution without regard for differences 
in institutional structure and cultures, without spending adequate time analyzing and assessing 
the models being considered, and often without the key players weighing in on the factors 
necessary to make an informed decision. 
Chapter 2 discussed how this “me, too” scenario played out at many academic health 
centers (AHCs) after the introduction of managed care, and described the devastating results due, 
at least in part, to the lack of analysis and assessment prior to implementation of new AHC 
models.  Loyola University of Chicago and other academic institutions suffered substantial 
unintended consequences due to the quick adoption of another institution’s model as is. 
Biotechnology commercialization is a fluid, complex area that requires much study and 
review by many experts in order to possibly implement the best model for any institution looking 
to expand, revise, or create a well-designed and effective commercialization mechanism. 
To this end, a level of ongoing flexibility in terms of program creation and adaptation 
was apparent in all three models studied.  The Georgia Research Alliance has seen the creation 
of an ancillary program, the Georgia Venture Fund, which runs in parallel to its own 
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commercialization program.  The Pennington Biomedical Research Center is developing a more 
comprehensive, multi-tiered approach to early-stage biotechnology development due to the 
realization that having a venture fund in place was not enough on its own for commercialization 
success.  The state of North Carolina is in the process of restructuring its North Carolina 
Bioscience Investment Fund (NCBIF), after several years of existence. 
Restructuring or reformulating the commercialization model can take place while there 
are ongoing, working, successful components already in place.  In an area such as biotechnology, 
which is still relatively young but which must respond quickly to numerous marketplace shifts, 
the mechanisms in use should be adaptable and adjustable. 
In addition to flexibility in the commercialization structure, those who are the key 
individuals involved in these activities need to be comfortable with risk-taking and thinking in 
non-traditional ways.  This is evidenced by the need for a flexible, non-bureaucratic 
organizational structure, the existence of a highly entrepreneurial culture, and the ability to 
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CHAPTER 5. 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Study Overview 
Three decades have passed since universities have been given the federal mandate to 
commercialize their inventions and discoveries, and the process still faces some obstacles.  A 
growing issue facing universities is the lack of research and development funding and expertise 
available for the successful commercialization of early-stage academic biotechnology inventions 
and discoveries.  As a result, some of the most promising technologies might never reach the 
marketplace.  To help address this situation, closer relationships have developed between 
universities and industry.  Unintended consequences, such as concerns over faculty roles, 
financial conflicts of interest, and the mission of the public university have occurred as a result. 
Despite these issues, missing out on the opportunities to develop promising 
biotechnologies could have significant negative consequences for universities and for the public 
good.  Many communities, regions, and states are increasing their economic development 
expectations in relation to academe, seeing universities as the key to successfully revitalizing and 
expanding their underperforming economies. 
 These expectations have resulted in an escalation in the formation of closer relationships 
between academia and communities.  Some argue that higher education institutions are more 
important to a community’s economic development than tax cuts or other incentives (Fischer, 
2006).  Washburn (2005) discusses the danger of universities marketing themselves as engines of 
economic growth, which could create false expectations, especially in the so-called “catch-up” 
schools.  One of the concerns Washburn explores is that if these universities are unable to deliver 
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on the promises they have made to their legislatures and communities, this failure could 
jeopardize their requests for future funding. 
 In support of this point of view, many faculty and others are concerned that the 
expectations being placed on academia are out of proportion, especially in economically 
depressed regions.  Those who push this economic platform know that academic-based 
blockbuster biotechnology hits, which have grossed millions of dollars for universities, faculty, 
related institutions, academic teaching hospitals and other affiliated centers, are central to their 
success (Fischer, 2006). 
 Even though the nation’s universities are the largest source of such academic capital, 
transforming this raw resource into successful market bioscience products and treatment is a 
complex process with a low success rate.   Despite more than 25 years of technology transfer 
activity, this resource is still difficult to harness (Pisano, 2006). 
Several experts argue that academia’s fascination with the technology industry and the 
commercialization of its own inventions and discoveries is not based on extensive review of the 
process and the realistic probably of success, nor on comprehensive strategic planning geared 
toward maximizing opportunities (Pisano, 2006;  Powers, 2006).  Those who are skeptical 
declare that the shift from more traditional revenue sources to this new model, which focuses on 
commercial returns and economic impact, was implemented hastily   This lack of vision, Pisano 
(2006) points out, has contributed to the lackluster overall performance of the biotechnology 
industry. 
As reinforcement for this argument, Washburn (2005) reports that the biotechnology 
commercialization problem may go back as far as the late 1970s.  At that time, Washburn reports 
that data presented to Congress in support of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was somewhat 
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misleading.  This watershed piece of federal legislation, which marked a significant change in 
the federal science and technology policy, became a catalyst for commercialization of academic-
based inventions and discoveries.  Proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act argued that federally-
licensed patents, including those from academia, were sitting dormant and not being 
commercialized.  What was not disclosed in the data presented to Congress, was the fact that the 
majority of the patents held by the federal government at that time, had been offered to industry 
but were turned down because they were too early-stage and needed further developmental 
research funding which those in industry were unwilling to provide (Washburn). 
This same problem of how to develop and fund early-stage inventions and discoveries 
remains a major issue for universities today (Friedl, 2006; Kouri, 2006; Nowak, 2006).  Yet, the 
fact that many academic technologies are too early or even inappropriate to commercialize is 
often overshadowed by the assumption that success for early-stage technologies is all but assured 
with just additional time and money.  The revelation that most university-generated technologies 
were not commercialized prior to Bayh-Dole because they were too early-stage or not 
appropriate to market, begs the question as posed by Washburn (2005), “what share of the 
university-based inventions generated since 1980 were  commercialized because of the 
institutions created under Bayh-Dole, and what share would have been commercialized anyway?” 
(p.143). 
Statement of the Problem 
Powers (2006) and Pisano (2006) suggest that university leaders need to rethink the 
technology transfer model in order for these institutions to reach their true commercial potential. 
One of the most important pieces absent from the current commercialization paradigm is a 
reliable mechanism for bridging the gap between early-stage academic biomedical inventions 
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and discoveries and venture fund investment interest.  This valley of death, or funding gap, as 
described by Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006), and Nowak (2006), exists today despite more than 
twenty years of increasingly sophisticated academic biotechnology transfer activities. 
This exploratory study focused on analyzing the following:  1) the mechanisms for 
commercializing early-stage academic inventions and discoveries, and 2) the resulting 
unintended consequences and  how to minimize or remove them from such commercialization 
activities.  The goal of the study was to be able to present possible mechanisms, models, and best 
practices that other public universities could use to successfully commercialize their own early-
stage biotechnologies while preserving the overall mission of the university and minimizing or 
eliminating related unintended consequences. 
Initially, this study intended to analyze two different mechanisms for early-stage, 
academic biomedical inventions and discoveries at two different public universities.  One model, 
that of the Pennington Biomedical Research Center (PBRC) as part of the Louisiana State 
University System, is based on an early-stage research and development investment platform; 
while the second, an MBA entrepreneurial program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, is focused around a curriculum specialization in the graduate school MBA program.  
However, during the initial research phase of the analysis, a decision was made to study a third 
model.  As a result, this study has been expanded to include an analysis of the Georgia Research 
Alliance (GRA), which is considered a highly successful commercialization mechanism and 
perceived as being adaptable in many other research university settings. Therefore, this study 
was expanded to include an analysis of the GRA as a third commercialization mechanism. 
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Summary 
Five key components were identified as being important in order to ensure successful, 
academic biotechnology commercialization.  These components were analyzed individually at 
each site and then comparatively studied, with a summary of the results described below. 
GRA, PBRC, UNC AND UCSD 
Component 1:  Small Size of the Institution: 
 None of the three models studied fits the traditional definition of a small institution, yet 
each contains some of the characteristics of a small-sized institution deemed important in the 
UCSD model.  For example, the UNC MBA model can be described as a small organization 
when looking only at the MBA curriculum program.  This program is well-defined and focused, 
based on a flat hierarchy, and subject to little bureaucracy.  In addition, the majority of the funds 
for the program are generated from sources outside of the university.  The fact that the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is one of the largest single campuses in the state, 
does not seem to have a negative impact on the efficiency or effectiveness of the MBA 
curriculum program (UNC MBA, 2007). 
 Similarly, the GRA model is also based on a small organization which directly employees 
very few individuals.  The GRA is comprised of a focused program, flat hierarchy, and little 
bureaucracy.  In the GRA model, the mission is to serve the biotechnology commercialization 
needs for Georgia’s top six research universities, but GRA functions as its own separate entity.  
The difficulties often encountered in large organizations, such as bureaucratic gridlock, 
fragmentation, and multiple layers within a multi-tiered hierarchy, are not present in the GRA, 
even though the state government and six major universities are collaborative partners in this 
alliance along with business and industry (GRA, 2007).  With both the UNC and GRA models, it 
  197 
appears that when a specific program is contained within a small organization it can work well 
whether or not the program is part of or runs in parallel to a large organization. 
 A somewhat different situation exists at the Pennington Biomedical Research Center, 
which is one of 11 institutions comprising the Louisiana State University System.  PBRC 
employs more than 650 individuals, but has a narrow research focus and no teaching component.  
PBRC is modeled on the organized research unit (ORU) structure with the advantage that the 
funding sources and faculty duties are not bifurcated.  The culture of the Center is to be efficient 
and effective and the administrative organization is very lean and flat (PBRC internal documents, 
2007). 
In most day-to-day operations, the Center does not suffer from the problems associated 
with a large bureaucracy, but, as described earlier in the chapter, there are some restrictions 
facing the commercialization process because PBRC sits within a much larger academic 
organization, the LSU System.  The overall commercialization culture at various LSU campuses 
and at the LSU System level has been inconsistent, with varying performance records, but new 
programs and directions undertaken within the past few years are changing the situation, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter (LSU System, 2007; PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
 Despite this situation, PBRC has been able to partner with its Foundation to move 
forward in the development of an integrated, multi-function commercialization mechanism.  The 
key players recognize that there is a balance to be maintained between the Center’s obligations to 
the LSU System and the need for flexibility, some of which is obtained by partnering some of 
PBRC’s activities with its Foundation (PBRF internal documents, 2007). 
With PBRC’s characteristics of a flat hierarchy, minimum bureaucracy, and physical 
proximity to its researchers, the groundwork is in place to allow for efficient and effective 
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operations.  Since the Foundation is a separate entity not subject to university or government 
restrictions, it can allow for some additional flexibility, such as hiring out-of-state patent counsel 
and outside consultants.  The Foundation is also able to provide additional types of funding for 
R&D of early-stage technologies, partner with the biotechnology industry, and play a significant 
role in new company start-up activities as well as in other related commercialization processes 
(PBRF internal documents, 2007). 
In the end, none of the three commercialization models studied fits the definition of a 
traditional small institution, and none has the structure that is in place at UCSD, yet there have 
been some significant start-up company successes generated out of these three models.  When 
analyzing the infrastructure of a complex organization, the following characteristics related to 
size of the institution and methods of operations appear to be important for commercialization 
success: 
1) efficient and effective operations within the commercialization model whether the 
overall organization is small or large; 
2) separate funding sources for the commercialization program which are not part of 
traditional university coffers, and if possible, resting outside of the overall university 
umbrella; 
3) well-focused, small scope, targeted commercialization program; and 
4) a flexible operations approach in order to implement non-traditional activities such as 
industry partnerships, research development funding for faculty, patent activities, and 
R&D expertise in a fluid commercialization marketplace. 
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Component 2: Higher than Norm for Research Money per Biosciences Faculty: 
 In the traditional definition of the ratio of research money per bioscience faculty, the 
Pennington Biomedical Research Center is the only one of the three models analyzed that 
contains this component.  Yet, PBRC faces an early-stage technology funding gap and a small 
ratio of invention disclosures translating into viable venture startups of licensed technologies 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007).  Therefore, the ratio of research money per faculty does not 
equate with successful commercialization at PBRC, even though this component was deemed 
essential in the UCSD model. 
 The UNC MBA program is different from the other two models analyzed because it looks 
at such a small number of technologies and therefore, a small number of faculty.  Mostly near-
commercialization possibilities such as medical devices and testing and diagnostics products 
become part of the UNC MBA Carolina Challenge (Kouri, 2006).  This small number does not 
capture a true cross-section of the research funding of the UNC bioscience faculty.  Therefore, it 
is not feasible to apply this funding ratio to the small group of biotechnology researchers 
participating in the UNC MBA entrepreneurial program. 
 The Georgia model does meet the criterion of higher than norm research money per 
bioscience faculty member if its GRA Eminent Scholars are the only researchers in the pool.  
The GRA model is an example of a very successful commercialization program that does not 
depend on an overall high ratio of funding per bioscience faculty.  Instead, this model leverages 
traditional biosciences research funding for its Eminent Scholars by combining it with GRA’s 
own funding sources.  This specifically targeted funding program generates additional research 
dollars and fuels even more funding for the select Eminent Scholars.  The high ratios of 
combined research dollars per Eminent Scholar have translated into exceptional success with 
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commercialization results over the past 16 years.  Keep in mind that GRA’s success is for a mix 
of public and private universities with different inherent levels of bioscience research funding 
and bioscience faculty strengths and the program works well in all six universities (GRA, 2007). 
As pointed out here, at least for two of the three models researched in this study, the 
UCSD component of higher than norm research dollars per faculty member does not apply.  The 
fact that by targeting a much smaller group of faculty is a formula that works for both public and 
private research universities in Georgia reinforces the belief that a targeted Eminent Scholar 
program could be adapted for use by a range of research universities. 
  As mentioned above, the UNC model is very limited in the number of faculty 
participating and the scope of technologies it can commercialize, so it is not feasible to calculate 
the ratio of research funding per faculty involved in the I\UNC MBA Carolina Challenge. 
Ironically, the only model which meets this higher than norm ratio present in the UCSD 
model is PBRC, which finds itself needing to implement a more comprehensive 
commercialization program in order to be successful.   
In this study, the most successful example of this component is the GRA Eminent 
Scholar program, which contains some characteristics which are different from the UCSD model.  
The GRA model only applies the ratio to its targeted group of 50-plus Eminent Scholars.  A 
more focused program, such as the GRA, might easily be adapted by other universities since it is 
not dependent on an overall higher than normal ratio of research dollars per faculty but can be 
focused around a much smaller group of targeted bioscience faculty.   In actuality, it might not 
matter if there is a high ratio of research dollars for all bioscience faculty members as long as 
there is a correspondingly high ratio for those particular faculty researchers who actually 
participate in the commercialization mechanism. 
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Component 3:  Extremely Entrepreneurial Community: 
The ongoing support, development, expansion, and successes of the Georgia Research 
Alliance and its related initiatives and activities such as the Georgia Venture Partners Fund, 
reinforce the state of Georgia’s commitment to fueling the entrepreneurial spirit.  As described 
by the GRA itself, its mission is to create the opportunities to grow the economy of the state 
through scientific discovery and related commercialization activities.  Unlike San Diego or the 
North Carolina Research Triangle, which had developed entrepreneurial cultures decades ago, 
the state of Georgia had not been culturally entrepreneurial regarding bioscience development 
prior to the creation of the Georgia Research Alliance in 1990.  The GRA is an example of a 
statewide initiative that includes partnerships of academic, government, and private 
organizations which have proven very successful in meeting its mission (GRA, 2007).  Yet, even 
with all of the success and the highly entrepreneurial culture in Georgia, there is a 
commercialization gap for early-stage academic biotechnologies, which led to the formation of 
the Georgia Venture Partners Fund in 2004.  GRF has just recently begun to invest in early-stage 
technologies (GVP, 2007). 
Although inherently entrepreneurial in terms of risk-taking to seek outside research funds 
and agree to faculty positions that only include five-year rolling tenure, PBRC finds itself hoping 
to work within a broader entrepreneurial culture in order to move ahead with successful 
biotechnology commercialization.  PBRC sits within this larger, mixed-risk culture in place at 
the LSU System, the greater Baton Rouge area, regionally, and at the state level.  There is some 
movement toward the development of a more creative class within this overall traditional, 
conservative, risk-averse setting, but it remains to be seen if this fragmented movement is 
enough to provide a catalyst for PBRC’s commercialization initiative. 
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Like UCSD, the Research Triangle region of North Carolina also has been a highly 
entrepreneurial area for several decades, with its main focus on biosciences R&D.  It has been 
home to Glaxo SmithKline, a very large pharmaceutical company, for several years and has, 
within its region, a large number of experts in the biotechnology field.  Like the Georgia model, 
the North Carolina Research Triangle initiative was a planned, collaborative partnership among 
the three research universities in the region, the state of North Carolina, and private industry 
(Milken, 2004; Washburn, 2005). 
Despite this long-term culture of entrepreneurship, UNC also found itself faced with the 
same biotechnology valley of death that has been described in detail throughout this study.  In 
such an entrepreneurial climate, UNC still could not successfully commercialize its early-stage 
biotechnology inventions and discoveries.  The overall culture of entrepreneurship was not 
enough to guarantee biotechnology success at UNC, as witnessed by the need for the Carolina 
Challenge (Kouri, 2006).  On the state level, the government has more recently declared the need 
to overhaul the North Carolina Bioscience Investment Fund, which was created to commercialize 
inventions and discoveries generated in North Carolina.  The state also made the admission that 
its past mechanisms for commercializing biotechnologies have had mixed results (Weisbecker & 
John, 2007, 2007). 
The recent creation of the $1.5 billion North Carolina Research Campus, a collaboration 
which includes seven North Carolina research universities, the state, and David Murdock, owner 
of Dole Foods, is significant.  In addition to this enormous biotechnology initiative, the President 
of the University of North Carolina System has declared that the University’s mission will 
include economic transformation (Fischer, 2007). 
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Based on the models studied, it appears that an entrepreneurial culture or community is 
important to successful commercialization, but this entrepreneurism can be deliberately created, 
at the same time as a successful program is implemented, as was the case in Georgia.  
Conversely, the presence of a highly entrepreneurial community does not guarantee, in and of 
itself, a corresponding success rate for commercializing early–stage biotechnologies, as 
witnessed in North Carolina.  As with the analysis of other components in this study, they appear 
to be necessary but not singularly sufficient in terms of translating into commercialization 
success. 
Component 4:  Integrated Life Sciences Curriculum Program: 
This component is not directly related to any of the three commercialization models 
studied, yet its importance may be undervalued in this study by virtue of the characteristics of the 
particular models being analyzed.  One reason that the importance of an integrated life sciences 
curriculum program might have a much larger overall impact on an academic institution than is 
present in the three models, is based on a new NIH program.  The NIH has realized that it has 
been largely unsuccessful in its ability to translate its federal clinical research funding into an 
adequate number of positive outcomes related to patient care and new bioscience discoveries to 
improve the overall health of the population (NIH, 2007).  As a result, the NIH has launched a 
new initiative called the Clinical Translational Science Awards (CTSA). 
Both the UCSD model and the NIH CTSA emphasize a new approach to training 
bioscience researchers at least partly through an integrated curriculum.  This new NIH program 
is geared toward breaking down the barriers or silos of research so that cross-collaboration and a 
broader spectrum of possibilities becomes the norm for the individuals being trained (Milken, 
2004; 2006).  The belief is that, by cross-training clinical researchers, an increase in broader-
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based translational research activities will occur, as will an increase in treatment initiatives (NIH, 
2007). 
In its own way, the GRA has accomplished some of these same outcomes in terms of 
developing cross-trained translational researchers by its requirements and criteria for its Eminent 
Scholars Program and Eminent Scholars Innovation Fund.  Unlike the UCSD model or the NIH 
CTSA program, the Georgia Eminent Scholars are senior, expert bioscientists, not students, who 
are chosen for further funding based on cross-collaboration and commercializable areas of 
research.  In this model, the requirements for the Eminent Scholar programs are substituted for 
the curriculum requirements of the life sciences students (GRA, 2007). 
It might be possible in certain circumstances, for example, at the Pennington Biomedical 
Research Center, to implement the Eminent Scholars model as an alternative to the UCSD model 
because PBRC has no students and does not confer degrees, yet needs to improve its ability to 
generate biotechnology commercialization opportunities for the research scientists on its faculty.   
In the focus group discussions and in individual meetings with PBRC faculty, they welcomed an 
opportunity to vie for membership in a program similar to the GRA Eminent Scholars program 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
Overall, a more comprehensive model might include a combination of the UCSD 
integrated life sciences curriculum model, the NIH CTSA program, and the GRA Eminent 
Scholars program.  A parallel program involving both senior researchers and life sciences 
students, including graduate, medical, doctoral, and postdoctoral students, could produce a more 
immediate impact from the researcher level and a longer-term sustainable impact from the 
education and training levels.  The combination of these programs might even result in 
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synergistic overall commercialization successes beyond what has been observed in any one 
model alone, including that at UCSD. 
Component 5:  Integrated Commercialization Track: 
 a)  Funding: 
Despite having a very successful, well-planned, statewide, comprehensive bioscience 
economic development program in place, the problem of commercializing early-stage bioscience 
inventions and discoveries still appeared in Georgia.  Since it was recognized as such a critical 
issue, three of Georgia’s research universities decided to create a small seed fund on their own 
and not wait for the state to intercede.  Emory University, Georgia Institute of Technology, and 
the University of Georgia developed a $5 million fund called Georgia Venture Partners (GVP) 
by combining $1 million from each of the academic institutions with $2 million from private 
investors.  The GVP is a professionally managed seed fund at arms-length from the universities 
and the GRA (GVP, 2007). 
The GVP fund has two principle functions, 1) to generate substantial investment returns, 
primarily through capital gains, by investing in a portfolio of companies ; and 2) to increase the 
economic development of life sciences in Georgia through seed or early-stage investments in life 
sciences start-up companies based around academic inventions and discoveries and other 
bioindustry companies.  GVP initially invests between $100,000 and $200,000 in a single 
company, with a maximum investment capped at $1 million dollars for that company.  GVP has 
recently begun to invest in early-stage technologies (GVP, 2007). 
 A different scenario is in place at PBRC.  Although PBRC’s research revenues are very 
strong, the majority of PBRC’s inventions and discoveries are very early-stage and often require 
further development prior to outside investment interest.  The initial step taken to correct this 
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problem at PBRC was to create an early-stage seed fund to provide the necessary capital for 
inventors to further develop their nascent technologies.  A $12 million dollar seed fund, 
Themelios Venture Partners (TVP), an arms-length venture fund, was formed to support in 
PBRC inventions and discoveries and also allow a small percentage of investments in outside 
companies which would partner with PBRC on specific commercialization projects (PBRC 
internal documents, 2007; TVP, 2007). 
 The overall structure of TVP is similar to that of the Georgia Venture Partners.  In 
PBRC’s case, the seed fund was created first and the commercialization platform is being 
developed after TVP, while, in Georgia, the commercialization platform was created first, 
followed by the seed fund.  Even though TVP has already invested in several PBRC 
technologies, it has turned down the majority of the technologies it has reviewed, claiming that 
the discoveries are too early for it to consider.  As a result, PBRC has found itself facing the 
same funding gap described by Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006), and Nowak (2006), even after the 
formation of TVP.  PBRC and PBRF are now exploring additional funding mechanisms such as 
some adaptation of GRA’s VentureLab fund and a corporate sponsorship program to further 
develop the nascent technologies in-house (PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
A third situation exists in North Carolina.  Other than the Kauffman Foundation and 
matching UNC funding which comprise the bases for the Carolina Entrepreneurial Initiative, 
there is no specifically designated university-based fund to springboard early-stage academic 
technologies for commercialization as a direct part of the UNC MBA entrepreneurial program.  
If a technology wins the Carolina Challenge, the winner receives a $25,000 prize to further 
develop the technology.  Some statewide funding is available through other organizations, but 
there has been a reassessment of those sources recently (Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007). 
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The first fund being reevaluated is Eno River Capital and the second is the North 
Carolina Bioscience Investment Fund (NCBIF).  The Eno River Capital fund, which was created 
in 1998 to commercialize life science technologies developed in North Carolina’s public 
academic universities through the formation and development of locally-based start-up 
companies, has been under close review recently.  The fund was charged with creating new, 
high-paying, high-skill jobs and attracting new capital from later stage investment firms.  The 
core expertise of Eno River Capital is in technology commercialization, with a major focus on 
transforming discoveries into products or services and turning a profit.  Areas of expertise are 
described as deal-structuring and intellectual property licensing along with operational 
experience in the areas of information technology and the life sciences.  Consulting services are 
also provided (Eno River Capital, 2007). 
Until recently, Eno River Capital has managed the $26 million North Carolina Bioscience 
Investment Fund (NCBIF), which is a seed-stage venture capital fund for life science inventions 
and discoveries (NCBIF, 2007).  In June, 2007, it was reported that NCBIF’s $10 million dollar 
investment in the Eno River Fund had a net worth of approximately $1.3 million.  Of the 10 
companies the Eno fund has invested in, eight have been sold or are out of business.  NCBIF’s 
new director admitted that the Eno River Fund has not performed well, although he sites other 
investments in new companies that did result in new jobs.  At the present time, NCBIF receives 
approximately $12 million in annual funding from the state of North Carolina (Weisbecker & 
John, 2007, 2007).  Ongoing realignment is occurring in the state of North Carolina regarding its 
funding for early-stage technologies. 
 Most recently, the $1.5 billion North Carolina Research Campus initiative has begun.  
Details regarding specific commercialization activities are not yet available, but the UNC System 
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President has announced that economic transformation is part of the University’s mission 
(Fischer, 2007).  With seven research universities participating, a state commitment of $30 
million annually, and an overall budget of $150 million per year, this program could provide 
significant impact in North Carolina regarding an integrated commercialization track. 
 The three models are not alone in facing investment difficulties.  Even with its overall 
success, the UCSD model also recognizes some challenges to its commercialization pathway.  
Edward Holmes (2006) points out that there are at least two gaps in the road to clinical 
translation at UCSD, 1) between discovery and development (Post-NIH and pre-
commercialization) and 2) between R&D and clinical evaluation (FDA Phase I-II and Phase III).  
Holmes acknowledges that funding for the gap between discovery and development, or the 
valley of death as described by Friedl (2006), Kouri (2006) and Nowak (2006), is often not 
available in the UCSD university setting. 
 Analyzing all three models as well as the UCSD model, it appears that a funding source 
is crucial, but not enough by itself, to ensure commercialization success.  This funding 
component appears to be closely linked with the need for available R&D expertise.  The PBRC 
situation clearly reflects this need, while the GRA model indicates that the R&D expertise 
without the funding is also not enough to guarantee commercialization success. 
 b)  R&D Expertise: 
Different situations in terms of R&D expertise exist at each of the three models studied.  
In Georgia, the state was not flush with R&D experts when the GRA was introduced in 1990, 
and acknowledging that lack, GRA integrated a planned mechanism for access to R&D experts 
as part of its VentureLab program (GRA VentureLab, 2007).  In addition, the GRA program 
specifically recruits researchers who are R&D experts for its Eminent Scholars program.  As a 
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result, the GRA has proven to be a successful combination of outside expertise and internally-
grown R&D experts (GRA, 2007). 
The GRA VentureLab program contains fellows and commercialization catalysts who 
have much in common with the local R&D experts in the Research Triangle area of North 
Carolina, with one major difference.  The GRA VentureLab program requires that the fellows 
and commercialization catalysts be employed by the specific research university where they are 
working (GRA VentureLab, 2007).  The UNC MBA entrepreneurial program’s affiliation with 
its local experts is informal and voluntary (Kouri, 2006). 
The model with the highest number of inherent R&D experts is the UNC MBA 
curriculum program which resides within the North Carolina Research Triangle.  A significant 
number of highly-skilled biotechnology experts are available locally to help develop new 
biotechnologies.  Since this part of North Carolina has been home to a major pharmaceutical 
company for many years in addition to being the center of bioscience activity for several 
decades, there are signification numbers of local R&D experts who are willing and able to 
participate in biotechnology commercialization activities (Kouri, 2006). 
Such a concentration of experts can prove to be highly valuable to biotechnology start-
ups and inventors in the region.  Since the biotechnology field is such a highly specialized one, 
experts are difficult to find in many geographic areas.  Having such a high concentration of 
experts in many areas of biotechnology, including senior management, developmental science, 
bio-business, and others, is unusual and very valuable to the UNC MBA program and the 
participants in the Carolina Challenge (Kouri, 2006; UNC MBA, 2007). 
Despite this atypical collection of R&D experts, there is a limited amount of success in 
terms of commercialization of early-stage technologies at UNC and overall in the state of North 
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Carolina.  This limited success might indicate that there is a need for a combination of 
components in order to ensure broader commercialization success, as pointed out by Dr. Kouri in 
his AUTM presentation (2006). 
 In a related R&D issue, the San Diego area was identified as a region that is finding it 
difficult to retain some of its specialty-trained biotechnology workforce (Milken, 2004; 2006).  
In particular, those individuals at the mid-level and support levels of the workforce are finding it 
difficult to remain in the area due to the extraordinary high cost of living in the San  Diego 
region and also in the Boston area (Coombs, 2007).  Although this is a newly recognized issue, 
the need for such a skilled workforce is important to the overall success of a biotechnology 
economy. 
In contrast, the state of North Carolina has implemented a program through its 
community colleges to train individuals for workforce deployment.  This focus, in conjunction 
with the UNC MBA entrepreneurial program, may provide a significant cadre of regionally 
grown biotechnology employees necessary for growing this specific biotechnology component 
for economic development in the state (NCBIF, 2007).  North Carolina’s Rowan-Cabarrus 
Community College has implemented a biotechnology curriculum program to prepare students to 
become laboratory technicians and biotechnology manufacturing workers (Fischer, 2007). 
 The need for this type of workforce was also recognized at the research and development 
focus group meeting in April, 2007, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, sponsored by the Louisiana Board 
of Regents and the Louisiana Recovery Authority (BOR, 2007).  Recognizing the lack of R&D 
experts to assist in the further development of early-stage technologies, PBRC and PBRF key 
individuals, along with PBRC faculty, expressed the need to be able to access such outside 
expertise.  Faculty suggested some form of mentoring or coaching for inventors as a possible 
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solution as a development plan for early-stage technologies, which was reinforced by the 
consultant, who suggested that the GRA VentureLab model could be implemented.  PBRC 
faculty and key individuals also recognized the importance of recruiting senior scientific experts 
to PBRC who have expertise in or who want to focus on commercialization, and are exploring 
using some form of the Eminent Scholars program as a model (PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
The Louisiana Board of Regents, the Louisiana Recovery Authority, and the Baton 
Rouge Area Foundation also found many aspects of the GRA model, including the Eminent 
Scholars program, as a model that can be adapted for the state of Louisiana (BOR, 2007).  In that 
case, PBRC could benefit from such a statewide academic recruiting initiative. 
 c)  Springboard for New Companies: 
Of the three models studied, the one which contains the most comprehensive and overall 
successful springboard for new companies is the GRA model, which has launched more than 125 
new companies since its inception in 1990.  More than 5,000 new jobs have been created as a 
result, and more than $600 million in private investments in these new companies has occurred.  
The program has also fueled partnerships with more than 100 Georgia companies.  The 
combination  of a narrow focus along with  well-developed, strategically integrated phases of 
commercialization funding and R&D expertise all play into a successful springboard for new 
companies (GRA, 2007). 
The GRA VentureLab phases contain specific requirements which are paramount to 
R&D activities and formation of new companies.  These requirements include the further 
development of the technology, design and implementation of a business plan and coordination 
of the Eminent Scholars’ funding sources, which leads to solid new start-up companies.  This 
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series of phases provides progressive steps in an overall process geared toward 
commercialization success (GRA VentureLab, 2007). 
Even with such a successful program, an early-stage funding gap still emerged, despite 
the comprehensiveness of the GRA economic plan for new company development.  As a result, 
three of the six GRA research universities combined with private partners to create a special 
early-stage biotechnology funding source called the Georgia Venture Partners Fund.  The GVP 
has helped to bridge the gap between nascent biotechnologies and the next stage of 
commercialization.  GVP has recently begun to invest in early stage technologies (GRA, 2007; 
GVP, 2007). 
In contrast, PBRC has had mixed results related to a springboard for new companies.  On 
one hand, the TVP venture fund has been very supportive as a springboard for new companies 
for the few technologies it has invested in, but TVP has declined to invest in the majority of 
technologies it has reviewed.  TVP cites the early-stage nature of the inventions as its reason to 
decline investment.  Currently, PBRC and PBRF are analyzing multi-tiered commercialization 
programs to further develop these early discoveries.  Focus is on R&D expertise and 
VentureLab-type funding and also on recruiting faculty who have experience in commercializing 
(PBRC internal documents, 2007). 
It appears that the state of North Carolina also has had mixed results as a springboard for 
new companies.  Even with its cache of local highly-skilled R&D experts, the success of new 
company start-ups in North Carolina has been inconsistent.  Although the state established the 
North Carolina Bioscience Investment Fund (NCBIF) several years ago, its main funding source 
remains the state, although some new high-skilled, high-paying jobs have been created since its 
inception.  As recently as late June, 2007, the NCBIF was undergoing restructuring efforts while 
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the ties between NCBIF and the Eno River Capital fund were under review (Weisbecker & John, 
2007, 2007). 
The UCSD model is ranked number one by the Milken Reports (2004; 2006) in terms of 
new start-up companies created and still in existence.  Even so, there is a growing concern over 
the high cost of living in the San Diego area, which is crucial when new start-up companies are 
trying to recruit new Ph.D.’s, support scientists, and management teams (Coombs, 2007). 
 This research study has shown that, overall, the three models are often different from 
each other as well as from the UCSD model.  As a result, a revised version of the comparison 
chart is presented below (Table 6).  In almost every category, there are some changes in the 
assessments as to whether or not a component is present, absent, or appears as a hybrid or in 
partial form.  A simple yes or no answer often is not an accurate reflection of the presence or 
absence of specific components.  Sometimes, pieces of a component exist, or a hybrid situation 
occurs.  This broader interpretation of the five essential components could assist academic 
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Small Size of Institution Y N Y N 
Higher than Norm for Research Money per 
Biosciences Faculty 
Y N Y Y 
Extremely Entrepreneurial Community Y Y N Y 







N N N 
Integrated Commercialization Track 
 Funding 
 R & D Expertise 

















Structured, highly focused commercialization 
program with measured outcomes 
 N P Y 
Critical mass of bioscience researchers 
Focused on commercialization 
 N P Y 
Work force development program  Y N N 
Cross-collaboration programs 
 
 TBD N Y 
Faculty incentives and rewards for 
commercialization 
 TBD N Y 
  
Y = yes 
N = no 
TBD = to be determined 
P = partial 
UCSD = University of California - San Diego 
UNC = University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
PBRC = Pennington Biomedical Research Center 
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Implementation Model for PBRC 
 Based on this study, restructuring of the PBRC model in the following manner is 
recommended: 
1) Small size of the institution – Even though PBRC fits the definition of a small-sized 
organization, this study pointed out that other characteristics related to organizational 
structure might be as or more important, namely being efficient and effective.  
Improvements can be made in the overall organizational operations of PBRC by 
adopting the specific projects and programs outlined in this section, such as a version 
of GRA’s VentureLab, an Eminent Scholar program for those committed to 
commercialization, and specific funding mechanisms. 
2) Higher than normal ration of research dollars per faculty – Since PBRC has met this 
criterion when assessing the ratio for all of its faculty, the future focus should be on 
recruiting and retaining researchers with a specific focus on commercialization who 
possess this higher ratio of research dollars. 
3) Extremely entrepreneurial community – PBRC can increase the opportunities for 
commercialization-focused researchers to become more entrepreneurial using a 
version of VentureLab.  In addition, more programs should be developed to provide 
entrepreneurial information and R&D education and training for researchers. 
4) Integrated life sciences program – Since PBRC does not educate students, a faculty 
version of this integrated program could be implemented based on funding Eminent 
Scholars who focus their research on commercialization. 
5) a) Funding – PBRC and PBRF should adopt some version of GRA’s VentureLab and 
its Eminent Scholars programs and also develop a corporate sponsorship program. 
  216 
b)  R&D expertise – PBRC and PBRF can develop mechanisms to assist with the 
R&D expertise needed to move their early-stage biotechnologies along the 
commercialization continuum by engaging consultants and through the adoption of 
some form of the VentureLab program. 
c)  Springboard for new companies – PBRF can provide loans to new companies and 
develop a mechanism for equity ownership.  PBRF should develop programs to assist 
with new company formation, management initiatives, and other new company 
activities in some manner. 
6) Structured, highly focused commercialization program with measured outcomes – 
PBRC and PBRF should incorporate these evaluation measures in its Eminent 
Scholars programs, its new research and development funds, and in its corporate 
sponsorships program. 
7) Provide a critical mass of bioscience researchers focused on commercialization – 
PBRC and PBRF need to focus on recruiting this nucleus of specialized researchers 
and provide them with significant research and laboratory funding as a catalyst for 
increasing inventions and discoveries and developing more mature technologies. 
8) Work force development program – PBRC should partner with other higher education 
institutions which will be educating and training this workforce.  PBRC also has an 
opportunity to provide its own work force development in terms of postdoctoral 
training that focuses on commercialization.  The NIH CTSA grant application is one 
program for developing this cadre of a more sophisticated biotechnology workforce. 
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9) Cross-collaboration programs – PBRC should promote new ideas and provide grants 
for researchers who will collaborate with other researchers focused on 
commercialization. 
10) Faculty incentives and rewards – PBRC promotion and tenure should include 
recognition for commercialization activities.  Faculty release time for working with 
new company formation and further R&D should also be implemented. 
The PBRF also can develop a mechanism that will provide for some direct payback to 
PBRC, and therefore, the university, with regard to further research funding, as a way to 
continue the mission of the Center and the LSU System.  Although PBRC is mentioned in most 
of the ten components listed above, the involvement of PBRC and PBRF should be assessed in 
order to determine which entity would better be able to carry out that particular component.  
Recommendations for Other Public Research Universities 
 Several of the key components analyzed as part of this study were found to be essential 
for early-stage biotechnology commercialization success, while others were not necessarily 
essential.  One of the most significant findings from this study that can be applied to other public 
research universities is that it is not necessary for all components for commercialization success 
to be present in order for an academic entity to be successful at this endeavor.  At the same time, 
it appears that the following original key components should be present, at least to some extent 
to help ensure success related to the formation of start-up companies.  These three components 
form a confluence of factors considered essential for successfully moving technologies along the 
commercialization continuum: 
1) organizational efficiency, 
2) a highly entrepreneurial community, and  
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 3) an integrated commercialization track 
a) funding for new biotechnologies, 
b) research and development expertise, and 
c) a springboard for new company development. 
Two components warrant further study to determine whether or not they might be 
advantageous in specific academic settings.  Due to the nature of the three models which were 
analyzed in this study, these components could not be studied in-depth.  The components noted 
for further study are presented below. 
1) the ratio of research money per bioscience faculty; and 
2) an integrated life sciences curriculum program. 
In addition to the existence in some form of the five original components listed above, it 
also appears that the following new components are necessary, at least to some extent, in order to 
produce commercialization success: 
1) creating a structured, narrowly focused funding gap program which includes 
outcomes measures and an ongoing evaluation process; 
2) achieving a critical mass of bioscience researchers, including translational 
researchers, focused on commercialization; 
3) creating specialized workforce development programs, 
4) creating cross-collaboration to promote new areas of discovery, and 
5) creating faculty incentives and rewards for commercialization. 
Unintended Consequences 
 One of the main goals of this study was to explore the possibility of finding a hybrid 
solution to the myriad of unintended consequences related to academic biotechnology 
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commercialization.  Concerns were raised regarding the issue that some technologies are not 
ready to be commercialized or should never be commercialized.  To deal with this issue, an 
institution can implement a version of the GRA VentureLab program that assesses the 
commercial possibilities for technologies.  If it is determined that the technology should not be 
further developed, even if funds are available, then the technology should be released for the 
public good so that this knowledge can be disseminated to support the overall research initiative.  
If the technology shows promise but is early-stage, then the organization can create an early-
stage R&D program which also includes funding to further develop the technology. 
 Faculty roles were also discussed.  The GRA Eminent Scholars program hires and funds 
scientists who are expected to commercialize their inventions and discoveries and are 
encouraged to become part of start-up companies.  Rewarding faculty for commercialization 
activities and including these successes in promotion and tenure decisions reinforce the 
importance of economic development.  Some universities have developed formal processes that 
document faculty ownership in companies and manage their other conflicts of interest. 
 There are also ways to preserve the mission of the research university while encouraging 
commercialization activities.  University foundations can play a central role in the licensing and 
equity activities surrounding invention commercialization.  Foundations are created to support 
the mission of the university but have more flexibility in such activities to carry out this goal.  
Venture funds can allocate a portion of income back to the university to support academic 
activities, which is part of the Georgia Venture Partners Fund mission. 
 Overall, there are ways to manage conflicts of interest and other unintended 
consequences while still preserving the mission of the public research university.  Examples exist 
where the commercialization process brought revenues back to the academic institution to 
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support other teaching and research programs.  In other instances, the public health of the 
population benefits from new medical treatments or drugs or society overall benefits from the 
technology. 
Other Findings 
 In addition to all of these key components, other findings have emerged regarding 
university commercialization.  In all three models studied, it was very important to have the 
ability to take an in-depth look at what type of organization and culture already were in place and 
what other initiatives were planned or in existence prior to determining how a develop a better 
program.  There have been examples in higher education of the “me, too” syndrome, where 
universities push quickly to adopt a model from another institution without regard for differences 
in institutional structure and cultures, and not spending adequate time analyzing and assessing 
the models being considered.  Often, the key players who could best weigh in on the factors 
necessary to make an informed decision are not included in the decision-making process. 
Chapter 2 discussed how this “me, too” scenario played out at many academic health 
centers (AHCs) after the introduction of managed care, and described the devastating results due, 
at least in part, to the lack of analysis and assessment prior to implementation of new AHC 
models.  Loyola University of Chicago and other academic institutions suffered substantial 
unintended consequences due to the quick adoption of another institution’s model as is. 
Biotechnology commercialization is a fluid, complex area that requires much study and 
review by many experts in order to possibly implement the best model for any institution which 
is looking to expand, revise, or create a well-designed and effective commercialization 
mechanism. 
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To this end, a level of ongoing flexibility in terms of program creation and adaptation 
was apparent in all three models studied.  The Georgia Research Alliance has seen the creation 
of an ancillary program, the Georgia Venture Partners Fund, which runs in parallel to its own 
commercialization program.  The Pennington Biomedical Research Center is developing a more 
comprehensive, multi-tiered approach to early-stage biotechnology development due to the 
realization that having a venture fund in place was not enough on its own for commercialization 
success.  The state of North Carolina is in the process of restructuring its North Carolina 
Bioscience Investment Fund (NCBIF) after several years of existence. 
Restructuring or reformulating the commercialization model can take place while there 
are ongoing, working, successful components already in place.  This ability is important in the 
biotechnology industry, which is still a relatively young industry which  often must respond 
quickly to numerous marketplace shifts. 
In addition to flexibility in the commercialization structure, those who are the key 
individuals involved in these activities need to be comfortable with risk-taking and thinking in 
non-traditional ways.  This is evidenced in the need for a flexible, non-bureaucratic 
organizational structure, the existence of a highly entrepreneurial culture, and the ability to 
change and adapt to a high-paced, evolving industry. 
Conclusion 
 This exploratory study analyzed how to commercialize nascent academic biotechnologies 
while preserving the mission of the public research university.  Although some components were 
regarded as being key to commercialization success, others were viewed as optional or only 
necessary in part.  At the same time, new components were identified as being instrumental in 
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the commercialization process.  Mechanisms for reducing or eliminating unintended 
consequences related to the commercialization process have also been studied and discussed. 
Since this study has been exploratory in nature, further analysis is recommended.   
Regardless of which components might be considered for inclusion in a new or revised model, it 
is recommended that an in-depth assessment of the academic institution itself be conducted prior 
to the time when that entity creates and implements its own early-stage commercialization 
model. 
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APPENDIX A 
Several key individuals participated in this research study.  Below is a listing of them by 
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APPENDIX B 
As described in Chapter 3, this exploratory study contained both individual interviews 
and focus group sessions.  These two interview methods included general and specific questions 
as described below. 
Individual Interviews 
Many of the individual interviews were based on a particular topic or issue.  The 
questions in those sessions began with the topic at hand and then broadened to include more 
general questions.  At other times, the questions began in a more general, or grand-or mini-tour 
fashion and then became more specific, often using probes to gain specific information.  
Questions included the following: 
Community: 
How is academic technology transfer perceived in the community? 
What advice do you have that would help gain community support? 
What are the most significant advantages/barriers to promoting the entrepreneurial culture? 
Consultants: 
What parts of the commercialization model do you think would work/not work for this particular 
setting? 
Have you seen the same difficulties or roadblocks or successful routes regarding 
commercialization in the different projects you’ve seen? 
What other commercialization models would you suggest be studied? 
Faculty: 
What ideas or ways do you believe might help you to move your technology further along in the 
commercialization process? 
  236 
What activities could help this transition from your research lab to start-up company? 
What topics would you like to see offered in educational and training sessions about technology 
transfer? 
Would you like to see changes made to promotion and tenure in terms of your commercialization 
activities? 
Foundation: 
What role do you see the foundation playing in the commercialization process? 
Are there specific programs or projects you would suggest be implemented at the foundation 
level to help in setting up (topic) or in developing (program)? 
What other foundation models would you suggest be studied? 
University Administrators: 
What difficulties/successes have you encountered in your commercialization process regarding 
early-stage inventions and discoveries? 
Does this specific commercialization  process work for you or would you change any part of it if 
you had the chance now to develop it over again? 
What specific roadblocks or unexpected difficulties should one be aware of when trying to set up 
(blank)?  
Focus Group Sessions 
Focus group sessions were structured around the general topic of technology 
commercialization.  The following exploratory and explanatory questions were asked in a grand- 
or mini-tour fashion.  Time was allotted for general discussion of the topic.  After some 
discussion, more specific questions were asked about some of the comments made.  Some of the 
  237 
individual interviews followed the focus group sessions when individual follow-up was seen as 
important.  Questions included the following: 
Exploratory/Explanatory (Grand- or Mini-Tour) Questions: 
What has been your own personal experience regarding technology commercialization? 
How do you believe the overall academic commercialization process could be improved? 
More Focused Questions: 
What other commercialization models would you suggest be studied? 
How important do you believe the following key components are regarding successful 
commercialization of early-stage biotechnologies? (included questions based on the list of the 5 
key components from Table 1) 
Questions Asked in Both Types of Interviews 
What have you learned in the commercialization process? 
Is there anything else you can think of that we haven’t discussed that you believe is important 
regarding this topic? 
Is there anything that you were surprised or did not expect you would learn or realize regarding 
this topic? 
What can be done to help resolve the conflicts regarding (faculty roles, the mission of the public 
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